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Claire Alexander and Bridget Byrne
The question is not who we are but who we can become. 
Stuart Hall, 2017
Windrush 2018, racial landmarks and contested national 
(hi)stories
On 22 June 1948, the Empire Windrush arrived at Tilbury Docks, 
London from Jamaica, carrying 492 people, mainly young men 
and ex- servicemen, from across the Caribbean islands. The arrival 
of the ship, and its iconic scenes of be- suited and be- hatted young 
men disembarking along the gangplank, is often celebrated as a 
landmark moment in British history, heralding the start of large- scale 
postwar labour migration from the colonies and former colonies, and 
marking the birth of modern multicultural Britain. Seventy years 
on, and the ‘Windrush scandal’ dominated the spring and summer of 
2018, exposing the victimisation and deportation of members of the 
‘Windrush generation’, many of whom arrived between 1948 and 
19711 as children with a legal right to remain in Britain, but without 
appropriate paperwork, and who had inadvertently fallen foul of the 
Home Office’s much vaunted 2012 ‘hostile environment’ initiative for 
illegal immigrants.
The political fallout from the ‘Windrush scandal’ – underpinned by 
public and media outcry, which led to a belated public apology by 
the Prime Minister to Caribbean leaders in April 2018 (BBC Online, 
2018a), followed by the reluctant resignation of Home Secretary Amber 
Rudd soon afterwards (The Guardian, 2018b) and the appointment of 
Britain’s first minority ethnic Home Secretary Sajid Javid (BBC Online, 
2018b) – has been most usually presented as an accidental pothole in 
the road to Britain’s post- racial present. Subsequent months saw a rush 
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of the Windrush migrants, to be marked in an annual ‘Windrush Day’ 
on 22 June ‘to celebrate the contribution of the Windrush generation 
and their descendants’ (Ministry of Housingm Communities and Local 
Government, 2018). The first of these events was celebrated in 2019, to 
a cautious welcome from anti- racist activists (Singh and Khan, 2019).
However, this neatly- bookended national (fairy)tale of arrival, 
exclusion, struggle and, finally, acceptance, erases both Britain’s 
longer, broader and darker history of migration and racism, and the 
ongoing struggles for inclusion, recognition and equality in the present 
(Alexander, 2002, 2018). In particular, it highlights three key silences 
in the national (hi)story:  first, around Britain’s entanglement in a 
broader global history of European slavery, colonisation and empire, 
which paves the way for black migration and settlement. Second, the 
longer history of migration to Britain, which precedes the Windrush 
arrival by nearly two thousand years, and has erased the nation’s 
inherently migrant roots in favour of an increasingly nativist discourse,2 
the consequences of which have been made dramatically apparent in 
the run- up to and aftermath of the Brexit referendum. And third, 
the ‘flattening’ of the histories of, particularly, black communities in 
Britain,3 which have denied the place of black histories in the broader 
history of what David Cameron referred to as ‘Our Island Story’ 
(Alexander et al, 2012), its more demotic and contested formations, 
and its unequal racial present.
The story of the black presence in Britain must, then, be balanced 
with the recognition of hostility and exclusion. As David Olusoga 
evocatively comments, ‘The Windrush story was not a rosy one even 
before the ship arrived’ (Olusoga, 2018). Olusoga points to the attempts 
to deny the entry rights of black and brown British colonial subjects 
even as the Nationality Act 1948 – also marking its 70th anniversary – 
supposedly enshrined them, and the ‘motherland’ appealed for their 
labour to rebuild postwar Britain. Indeed, the 1948 act, ironically 
sharing its anniversary with the arrival of the Windrush, underscores 
the precarious place of black and brown citizens within the national 
imagination (Lidher, 2018), and which has marked the subsequent 
70 years in which the limits of ‘the nation’ have become increasingly 
racially circumscribed.
Olusoga notes too that 2018 was ‘overflowing with anniversaries’ 
that capture this more fraught and entangled history. The year 1948 
of course, and not accidentally, coincided with the 70th anniversary 
of the launch of the National Health Service (NHS), the iconic 
British institution, which is intricately enmeshed with the Windrush 





migrants who made it possible, but whose contributions remain 
ignored or denied (Younge, 2018b). The year 2018 also marked 
the 50th anniversary of Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, and the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which denied full citizenship rights 
to East African Asian refugees, and the 50th anniversary of the Race 
Relations Act of 1968, which sought to tackle institutional racism in 
housing, employment and public services. We might add to these the 
60th anniversary of the Nottingham and Notting Hill anti- black riots 
of 1958, and the murder of Kelso Cochrane the following May; or the 
40th anniversary of the murder of Bangladeshi textile worker Altab 
Ali, or the 25th anniversary of the murder of black teenager Stephen 
Lawrence. We could point too to the centenary memorialisations of 
the First World War, with its hundreds of thousands of invisible colonial 
soldiers, supply workers and trench diggers. The shadow of 2017’s 
70th anniversary of Indian partition looms large, while more recent 
events, such as the first anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire and the 
ongoing inquiry speak to the invisibility, denial and inequalities which 
still scar post- imperial Britain, and pose stark challenges to Britain’s 
post- racial pretensions.
Of course, such landmark moments are not without their dangers. 
As the hasty government plans for a Stephen Lawrence Day and a 
Windrush Day clearly illustrate, acts of commemoration can substitute 
celebration for a more critical engagement with the past, and its traces 
in the present. Most often, what and who gets memorialised reflects 
the dominant national narrative and the interests of social, cultural and 
political elites, often in an over- celebratory and eulogising manner. 
This silences alternative voices and experiences – women; religious, 
sexual, ethnic and racial minorities; working- class, young, old and 
disabled people. At the same time, anniversaries bracket particular 
individuals, events, places and times from the broader, more banal, flow 
of ‘everyday’ encounters, exclusion, violence or solidarities, focusing 
on the spectacular rather than its context, or the ‘moment’ rather than 
its causes and consequences. And, of course, they form part of a range 
of practices of social and cultural classification and exclusion which 
draw the boundaries of who belongs to the ‘nation’, and who does 
not, who are the ‘deserving/ good’ or ‘undeserving/ bad’ immigrants 
(Shukla, 2016; Younge, 2018a) whose stories (or ‘contributions’) 
‘count’, when, why and how they are made to ‘count’, and whose 
remain untold or uncounted.
The stories, people, places and objects of commemoration form 
the foundation of the way in which nations and nationhoods are 
narrated or imagined, most notably in times of transformation and 
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tumult. They serve as an anchor for identity, as a weapon for those 
on the side of preservation and a target for those demanding change. 
Indeed, recent years have seen the explosion of high- profile campaigns 
around the globe – from the Rhodes Must Fall campaign in South 
Africa to the demolition of Confederate statues in the United States 
and #BlackLives Matter – which attempt to redress the balance; while 
nation- states and populist/ nativist groups have, in their turn, attempted 
to reinscribe sanitised national (hi)stories, as in Poland or Turkey, the 
United States, Australia, Brazil and, of course, Britain (Hirsch, 2018b). 
In the British academy, culture wars have been re- ignited by student 
campaigns around decolonising the curriculum, and by furious claims 
and counterclaims of academic censorship and political correctness 
(McDougall and Wagner, 2018; Riley, 2018a). That such debates have 
traction beyond the ivory tower can be seen in the flush of challenging, 
popular and garlanded publications exploring the experience of race 
and racism in the national narrative (Akala, 2018; Shukla, 2016; 
Eddo- Lodge, 2017; Hirsch, 2018a).They remain constant too in the 
more conventional rose- tinted not- yet- post- imperial nostalgia of the 
imagination of mainstream Britishness: in the cinema and television 
(from Darkest Hour and Downton Abbey to Beecham House); in the neo- 
colonial, post- Brexit aspirations of politicians; in the resurgence of 
authoritarian populist political movements, and the embracing of their 
views at the heart of government; and, most worryingly, in schools 
and playgrounds, where the curriculum has long been a political 
battleground for competing views of national identity and cultural 
citizenship (Alexander et al, 2012; Alexander and Weekes- Bernard, 
2017; Miah, 2017).
Anniversaries and memorialisations, then, offer not only a chance 
for celebration, but for reflection and re- evaluation. Rather than 
definitive and timeless landmarks, they provide staging posts in the 
national (hi)story, providing the opportunity to pause, to consider 
distance travelled, to examine where we are, and to (re)consider the 
road(s) ahead. They offer the chance to excavate hidden or forgotten 
stories, to revisit familiar stories, to rewrite (or rethink) the national 
story as we know it, and to imagine new and better ones.
Ethnic and racial inequality in Britain: continuity 
and change
The year 2018 also marked another significant anniversary in Britain’s 
history of ethnic and racial inequality, and the struggle for equality: the 




Anthony Lester in 1968, the trust was founded as an independent think 
tank to provide evidence- based policy recommendations to ‘nail the 
lie’ of racism and promote race equality ‘by providing timely, reliable 
and objective information’ (Lester, 2003). In the introduction to Colour 
and Citizenship, published in 1969, Rose warned of the dangers of a 
country ‘turning in on itself, if a loss of confidence was accompanied 
by increasing nationalism, and if apparent affluence were engendering 
selfishness, then the climate might be unhealthy for the growth of a 
multi- racial society’ (Rose, 1969: 4). Fifty years on, nearly two decades 
into the ‘War on Terror’, in the midst of the migrant crisis enveloping 
Europe, the growth of extreme right and ultra- nationalist movements 
at home and abroad, and facing an uncertain post- Brexit future, Rose’s 
warning still carries resonance.
Rose’s study was significant not only in focusing attention on ‘the 
facts’ of racial inequality in Britain itself, nor on its comprehensive 
survey of key arenas of social life – employment, housing, education, 
income, policing and welfare  – but in placing these facts in their 
historical and political context, and in relation to the policies and 
practices that engendered and addressed (or failed to address) them. 
He notes too that the experiences of ‘coloured immigrants’ in Britain 
cannot ‘be satisfactorily explained in terms of class or the fact of 
strangeness’ (Rose, 1969: 6) – that race or ethnicity (or what Rose 
glosses as ‘colour’) had an independent and enduring effect. Perhaps 
most importantly, it placed the onus for change not on ‘coloured 
immigrants’ themselves but on the post- liberal racial state, and on 
wider, white British society – on what he terms ‘the social life of the 
nation’ (Rose, 1969: 2)
Nevertheless, while Rose’s message, nearly fifty years on, feels 
disturbingly contemporary, it is important to recognise the changes 
in Britain’s racial landscape in the past five decades. The focus on 
the experience of ‘the coloured man’, while perhaps reflecting the 
demographies of immigration at the time, has been expanded and 
transformed through the presence and experience of women and 
families, the feminisation of migration and a recognition of the 
intersection of gendered and raced/ ethnic experience. Similarly, 
the focus on ‘immigrants’ from the ‘West Indies’, India and Pakistan 
has been overtaken or undermined by the presence of successive 
generations of their British- born descendants, by the increasing 
diversity of Britain’s immigrant communities in the last 30 years and 
the growth of mixed race British populations, and by new forms of 
local and global religious, ethnic and racial solidarities. The role of 
Britain’s diverse black communities in challenging racial discrimination 
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and inequality across a range of the social arenas Rose examines should 
also be acknowledged. We might, in contrast, note the relative lack 
of traction (or notable obstruction) from the machinery of the state 
in addressing those patterns of inequality, or indeed how it actively 
entrenches them.
Some of these shifts can be most easily traced at the level of 
terminology. Rose’s label of ‘coloured immigrants’, while in keeping 
with the historical moment, also reflects the perception of black and 
Asian settlers as defined (and conflated) through phenotypical difference 
(as non- white) and as newcomers/ outsiders to the (white) nation- state, 
as well as their shared position in the social and economic structures 
of the UK. This shared positioning, and the experience of exclusion 
and hostility which accompanied it, was to form the foundation for 
the political label ‘Black’, which was to dominate the struggle against 
racism in Britain through the 1970s and 1980s (Alexander, 2002, 2017; 
Virdee, 2014). The rise of ethnicity as a primary framework for identity 
from the mid- 1980s onwards reflected not only the resurgence of 
‘culture’ as the basis for political action, but also increasing divergence 
in the social and economic experiences between ‘West Indian’ (now 
labelled African Caribbean, or simply ‘Black’), and ‘Asian’ groups 
(Brown, 1984). In turn, the category ‘Asian’ splintered around first 
national and then religious classifications, captioned initially as the 
split between Indian ‘achievers’ and Pakistani/ Bangladeshi ‘believers’ 
and, later, in the wake of the Satanic Verses affair and the first Gulf 
War, through the emergence of ‘the Muslim underclass’ as a new folk 
devil. This division was clearly reflected in the fourth Policy Studies 
Institute survey, published in 1997, and tellingly subtitled Diversity and 
Disadvantage (Modood et al, 1997).
The focus on ‘diversity’ as a proxy for racial and ethnic identity can 
also be seen clearly in the proliferation of census categories, from the 
national origin labels of the 1991 Census (in which the variety of non- 
white national options were opposed to an undifferentiated ‘White’), 
through the inclusion of religion and mixed race in 2001 (as well as 
the inclusion of ‘White Irish’ and ‘White Other’) and the insertion of 
White Gypsy/ Traveller and Arab in the 2011 Census. The census has 
always trodden an uneasy line between reifying ethnic difference and 
reflecting changing identities (‘mixed race’), and between illuminating 
patterns of inequality or pinpointing the new ‘problem’ categories (that 
is Muslims, Gypsy/ Traveller, ‘Other’ Whites). As research by CoDE 
(Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity) on ethnic diversity notes in passing, 
the framing of ethnicity questions in the census also marks a shift in 
understanding from a biologised notion of ‘descent’ in 1991, to ‘cultural 
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background’ in 2001, to a simple ‘ethnic group or background’ personal 
identification in 2011 (CoDE, 2012). However, despite these shifts, the 
resulting categories frequently remain listed in colour- coded hierarchy 
which ranges from imagined white to darker skin- tones which is an 
inheritance from the earliest racial theories.
The rise of ethnicity and culture as a primary framework of 
identity – and the basis for political formation and activism – through 
the 1990s and into the millennium is apparent in the Runnymede 
Trust’s report on The Future of Multi- ethnic Britain (Parekh, 2000). The 
landslide election of New Labour in 1997, and the run- up to the new 
millennium seemed to offer a brief period of optimism in the struggle 
for racial equality in Britain, with the publication in February 1999 of 
the long- awaited Macpherson report into the racist murder of Stephen 
Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999), the Race Relations Amendment Act 
in 2000 and the publication The Future of Multi- ethnic Britain (Parekh 
et al, 2000). Together, these reports and the act pointed at once to the 
entrenched and enduring nature of systemic racial and ethnic inequality 
in Britain, to a seeming government commitment to redressing these 
injustices, and to an alternative vision of multicultural Britain which 
chimed momentarily with the optimism of New Labour’s post- imperial 
‘Cool Britannia’ national rebrand.
The Future of Multi- Ethnic Britain (Parekh, 2000) – now 20 years 
old – illustrates both continuity and change with/ from its predecessor. 
As with Colour and Citizenship (Rose, 1969), the report examines the 
ongoing issues of racial inequality across social arenas and institutions – 
employment, education, health, criminal justice – but also includes 
sections on arts, media and sport, and religion and belief, which 
reflects the growing emphasis on culture, identity and religion across 
the intervening 30 years. The optimism of the report can perhaps be 
seen in the long list of recommendations at the end (many of which 
have been taken up, if rather surreptitiously and slowly), but perhaps 
most notably (or notoriously) in its opening ‘Vision for Britain’, 
and its attempt to ‘rethink the national story’, which caused a media 
and political furore (Khan, 2015). It is here, in the ‘vision’, that the 
discursive shifts around race equality are most apparent – particularly 
in the hybrid liberal- pluralistic idea of the nation as ‘a community of 
communities’ as well as ‘a community of citizens’ (Parekh, 2000: 48). 
The public realm is one predicated on cultural diversity, recognition 
and respect within a framework of ‘common values’ (Parekh, 2000: 53) 
and ‘human rights’. While this pluralist approach is balanced, uneasily, 
with the assertion of dialogue, interdependence and dynamism (Parekh, 
2000:  ‘Identities in Transition’ ( chapter 3)), the dominant emphasis 
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is on ‘communities’ of identity and culture, and on bounded ideas of 
difference – immigrants and their descendants are no longer ‘coloured’ 
but ‘cultured’.
There is an inherent and unresolved tension in the report about what 
this means, and between two quite different theoretical understandings 
of key concepts – of the nation, community, culture and identity – 
which might be glossed as a Parekh- ian political theory versus a Hall- 
ian cultural studies approach. Nevertheless, in both framings, the focus 
has clearly shifted to cultural identity as the basis for recognition and 
for equality. Meanwhile ‘the nation’ is reimagined not as ‘white’, as in 
Rose’s account, but as complex and multicultured. Importantly, the 
‘multi- ’ in multi- ethnic Britain refers as much to differences between 
(and within) minority ethnic communities as between them and the 
white majority.
At the heart of the report, as with Colour and Citizenship (Rose, 1969), 
stands a challenge to the nation, its leaders and citizens, to envision a 
more inclusive, more tolerant and more equal society for all. Echoing 
Rose’s concerns three decades earlier, the report notes that Britain 
again stands at a ‘turning point or crossroads’, and asks:
Will it try to turn the clock back, digging in, defending old 
values and ancient hierarchies, relying on a narrow English- 
dominated backward definition of the nation? Or will it 
seize the opportunity to create a more flexible, inclusive, 
cosmopolitan image of itself? (Parekh, 2000: 15)
The hope for a positive response to this challenge proved short- lived, 
however, when the urban unrest of 2001 and the attacks on New York 
in September that year ushered in a new, intense phase of the ‘War 
on Terror’, abroad and at home. This refocused attention away from 
ongoing racial and ethnic inequality and social injustice towards the 
seeming failures of multiculturalism and the apparent inability of 
Britain’s ethnic minorities (now largely recast as ‘Muslims’) to ‘integrate’ 
into wider modern society (Meer and Nayak, 2015). While questions of 
race and racism largely fell off of the policy and political agenda, issues 
of religion, ethnicity and identity moved centre- stage, with evocations 
of ‘parallel lives’ and ‘community cohesion’ conjuring familiar and well- 
worn tropes of cultural difference and incompatibility that resonated 
strongly with the earlier ‘race relations’ framework (Alexander, 2004), 
but now with a sense of global urgency and threat (Kundnani, 2014) – 
both external and ‘homegrown’.
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The current context: post- millennial race and racism
Twenty years on from the Parekh report and facing a looming Brexit, 
the ‘future of multi- ethnic Britain’ seems even more uncertain and 
precarious. This period has seen the tightening of Britain’s borders 
through the proliferation of increasingly draconian immigration 
legislation, both externally and in the intimate spaces of everyday 
life – at work, in hospitals, on buses, at home, on the streets (Back 
and Sinha, 2015; Jones et  al, 2017). May’s now- disavowed ‘hostile 
environment’ is the culmination of New Labour, Coalition and Tory 
administrations which have seen the growth of incarceration for asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants (Bloch and Schuster, 2005; 
Bloch and McKay, 2016), the increased use of deportation and the 
stripping of citizenship (De Noronha, 2018b), and the expansion of the 
Prevent strategy into schools and universities in the name of ‘freedom 
of expression’ and the pursuit of ‘British values’ (Byrne, 2017; Miah, 
2017). At the same time, there has been the increasing concern around 
everyday and institutional antisemitism and Islamophobia, the growth 
of Europhobic and nativist sentiment in the run- up to, and aftermath 
of, the Scottish independence and Brexit referenda, and the explosion 
of anti- immigrant and asylophobic violence against the backdrop of 
the so- called migrant crisis and the mainstreaming of far- right political 
parties across Fortress Europe and elsewhere. The relationship between 
political rhetoric, policy formation and public opinion is, of course, 
a complex one.  Nevertheless, it might be argued that mainstream 
political fears around the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
and the failures of successive governments, both Conservative and 
(New) Labour, to take a positive public stance around migration and 
racial equality in response – mediated through the interpretations of 
a hostile anti- immigrant and racist press (Sveinsson, 2008; Van Dijk, 
2015) – and the eschewing of evidence- based policy in favour of high- 
profile dog- whistle gestures and punitive targets have contributed to 
this toxic atmosphere.
Despite this climate of hostility, Britain is now more ethnically, racially 
and religiously diverse than ever, and migration and multiculturalism 
form part of the mundane fabric of everyday life. The 2011 Census 
showed that just under 20% of the UK’s population self- identified 
as other than White British, while the UK’s Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BME) population doubled in size from 1991 to 8 million 
people (14%) in 2011. The census also illuminated important shifts 
in Britain’s demographic profile, with not only the growth of long- 
settled Caribbean and South Asian communities, but also an increase 
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in African groups (by 100%), Mixed (by more than 80%), ‘Other Asian’ 
(by 238%), ‘Other Black’ (by 186%) and ‘Other’ (by 46%) (CoDE, 
2012). There were also 230,600 Arabs (CoDE, 2012) while the ‘White 
Other’ category increased by over 1 million people – the largest increase 
in any ethnic group category, and including 579,000 Polish migrants 
(ONS, 2015). Work by CoDE also shows that while Britain’s BME 
communities are still largely concentrated in England’s urban centres, 
there is increasing dispersal across its ex- urban and rural places (CoDE, 
2012). And, despite the dominant political and public rhetoric around 
segregation, data show that all ethnic groups are increasingly mixing 
in terms of housing, cohabitation, marriage and the birth of children. 
These patterns are likely only to strengthen in the next census in 2021.
Nevertheless, and as the following chapters clearly show, racial and 
ethnic inequality, discrimination and racism remain entrenched features 
of ‘the social life of the nation’ (Rose, 1969) across all areas – from 
education to employment, housing to health, criminal justice and 
policing to politics, the arts, media and sport – and across all minority 
groups. The current moment, then, presents particular and unique 
challenges for tackling racial inequality in Britain. On the one hand, 
we have clear and consistent evidence of entrenched discrimination 
against ethnic minority communities and individuals, at a time of 
public and political hostility at levels not seen since the 1970s. On the 
other, we have an increasingly complex and fragmented tapestry of 
inequality within and between ethnic minority groups; a picture further 
fractured by intersectional considerations around class, gender, age, 
religion, region, sexuality, legal status and so on. This fragmentation 
is consolidated by the fracture of anti- racist activism and solidarity 
around the growth of increasingly narrow identitarian politics and 
political solipsism (Alexander, 2017, 2018).
However, complexity does not mean that racial, ethnic and religious 
inequality cease to matter, nor that they are irresolvable. Indeed, the 
current moment is also one of perhaps unprecedented recognition of 
the persistence of inequality at a state level: the government’s Race 
Disparity Audit is one clear example (Cabinet Office, 2017),4 while 
we might also point to the importance of the McGregor- Smith 
review on workplace inequalities, and the Lammy review of the 
criminal justice system, both published in 2017. We have also seen 
the proliferation of new policies and practices from, and at the heart 
of, key social institutions aimed at tackling entrenched disadvantage 
and discrimination, from the BBC and Arts Council, through higher 
education and the NHS, to politics and the trade unions. Of course, 




of the Prevent strategy and the implementation of increasingly 
draconian immigration legislation across those very same spheres. 
The complexities and contradictions pose very real and very urgent 
challenges to those working for greater social equality and justice in 
contemporary Britain, not only in understanding this shifting terrain, 
but finding ways to move forward, and together.
The state of the nation: a roadmap to change
Drawing its inspiration from Runnymede’s landmark publications, 
Colour and Citizenship (Rose, 1969) and The Future of Multi- ethnic 
Britain report (Parekh, 2000), the current book offers a marker in the 
history of ethnic and racial equality in Britain. A partnership between 
Runnymede and the CoDE at the University of Manchester, the 
book provides an evidence- based account of contemporary patterns 
of ethnic and racial inequality, across a range of key policy arenas, 
which shape the lives of Britain’s diverse black and minority ethnic 
communities. Working in collaboration with key experts in the field, 
the individual chapters trace the complex forms and dimensions of 
inequality in particular areas, and, importantly, how these have changed 
or entrenched over time, and in relation to particular policies and 
institutional practices.
Engaging with a variety of comprehensive and reputable sources, 
individual chapters trace what we know about ethnic inequalities in 
a range of fields in UK society and culture, including: citizenship and 
immigration, crime and policing, health, education, the labour market, 
housing, the cultural industries, politics, and racism. They situate this 
knowledge in an understanding of how things have changed over time 
in the last 50 years and the impact of major policies in the different 
areas. The next chapter provides an overview of the demography of 
the UK in terms of ethnicity, the age structure of different ethnic 
groups and their geographic locations. This is an increasingly complex 
picture and, as this chapter discusses, difficult to pin down because of 
the nature of data collection. As this introduction has briefly discussed, 
questions of terminology are complex, politically charged and shift 
historically. Racialised and ethnic identities are socially constructed and 
therefore mutable and changing. They are produced both through racist 
structures and discourses, as well as through processes of resistance and 
community- building. We start from the position that without naming 
these differences, we cannot address the inequalities they produce. We 
are addressing ethnic inequalities in this book and have largely used the 
term ‘ethnic minority’ to refer to groups or individuals when reporting 
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on the statistical data. At the same time, we recognise that the categories 
used by the statistical agencies on which we rely do not often map 
neatly onto the ways in which individuals identify themselves.
The ways in which the data are reported can also have profound 
political effects. This is perhaps most marked in the current context by 
the growth of the ‘White Other’ category. As much of the data reported 
in this book has shown, the ‘White Other’ category has relatively good 
outcomes in a range of fields relative to the ‘White British’ category. 
So, if White Other are included in over- simplistic reporting of data, 
then this will have the effect of masking inequality and discrimination 
faced by other groups. We need to be wary of where the state, or other 
institutions, report at the level only of ‘ethnic minority’ outcomes. In 
addition, the majority of the ‘White Other’ category will not face racist 
discrimination, protected as they frequently are by white privilege. Yet 
at the same time, some groups within this category have faced overt 
and hostile discrimination: whether Jews experiencing antisemitism, 
a form of racism or, in the case of Eastern European migrants, rising 
anti- immigration hostility. Thus wherever possible, it is important to 
be aware of the complexities of the experiences of different groups 
within the term ‘ethnic minority’ and to be alive to the ways in which 
processes of racialisation impact on experience and outcomes.
As mentioned, the categories used for data collection have changed 
historically and they also vary according to the different data collection 
agencies for the countries of the UK. This can make comparison 
between the UK regions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland difficult. For this reason, and for those of space, the discussion 
in the book tends to focus on England, where the vast majority of 
ethnic minority people in the UK live. However, where possible, data 
from the other regions of the UK are also discussed – as well as the 
different experiences of the increasing numbers of ethnic minority 
people living in suburban and rural areas. For similar reasons of data 
and space, we are not always able to draw out the complex interplay 
between ethnic inequalities and inequalities of gender, social class, 
disability and sexuality. In many cases, the data are not collected in 
ways which makes this possible. In addition, these intersections play out 
differently for different ethnic groups and limitations of space inhibit 
the proper discussion of this.
Nonetheless, and despite these limitations, collectively, the book 
provides a map of racial and ethnic inequality across all aspects of social 
and cultural life in Britain, while identifying points of intervention for 
policymakers. More than this, though, the book constitutes a snapshot 
of the current ‘moment’ in Britain, on the brink of Brexit and a 
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precarious new, and unpredictable era for our multi- ethnic, multi- racial 
country. The State of the Nation offers an assessment of where we are 
as a nation and the concluding recommendations extend an invitation 
to imagine a different and better future.
Notes
 1 Between the British Nationality Act of 1948 which confirmed the rights of all 
British subjects in the colonies and dominions to enter and settle in Britain, and 
the 1971 Commonwealth Immigrants Act which effectively stripped the rights of 
Black Commonwealth immigrants to settle (Solomos, 2003).
 2 See www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk
 3 ‘Black’ here is used to refer to ‘political blackness’, including people of African, 
Caribbean and Asian descent (Alexander, 2017).









The demography of ethnic  
minorities in Britain
William Shankley, Tina Hannemann and Ludi Simpson
Key findings
• Britain’s ethnic minority groups are primarily shaped by the 
country’s past imperial history and colonialism of different parts 
of the world resulting in large immigration movements from the 
mid- 20th century onwards.
• There has been an increase in the absolute size of each ethnic group 
between 2001 and 2011, except for the Irish group. And increasing 
diversity of groups, including mixed groups. The ethnic make- up 
of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is different from England, 
with higher levels of people identifying as White and lower non- 
white diversity.
• Family and fertility differ across all ethnic minority groups with 
variations in age of mother at her first birth, number of children 
and choice of partnership type.
• Segregation levels across ethnic minority groups have decreased with 
neighbourhoods becoming more ethnically mixed.
Introduction
In order to assess the different social, economic, health and wellbeing 
outcomes across different ethnic minority groups living in Britain, we 
need to collect and analyse data based on measures of identity, which 
can expose unequal experiences and the effects of discrimination. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter, these identity categories are not 
straightforward and reflect political choices made in particular historical 
contexts. The categories used by the state on which these data are based 
have shifted over time, and people’s identification with them will also 
change. This chapter will introduce the nature of ethnic diversity in 
the UK, giving an overview of the size and location of ethnic groups 
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ways in which Britain’s history as a global empire and related migration 
have shaped the categories we use today, which, in turn, determined 
the nature of ethnic diversity in the UK. The chapter will examine 
historic migration flows and current ethnic groups in the UK, the age 
structures of different ethnic groups, which reflect patterns and periods 
of migration as well as fertility and mortality patterns. Finally, it will 
consider the ways in which processes of migration have produced 
distinct residential patterns for different ethnic groups and how these 
are changing.
Immigration history and ethnicity in the UK
The demographic composition of Britain’s ethnic minority populations 
continues to be significantly shaped by Britain’s past imperial 
history and colonialism in different parts of the world, subsequent 
decolonisation, conflict and globalisation which have determined who, 
where and when immigrants settled in Britain. While there have been 
centuries of global contact, trade, migration and settlement in the 
UK (particularly in London and port cities such as Liverpool, Bristol 
and Cardiff), the groups that we tend to consider as the main ethnic 
minorities in contemporary Britain are historically connected to the 
migration of predominantly non- white migrants in the postwar period 
(Finney and Simpson, 2009). These migrants were generally taking up 
their rights as colonial subjects to move to Britain (a subject discussed 
in more depth in Chapter 2 on citizenship and immigration). While 
there continues to be a debate about the theorisation (or lack thereof) 
of the main ethnic categories used in Britain (see Nazroo, 1998 for 
a broader discussion on the problems with ethnic categorisation), in 
this section, we broadly trace the migration history of the main ethnic 
minority groups in the country.
As we discuss in Chapter 2, the control of movement into the 
UK as a phenomenon that began in Britain with the first restriction 
introduced in the Aliens Act 1905 and following the large- scale 
immigration of Jewish people from Eastern Europe and Russia 
(London, 2003). Over the last 60 years, since the British Nationality 
Act 1948, a series of immigration acts have further reduced the rights 
of colonial and post- colonial subjects to live and work in the UK. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, labour shortages 
and the need to rebuild Britain’s infrastructure and the economy, 
as well as to support the growth of the newly formed NHS, meant 
that the UK government actively endorsed labour migration from 
across the Commonwealth. In the 1940s this included largely the 
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migration of people from the Caribbean (migrants who provided the 
foundation of the Black Caribbean ethnic category for the census). 
These migrants began moving to the UK to settle in London and other 
major English cities. Unemployment across the Caribbean during 
this period and the prospect of employment opportunities in Britain 
facilitated the transatlantic migration aboard ships, for example, the 
SS Empire Windrush. The migration was possible, particularly because 
of the Caribbean migrants’ British subject status, which, due to their 
citizenship, allowed them to move unencumbered to the UK.
Similarly, immigration from the Indian subcontinent has contributed 
significantly to ethnic diversity in Britain, with Indians, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis migrating in large numbers. Their migration has been 
facilitated by Britain’s colonial connection with the region. Labour 
needs during the 1950s and 1960s also attracted many people from the 
region to fill labour vacancies, with many migrants (predominantly 
single men, with their wives migrating later) finding work in manual 
occupations such as manufacturing and the service sectors, and notably 
across the northern English towns. These can, in part, explain some 
of the residential settlement patterns of South Asian migrants across 
towns in the north of England (Peach, 2006; Finney and Simpson, 
2009). Data from the 1971 Census showed Indian migrants (by this 
time the country had separated from Pakistan and Bangladesh) as the 
second largest migrant group in the UK (after the Irish) (ONS, 2013). 
Moreover, a second wave of South Asian migrants occurred in the 
1960s and early 1970s and consisted of migrants who moved from East 
Africa where they were subjected to Africanisation policies. These 
policies favoured African citizens over Asians and expulsions made 
many of them refugees coming to Britain due to colonial connections 
(Robinson, 1986; Clarke et al, 1990). Many of the Asian expellees 
from East Africa had the right to settle in Britain as subjects.
Another group, the White Irish group, has a long history of migration 
to Britain, with early accounts stretching as far back as 1740, showing 
seasonal migration patterns across the Irish Sea (Collins, 1976). The 
potato famine in the 1840s was significant and motivated a large 
number of Irish people to move to escape the famine and settle in the 
UK, where they found work in mining, shipbuilding, engineering and 
linen production (MacRaild, 1999). The pattern of Irish migration 
to Britain has continued to the present day, with many Irish people 
moving to Britain for work, lifestyle and education reasons (Migration 
Observatory, 2017).
The ethnic Chinese group is largely comprised of migrants who 
originated in Hong Kong due to the area’s historical connection with 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
18
Britain. The wider ethnic Chinese population in Britain comprises 
people of diverse origins and cultural backgrounds that were also 
associated with Britain and include people from Mainland China, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia (Chan and Chan, 1997). 
According to Au and P’ng (1997), Chinese migration to Britain 
has a long history that began in the 1880s. More recent migration 
from Mainland China has increased the size of the group, with many 
people moving to Britain for education and lifestyle reasons as well as 
along the asylum channel. More recently, Britain has experienced an 
increase in migration from Africa, hence the ethnic category ‘Black 
African’ has been introduced in the census and social surveys in the 
UK. Immigration from Africa to Britain gathered momentum from the 
1990s when levels of immigration from African countries increased to 
approximately 20,000 people per year (Migration Observatory, 2017).
How we understand ethnic diversity (notably with the introduction 
of the ‘White Other’ ethnic category) substantially changed due to 
reconfigured immigration patterns, which were the product of the 
European Union (EU) expansion in 2004 (and subsequent expansions 
in 2007 and 2013). Before the EU enlargement, intra- EU migration 
between the EU15 countries was relatively stable (Moch, 2003; 
Burrell, 2009). This stable pattern (relatively equal immigration 
versus emigration) across the EU zone was the result of a similar 
level of economic development across the member countries. The 
EU enlargement admitted a total of 13 countries into the EU system 
from Central and Eastern Europe, with Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
joining in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and 
finally Croatia in 2013. For Britain, the expansion has resulted 
in a large and unexpected group of new arrivals, predominantly 
from the initial EU Accession 81 countries who migrated to take 
up employment in the labour market where there were labour 
supply gaps in sectors such as agriculture, construction and services 
(Burrell, 2009). Furthermore, the state has also implemented specific 
recruitment programmes to benefit from the later 2007 and 2013 
EU accessions. This has steered migrants into the agricultural and 
farming sectors through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme 
(SAWS), which is restricted to migrants from Bulgarian, Romania and 
Croatia. A study by the Migration Observatory (2016 ) using Home 
Office Statistics found that between 2004 and 2011 approximately 
540,000 accession migrants moved to the UK. As such, the number 
of accession migrants has resulted in a sharp increase in the number 
of people included within the ‘Other White’ ethnic category. Even 
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though the economic recession in 2008/ 9 led to a slight decrease 
in the number of migrants moving from EU accession countries 
to Britain (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2016), they continue to 
contribute to an increase in the ‘White Other’ ethnic category. These 
new flows of migrants continue to challenge how we categorise 
ethnicity, particularly ethnic minority white groups in Britain, and 
our understanding of racisms, as discussed in Chapter 10.
Current ethnic minorities in the UK
In the last 30  years, notably since the 1991 Census, national 
governments in the UK have collected a variety of data referring to 
ethnicity (previously only the country of birth was collected). The 
ethnic categories used reflect a mixture of factors, including country 
of birth, nationality, language spoken at home, or racial category, 
national/ geographic origin and religion. The statistical agencies of 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales do not share a 
consistent format of categories, which makes a comparison between 
the UK regions rather difficult. In addition, census data collected have 
been fluid in terms of categories over the last three census rounds 
(1991, 2001, 2011), with additions such as ‘Mixed’ and ‘Irish’ in 2001, 
and ‘Arab’ in 2011 in the census for England, Wales and Scotland. 
Furthermore, for many individuals, these prescribed categories may not 
accurately describe their own (sometimes multiple) identities. As these 
are self- identified categories, even with consistent survey categories 
available, people may over time change their chosen ethnic group 
(Simpson et al, 2016). Nonetheless, despite these limitations and the 
inevitable loss of some complexity and diversity, without the collection 
of data in broad ethnicity categories, which can be taken as relatively 
high- quality approximations, it is a challenge to assess accurately the 
nature of ethnic inequalities in the UK and the dynamics of change 
over time and location within the UK.
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of ethnic minorities in the last 
census, in 2011, in England and Wales. While we discuss data of the 
combined region of England and Wales, it is important to notice 
that there is much less ethnic diversity in Wales than in England. In 
2011, Wales reported 93% of its inhabitants identify as White British 
(Welsh, English, Scottish or Northern Irish) while in England only 
79% identify as White British.
The White British category covers four fifths of the total population 
in England and Wales in 2011, followed by the Other White group 
with about 4.4%. The largest categories among the non- white groups 
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are Indians (2.5%) and Pakistanis (2%) followed by Black Africans 
(1.8%), Other Ethnicities (1.5%) and Black Caribbeans (1.1%). The 
mixed categories, which were introduced in the 2001 Census, already 
amount to 0.8% for Mixed White and Caribbean, 0.6% for Mixed 
White and Asian and 0.3% for Mixed White and African. The new 
categories in the 2011 Census, Arabs and Gypsy/ Traveller account 
for 0.4% and 0.1% respectively. Future censuses will show how these 
new groups develop and may also track the existence of other ethnic 
minority groups.









































































Note: All ethnic minorities which are collected in the relevant census are displayed.
Source: Census 2011, ONS.
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Comparing these data with the ethnic groups from the 2001 Census, 
several changes can be observed. The vast majority of the population 
in England and Wales identified as White British in both censuses, 
despite the decrease from 87.5% to 80.5%. Part of this decrease might 
be explained with the increasing share of mixed groups, as unions 
between White British and other ethnic minorities become more 
common and their offspring are more likely to identify as Mixed rather 
than White British only.
The second largest ethnic minority group, Other White, saw an 
increase of 60% from the 2001 Census as a result of the large- scale 
immigration from the EU Accession 8 countries which joined the 
EU in 2004 (Clark et al, 2018). This was again added to following 
the further expansion of the EU system in 2007 with the addition 
of Bulgarian and Romanian (EU Accession 2 countries) as members 
and, later, in 2013 of Croatia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the Other White group also includes minorities and migrants who 
come from Old Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as migrants from the EU15 and their children, who 
can choose to self- identify as either White British or Other White.
All other ethnic groups experienced an increase between 2001 and 
2011 with the exception of the White Irish group. The growth of 
certain ethnic categories could be the result of people choosing to 
switch ethnic categories as the specificity of the ethnic categories 
becomes more refined and better reflects their self- identification. 
The growth of the other categories corresponds to the groups’ natural 
growth (fertility versus mortality) as well as further immigration. 
Jivraj and Simpson (2015) demonstrated that, among the Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani and Mixed ethnic groups, natural growth was the main driver 
for their growth. The numbers and multiple characteristics of migrants 
from South Asia will be reflected upon throughout this book, with 
their different characteristics resulting in various outcomes throughout 
different domains of British society, for example, in their attainment 
levels of the state education system (see Chapter 5). Meanwhile, for the 
White Other, Indian, Black African and Chinese groups, immigration 
was the main reason for population expansion. A noticeable increase 
across the mixed ethnic group categories could be a product of people 
switching to these categories as they are now available as well as an 
increase of inter- ethnic relationships.
Individuals identifying as Black African include those coming from 
a diverse range of countries and a considerable portion of asylum 
seekers and refugees. Some have moved as the result of famine, 
conflict and political unrest  – particularly in Sub- Saharan Africa 
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(Migration Observatory, 2017; Clark et al, 2018) while others come 
for the prospect of higher education and economic opportunities. The 
Black African group differs considerably from the Black Caribbean 
group, whose migration history mainly relates to the Windrush- era 
immigration during the postwar period (Moch, 2003). Unlike many 
of the other ethnic minorities who are comprised mainly of recent 
migrants, the Caribbean group is largely made up of second- and third- 
generation British- born people. Furthermore, due to intermarriage 
and reduced migration from the Caribbean, the Black Caribbean 
group did not experience a large increase in recent years but the 
Mixed Caribbean group almost doubled in the same period (Simpson 
and Jivraj, 2015).
As mentioned earlier, the Irish group has one of the longest migration 
histories in the UK due to the contiguous position of Ireland to 
Britain and a long colonial history (Moch, 2003). Similar to other 
white minority groups, their size (0.9% in 2011) might be an under- 
representation of the actual population due to many British- born 
descendants of Irish migrants identifying as White British rather than 
White Irish.
The increasing Chinese ethnic group makes up 0.7% (2011) of the 
population (compared to 0.4% in 2001) and is comprised mainly of 
second- and third- generation British- born people as well as migrants 
from Mainland China and Hong Kong (Clark et  al, 2018). The 
ethnic Chinese population in Britain is also composed of people 
from diverse cultural backgrounds and includes people with roots in 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia (Chan and Chan, 1997). 
The Chinese group is well represented in professional occupations; 
however, many recent ethnic Chinese migrants find work in the ethnic 
food sector, particularly in the south- east and north- west regions of 
England (Clark et al, 2018).
The 2001 Census started to include mixed ethnic categories with 
White and Black Caribbean being the largest (0.5% in 2001 and 
0.8% in 2011) followed by the White and Asian (0.6% in 2011). The 
mixed groups have emerged as a significant share of the population as 
a consequence of rising ethnic diversity and the birth of children of 
parents from different ethnic backgrounds (Bradford, 2006).
As mentioned, the comparison of ethnic minorities across the whole 
UK is very complex. Northern Ireland and Scotland used different 
ethnic minority categories in their census, more adapted to their 
population’s diversity. In Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, we provide a brief 
overview of (aggregated) ethnic minorities in both regions according 
to data from the 2011 Census for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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While in the Scottish census individuals have a wide range of ‘white’ 
categories to choose from, inhabitants in Northern Ireland can only 
identify as White or Irish Traveller in their census. In both regions, 
the combined White group accounts for 96% (Scotland) and 98.3% 
(Northern Ireland), which is much higher than in England (86%) but 
comparable with Wales (93%). The largest ethnic minority groups 
in Scotland, after Other British and Other White, are Polish (1.2%), 
Irish (1.0%) and Pakistani (0.9%). In Northern Ireland, the largest 
ethnic minority groups are Chinese, Indian and Other Asian, with 
each making up 0.3% of the population. As the ethnic minority 

























































ANY OTHER 0.1% (4,959)
ALL OTHERS 16.0% (849,725)
Source: National Records of Scotland.
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categories differ substantially in definition and size between England 
and Wales, and Scotland and Northern Ireland, the rest of this chapter 
(and the other chapters) will concentrate on the data for England and 
Wales and present specific data for Scotland and Northern Ireland 
where appropriate.
Where possible throughout this chapter and the remainder of the 
book, data will be used to highlight the attainment and outcomes for 
these ethnic groups; however, often due to small group sample sizes 
and high diversity within the group, some groups cannot be analysed 




































































Note: More disaggregated groups are available for Irish Traveller, Other Asian, Black Other and Other 
Ethnic Group.
Source: National Records of Scotland and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.
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in depth. Specific discussions about the ethnic penalty and racism 
these groups face will be the topic of later chapters. For example, the 
Gypsy and Irish Travellers groups are discussed in more detail in the 
education chapter (Chapter 6), focusing on the high prevalence of 
education exclusion and low levels of educational attainment for this 
group. By comparison, the chapter on racism (Chapter 9) contains 
a more nuanced discussion of Islamophobia and the diversity of the 
Muslim population in Britain.
Age profile, fertility and family formation trends across 
ethnic minorities
As described earlier, each of the groups has their own specific history 
of immigration to Britain that shaped the current age profile of ethnic 
minorities in contemporary UK. Simpson and Jivraj (2015: 33) find 
that ‘half the population born abroad and living in England and Wales 
arrived in the UK aged 15– 29’. Age structure is a key characteristic 
for educational attendance and labour market participation, as well 
as family formation process, fertility and health patterns. It is not 
surprising that most ethnic minority groups have a younger age 
profile than the White British majority population group. This 
relates to classical theories such as the healthy migrant hypothesis that 
suggests, in general, younger and healthier individuals are more likely 
to migrate for educational and employment purposes. This is partly 
due to the selection effects based on the demands on the labour 
market and the physical and psychological strains of the migration 
process (Lu and Qin, 2014). Younger migrants are generally more 
economically productive and are unlikely to require or be eligible 
for state benefits.
Figure  1.4 shows the age profile of the 18 ethnic groups for 
England and Wales calculated by the age profiler of the 2011 Census 
(Simpson, 2015). There are three age groups with the middle group 
identifying the ages of economic productivity. The mixed groups 
have the youngest age profile, particularly the Mixed White and 
Black African group. These groups are composed of children whose 
parents come from different ethnic groups and represent some of the 
fastest- growing groups in Britain. For mixed groups 39% to 47% are 
under the age of 15; whereas only 4% are over 65. By comparison, 
the White Irish group has the oldest age profile with 31% of the 
group being over 65 years old and only 5% being under the age of 
16. Their children and grandchildren may often identify as White 
British and thus mask the complete age profile of the Irish group. 
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Figure 1.4 also shows that the Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups have 
relatively young age profiles, with large concentrations in the under 
15 and the 16– 64 age groups. Overall, for all groups the majority of 
people are in the age of 16– 64.
As mentioned, the age profile of a specific ethnic minority group 
will have a profound impact on economic, but also demographic 
patterns, such as family formation and fertility trends. It must be 
noted that detailed ethnicity- specific fertility and mortality rates 
are not available from the ONS. Therefore, Kulu and Hannemann 
(2016) used data from Understanding Society – The UK Household 
Longitudinal Study2 to examine the fertility of women from different 
ethnic groups in the UK (see Figure 1.5). Understanding Society is 
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a longitudinal study which replaced the British Household Panel. 
Data include a representative sample of UK residents as well as an 
Ethnic Minority Boost sample which enables researchers to study 
ethnic minorities in more detail without losing statistical power due 
to small case numbers.
First, Kulu and Hannemann (2016) found large fertility variations 
across ethnic minority groups. Fertility is measured as total fertility 
rate (the total expected number of children per women) and ethnic 
groups are constructed on the basis of country of birth rather than 
self- identified ethnic group. Immigrants from European and other 
Western countries showed very similar fertility to the British (defined 
here as individuals born in the UK, with both parents also born in the 
UK). They observed higher fertility for individuals born in India and 
the Caribbean and much larger fertility values for individuals born in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Especially the latter was found to be mostly 
due to higher propensities to have a third and a fourth child as well 
as experiencing an earlier start of family formation processes, and the 
more universal pattern of marriage and motherhood among women 
in those migrant groups (Hannemann and Kulu, 2015).






















































































































































Source: Kulu and Hannemann (2016) based on data from Understanding Society.
 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
28
Second, the authors found that for ethnic minorities, who were 
born in the UK (descendants of immigrants, so- called second- 
generation immigrants), fertility levels are less different and fall 
between those of the British group and their parents’ fertility values. 
Higher fertility among certain migrant groups has been attributed 
to differing economic and educational prospects as well as cultural 
differences in the definition of family and role of children. For 
instance, average household size is higher for Indian, African, 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups (Jivraj and Simpson, 2015) which 
can include multi- generational household members. These might 
have impact on fertility decisions as well as offer opportunities for 
child care provisions.
There is evidence that ethnicity plays a role in maternal morbidity 
and mortality differences (Kayem et al, 2011; Nair et al, 2014, 2016). 
The authors suggest that those differences are partly due to inadequate 
Figure 1.6: Infant mortality rate by ethnicity in England and Wales for the birth 
cohort, 2014
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access to natal care and the presence of other morbidity conditions 
across the ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, Figure  1.6 shows 
the level of infant mortality rate for White British and various ethnic 
minorities in England and Wales in 2014. These show distinctive 
disparities, with the highest infant mortality rate values found among 
infants born into the Pakistani, African and Caribbean ethnic groups. 
While the Other White group demonstrates lower infant mortality 
rate than the White British group.
Over the life course, the social inequality encountered in the 
UK has meant that health risks increase with age for disadvantaged 
ethnic minorities (Jivraj and Simpson, 2015). For example, the high 
concentration of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups in the lower 
echelons of the labour market and low purchasing power contributes 
to their concentration in deprived neighbourhoods. These residential 
patterns have an impact on multiple measures of health (see Chapter 4), 
which can all increase their risk of health complications. In general, 
we would expect the mortality rates for ethnic minority groups to 
converge with the majority population, given a long enough adaptation 
period, where health behaviours slowly converge to those of the 
majority population. However, Lievesley (2010) emphasises that the 
underlying explanations are more complex and are often different 
across ethnic groups. A more detailed look at health difference across 
ethnic minorities is provided in Chapter 4.
Residential settlement and segregation
Residential settlement
As discussed, the data show that Britain continues to become a more 
ethnically diverse country – particularly in England where the majority 
of the ethnic minority groups reside. The census data paint a national 
picture of diversity but ethnic minority people are not spread evenly 
across the UK. This is a product of their migration history and the 
needs of the labour market at their time of arrival, the availability and 
affordability of housing as well as issues that relate to discrimination 
and racism (Peach, 1998; Finney and Simpson, 2009). Historically, 
ethnic minority groups have tended to settle in neighbourhoods in 
inner- city urban areas across cities in the UK. Over time they have, 
to an extent, suburbanised; however, ethnic minority people remain 
in smaller proportions, compared with White British people, in 
rural and suburban than in urban neighbourhoods. Newer migrants 
have subsequently moved to these ethnically diverse inner- city 
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neighbourhoods for several reasons. First, their residential choice is 
shaped by social and kinship ties; second, the migrants are attracted to 
the diversity offered within these neighbourhoods; third, these diverse 
neighbourhoods offer migrants a reservoir of local knowledge about 
housing and labour market opportunities.
An interesting feature of migration from the new EU accession 
countries (13 countries located across central and Eastern Europe) has 
been their continued migration to neighbourhoods unaccustomed to 
large- scale immigration (Scott and Brindley, 2012). Many of these new 
migrants found employment in the agricultural and farming sectors 
in dire need of higher labour supply in regions such as the east of 
England, opening up these new geographies. Often, due to the scarcity 
of housing to accommodate the migrants, many of the businesses 
provided accommodation to support their workers. The changes to 
local labour market conditions explain how the association between 
ethnic minorities and place and the central focus on the urban setting 
has changed for migrants from EU Accession countries and shifted 
focus to suburban and rural places.
Ethnic segregation
The places where ethnic minority groups live have come under scrutiny 
as a product of moral panics after the terrorist attacks of both 9/ 11 
in New York and 7/ 7 in London as well as the civil disturbances in a 
number of northern English towns (Bradford, Oldham and Burnley) 
in 2001 (reviewed in Finney and Simpson, 2009; Catney, 2015). There 
has been a fear that places associated with ethnic minority people are 
also associated with multiple social problems, which include crime, 
radicalisation and specific anti- British ideologies. These anxieties are 
often associated with specific groups. This segregation narrative tends 
to assume that residential clustering is necessarily a social ill. In these 
assumptions, the residential separation of groups is seen to indicate a 
lack of meaningful engagement between groups, low rates of English 
language learning and poor ethnic relations.
Yet there is increasing recognition that residential clustering has 
positive elements that are vital to the interpretation of ethnic minority 
groups’ residential patterns. These include protective effects, where 
living in proximity to members of the same ethnic group can act 
as a resource for local knowledge, supporting language and culture 
maintenance. Residential proximity can be beneficial to the family, social 
and religious networks, as well as creating a buffer against intolerance and 
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discrimination from the majority population (see Bécares et al, 2011). 
Furthermore, as Chapter 7 on housing will discuss in more detail, we 
need to question the assumption that residential clustering reveals a 
desire on the part of ethnic minority people to self- segregate. Research 
has shown the extent to which the residential decision making of many 
ethnic minority groups is constrained (Robinson, 1986; Peach, 1998; 
Phillips, 2006). In addition, residential clustering of ethnic groups also 
reflects choices made by white residents or potential residents.
Notions of ethnic ghettos and anxieties about acute residential 
segregation pervade the US narrative on racial minorities and have 
(to a lesser extent) featured in the debate on ethnic minorities in the 
UK. In order to discuss how acute residential segregation is in Britain, 
we have deployed a method to measure it. The most commonly used 
approach to measuring segregation is the index of dissimilarity (Catney, 
2015: 112), This is a technique popularised by Massey and Denton 
(1988) that measures how evenly a group is spread across an area. ‘The 
proportion of an ethnic group’s total population in England and Wales 
living in a neighbourhood is subtracted from the proportion of the 
rest of the population that lies in the same neighbourhood’ (Catney, 
2015:  113). The absolute difference between proportions is then 
added across all areas. The result ranges between 0 and 100 with the 
highest level of segregation of a group indicated by 100 and an even 
spread of the ethnic minority group in a specific area indicated by a 
result of 0. The results thus provide a good measure of the residential 
segregation of different groups.
The ‘index of dissimilarity’, however, is not the only measure used 
to study residential segregation. More generally, we have to be cautious 
about the ways in which segregation is conceptualised and measured in 
order to reduce misinterpretation of the data. Problems raised regarding 
the use of various methods for studying segregation relate to, first, 
whether the areal unit the segregation analysis is built on is appropriate 
to assess a group’s social interactions in a meaningful way and, second, 
whether segregation is the dominant mechanism that is occurring. 
An important issue with segregation work has been the question of 
whether the results are in fact masking the effects of deprivation. As 
already stated, the main ethnic minority groups we concentrate on 
are the product of different migrant waves who settled in the UK and 
their children and grandchildren. For example, the Pakistani group 
began migrating to the UK in large numbers in the 1970s to fill specific 
employment gaps in manufacturing and other industrial sectors. The 
subsequent class profile of the different ethnic minority groups steered 
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many into living in specific houses in certain areas because of their 
affordability; this related to the housing options available to them and 
thus shaped their residential geographies. The same seems to be true 
with respect to the patterns of White Other settlement in rural locations 
where labour market practices have contributed to the concentration 
of migrants in particular areas. Therefore, ethnic segregation may, in 
fact, be partially a product of classed spatial inequalities and labour 
market mechanisms rather than solely the product of an ethnic minority 
group’s ethnic identities.
Using the ‘index of dissimilarity’ to measure the residential 
segregation of different ethnic groups, Catney (2015) conducted 
a comparison of segregation across different groups using data 
from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. Catney (2015) found that 
residential segregation across all groups has decreased and, overall, 
neighbourhoods are becoming more ethnically mixed. The results 
also show that ‘in over two thirds of districts, segregation decreased 
for Black Caribbean, Indian, Mixed and Black African ethnic groups, 
between 2001 and 2011’ (Catney, 2015: 109). Focusing specifically 
on London, the results found that residential mixing increased in 
inner and outer London. In outer London, for example, segregation 
decreased by 12 percentage points for the Bangladeshi ethnic group 
and 11 percentage points for the Chinese ethnic group. Other large 
cities, such as Leicester, Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford, 
have also seen a decrease in segregation for most ethnic groups. In 
addition, there has also been an increase in residential mixing between 
the White British and minority ethnic groups. The findings that 
indicate a reduction in levels of segregation across all groups can be 
explained predominantly by two mechanisms, the first is the spreading 
out of people from more concentrated areas, and, second, the effect 
of natural change that is the result of the number of births versus 
deaths in ethnic minority groups (Catney, 2015). The difference in 
segregation levels between different groups can be predominantly 
explained by their varying migration histories to the UK, with more 
recent groups being affected by chain migration and migrants moving 
to live near friends and relatives; whereas more established group’s 
may have formed families whose children subsequently move out of 
areas of concentration.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the demographic features of ethnic 
minorities in Britain are highly connected to immigration, fertility, 
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mortality and residential segregation. The composition and size of 
ethnic groups in Britain reflects the history of immigration to the 
UK since 1945 and began with the arrival of migrants from the 
Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent, Ireland and countries in Africa. 
As these migration patterns change, so have the ethnic categories that 
are used to enumerate ethnic groups in specific areas (with differences 
between England and Wales and Scotland, for example). Moreover, 
over time new categories have been added to the census to capture 
this new diversity, including mixed groups and Arab and Gypsy and 
Irish Traveller categories in 2001 and 2011 respectively.
The younger age profile of many of the ethnic minority has 
effects for their labour force participation, as well as demographic 
patterns regarding fertility and mortality. The chapter has shown large 
differences in fertility across different ethnic minority groups with 
migrants from accession countries and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and 
Indians tending to have higher fertility rates. However, the chapter 
showed that high fertility rates among immigrants are not continued 
by subsequent generations. Nonetheless, the average household size 
is still higher for Indian, African, Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups. 
Conversely, mortality is often lower for recent migrants due to a 
pre- migration selection effect in their country of origin (the healthy 
migrant hypothesis).
Finally, the specific residential pattern of ethnic minority groups – 
specifically non- white Muslims  – continues to be the focus of 
integration and housing policy brought on by anxieties that have 
followed moral panics that residential clustering is a breeding ground 
for social ills such as terrorism. The data suggest that overall ethnic 
minority segregation is decreasing across the country. Moreover, 
the chapter has raised some significant questions about how we 
conceptualise segregation and understand processes that underlie 
segregation. For example, the exponential increase of the White Other 
population between 2001 and 2011 as a result of the EU accession 
has seen new housing practices bring issues of residential segregation 
into new geographies such as rural and suburban neighbourhoods. 
New questions emerge about the consequences of conceptualisations 
of segregation in these spaces and what the effects will be on the new 
white migrant groups living in these areas.
Notes
 1 The term ‘Accession 8’ refers to the eight countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
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 2 University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social 
Research (2015). Understanding Society: Waves 1‒5, 2009‒2014: Special Licence 
Access, Local Authority District. [data collection]. 6th Edition. UK Data Service. 




Citizen rights and immigration
William Shankley and Bridget Byrne
Key findings
• Britain’s long history of migration has been shaped by its empire 
and relationship to Europe.
• In the post- Second World War period, mass immigration from both 
Europe and the colonies was driven by labour shortages in the UK. 
Nonetheless, ethnic minority citizen- migrants were often met with 
hostility and racism.
• Immigration and citizenship policy since 1948 has been driven by 
a restriction of citizenship rights and rights of abode in ways which 
were often highly racialised.
• EU migration increased significantly to the UK after the accession 
of new countries to the EU after 2004, although there has been a 
decline since the EU referendum in 2016.
• Recent immigration policy and bordering practices have been driven 
by a desire to drive down and control net immigration.
• The creation of a ‘hostile’ or ‘compliant’ environment risks increasing 
the discrimination and harassment suffered by ethnic minority 
individuals and communities.
• The Windrush scandal sheds light on the abuses suffered by citizen- 
migrants under new immigration policies.
Introduction
Immigration policy emerges out of the state’s attempt to control the 
movement of people across national borders. In Britain, immigration 
policy has developed over the last 100 years and has often been in response 
to the movements of racialised groups perceived as culturally different. 
Thus immigration policy is often used to define who are desirable and 
undesirable migrants and citizens in ways which are frequently racialised. 
This history has been fundamentally shaped by empire, and particularly 
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many non- white subjects as the empire ended. It is also worth noting 
that Ireland has been a major source of immigrants to the UK in the last 
century but is not subject to modern migration controls.
In this chapter, we will initially provide a brief history of immigration 
to the UK over the 21st century and the policies the government 
has used to control migration and define British citizenship. This 
will include consideration of the impact that these policies have on 
ethnic minority British citizens, as well as migrants. We will then 
examine contemporary immigration patterns and policies, such as 
the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 and bordering practices of 
detention, deportation and dispersal. The recent case of what has 
become known as the ‘Windrush generation’ will be considered as a 
window into how contemporary state immigration practices have led 
to depriving citizen- migrants from mainly Commonwealth countries 
of basic rights. Finally, we discuss the implications of Britain leaving 
the EU on the country’s future immigration policy.
Histories of migration
Britain has a long history of migration to the British Isles with a 
continual process of movement, trade and settlement between Britain 
and the wider world.1 While the arrival of what would now be seen 
as ethnic minority people in Britain dates back to the first century 
ad, these processes intensified with enslavement, industrialisation 
and empire. The exploitation of world resources and the expansion 
of the British empire brought slaves, servants, sailors and workers as 
well as traders to Britain, alongside entrepreneurs and political and 
religious refugees who all helped to shape the culture and economy. 
Under empire, and prior to the introduction of the British Nationality 
Act 1948, under British common law everyone who was born in a 
dominion of the empire was classified as a British subject (Karatani, 
2004). Formally at least, subjects of the empire had the right to move 
freely and settle in Britain. At the same time, colonised people in 
particular were often racialised and constructed as inferior and faced 
racist hostility to their settlement in the UK.
After the Second World War, migration to the UK intensified with 
the beginning of waves of mass immigration. Poland’s role as part of 
the allied resistance led to approximately 200,000 soldiers settling in 
Scotland and London. After the conflict, many were unable to return 
home due to Poland’s sovereign borders changing at the Conference 
of Yalta. With the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, Polish servicemen 
were allowed to be joined by their families (Stanchura, 2004). 
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Other European workers were also drawn into migrant recruitment 
programmes such as the European Volunteer Workers Scheme, 
which enlisted large numbers of Europeans displaced by the war to 
move to the UK and assist in the rebuilding effort. This European 
migration is frequently overlooked in the accounts of migration to 
Britain. Colonial migration to Britain also intensified in the post- 
war period, for example with recruitment drives in the Caribbean 
to attract workers to work particularly in the transport sector and the 
newly established NHS. Workers were also attracted from the Indian 
subcontinent, with many migrants moving to fill labour shortages 
in industries such as textiles in northern cities in England, cars and 
engineering factories in the West Midlands and light industries in the 
south. Migration from Ireland has also been a major source of workers 
for the UK over the last century.
Citizenship and immigration policy
The British Nationality Act 1948 provided the first definition of 
British citizenship and established the same rights for British- born 
and colonial- born people as a ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’ (CUKC or ‘British citizen’). All CUKCs were also British 
subjects and they all had the same rights to enter, work and settle 
with their families anywhere within Britain’s sovereign territory 
(Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 495). However, between 1948 and 1981, 
successive immigration laws and other policies restricted the rights of 
certain British and Commonwealth citizens to unrestricted entry and 
settlement in the UK. These were often based on racialised grounds 
so impacted on non- white citizens in particular. For instance, the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 introduced a quota system to 
regulate the number of New Commonwealth migrants who migrated 
to Britain (Lukes et  al, 2018). The Commonwealth Immigration 
Act 1968 introduced patriality, which required those seeking British 
citizenship to prove they had a parent or grandparent who already 
possessed British citizenship. This move saw the beginning of a shift 
in British citizenship from jus soli to jus sanguine or citizenship passed 
on by parental lines rather than place of birth and favoured white Old 
Commonwealth migrants (Byrne, 2014). The act was passed particularly 
to block the arrival of CUKC Kenyan Asians fleeing expulsion and 
Africanisation. Later amendments in the Immigration Act 1971 saw 
further restrictions to the movement of New Commonwealth subjects. 
The act introduced a system of permits that restricted the number 
of New Commonwealth migrants who could migrate to the UK to 
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work, study and visit. Successive citizenship and immigration acts 
further closed the rights and pathways to move to the UK from former 
colonies. For example, the Nationality Act 1981 reclassified CUKCs 
into three categories that limited the right to abode in the UK only 
to those with close connections to the UK. These amendments were 
racialised as they privileged white migrants with Old Commonwealth 
connections above the rights of predominantly non- white people from 
countries with close ties to Britain.
Subsequent acts have continued practices of exclusion but tended 
to concentrate more on what has been defined as ‘uncontrolled’ 
migration, often focused on asylum seekers and those deemed to 
be illegal. The Refugee Council (2018) defines an asylum seeker as 
‘someone who has lodged an application for protection on the basis 
of the Refugee Convention or Article 3 of the ECHR [European 
Convention on Human Rights]’. As a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, Britain has signed up to assist and protect anyone who 
has made a claim for protection in the country’s territory. Multiple 
examples from the past thirty years show how asylum channels have 
provided a vital protection channel against conflict and famine across 
the globe. However, as these movements are sometimes characterised 
as ‘uncontrolled’ migration, the state has attempted to deter or restrict 
entry and service provision to asylum seekers and other migrants 
who are deemed unacceptable or problematic (Fekete, 2009). The 
Immigration Acts of 1993 and 1996, for instance, restricted appeal 
rights for some migrant groups and also sought to restrict the 
housing options to asylum seekers. This steered asylum seekers into 
substandard housing in specific areas (often white neighbourhoods) 
under the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) scheme, where 
they often experienced hostility. Later the Immigration Acts of 1999 
and 2002 further constricted the rights of asylum seekers by removing 
their benefits and housing rights, and consolidated the appeals process, 
making it an offence to be an undocumented migrant in the country 
without a reasonable explanation. These were followed in the 2000s 
by more policies which aimed to make it harder for people to reach 
the UK to make a claim, and to make it more difficult for them while 
their claims were being considered, including the revocation of work 
rights and a system of dispersal (discussed later).
Figure 2.1 shows the figures for emigration, immigration, asylum 
and net migration in the UK in the years 1991– 2017. It shows how 
the number of asylum seekers has fallen since the early 2000s and that 
they make up only a small portion of the overall immigration numbers 
to the country. Sturge (2019) found that asylum seekers only made 
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up a total of 6% of the annual immigration numbers to Britain in 
2016 (see Figure 2.1), although they often feature quite prominently 
in public discourse.

































Source: ONS LTIM data.
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EU accession
A significant change to the patterns of immigration to the UK has 
been a direct result of the expansion of the EU, initially in 2004 and 
then again in 2007 and 2013 respectively. Figure 2.2 shows that prior 
to 2004, the migration of EU15 citizens remained relatively constant 
at approximately 35,000 per year (Sumption and Vargas- Silvia, 2019). 
Nonetheless, after 2004, the EU admitted new countries from central 
and Eastern Europe, with Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuanian, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joining in 2004; 
followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and finally Croatia in 
2013. For Britain specifically, the initial 2004 expansion resulted in 
a large and unexpected patterns of migration from the ‘Accession 8’ 
countries, with migrants moving in large numbers to fill employment 
gaps in the labour market and sectors that included the agricultural, 
construction and services sectors.
Coinciding with this large- scale geopolitical change, Figure 2.2 shows 
an increase in EU migration to Britain occurred after 2004, with Home 
Office statistics (Burrell, 2016) estimating between 2004 and 2011 
approximately 540,000 accession migrants moved to the UK. However, 
Figure 2.2 shows these high net migration levels fell around the same 
time as the financial crisis (2008 to 2012) to as low as 58,000 in 2009. 
Following this first large- scale migration, the government imposed a 
number of immigration policies to regulate the number of migrants 
from the ‘Accession 2’ (Bulgaria and Romania) cohort that were able 
to move to the UK, and later for Croatia. After the three accessions, 
Figure 2.2 shows that after 2013, a second wave of EU migration 
seemed to occur, peaking at 189,000 for the year ending June 2016. 
However, this number soon decreased after Britain’s EU referendum 
result, with net migration falling to 101,000 in 2017 (Sumption and 
Vargas- Silva, 2019). The anti- immigrant sentiment expressed in the 
political campaigns around the referendum and uncertainty about future 
immigration status have had a profound impact on EU net migration 
levels (Becker and Fetzer, 2017; Hix et al, 2017) Small- scale studies 
across different EU migrant groups note an increase in experiences 
of hostility before and after Brexit (see, for example, Rzepnikowska, 
2019). According to Sumption and Vargas- Silva (2019), the decline in 
EU net migration that followed the referendum result can be explained 
by a decrease in the net migration levels across all three EU groups, 
the EU15, Accession 8 and Accession 2 cohorts.
The following section considers how the British state has sought 
to control the numbers of migrants from different parts of the world 
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and the techniques it has also used to target those deemed to be 
uncontrolled migrants already in Britain.
Contemporary immigration policy and bordering 
practices (2010 onwards)
The state has sought to limit the number of migrants settling in the 
country and to restrict net immigration levels by using an array of 
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the state’s bordering arsenal to dissuade migrants from settling in 
the country and removing those are deemed to have settled illegally. 
This section will examine the following questions: what is bordering 
and what are the practices that the state uses to control and limit 
immigration, and how do these practices affect black and minority 
ethnic (BME) groups in Britain? Earlier we discussed how the state has 
revisited notions of citizenship to demarcate the rights various groups 
have and do not have to settlement and services in the country. In a 
similar way, the British state has also sought to regulate uncontrolled 
migration using practices such as detention, dispersal and deportation. 
Finally, the government has also redrawn its rights to remove citizenship 
from individuals as we shall discuss further later.
The most recent set of policies that the state has implemented to 
control immigration levels relates to the Immigration Acts of 2014 
and 2016. These policies aim to reduce net migration levels but also 
have detrimental impacts on migrants and ethnic minority groups 
alike. The Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 have implications 
for controlled and uncontrolled migration to Britain and set out the 
following aims:
 1) To restrict the number of migrants who can enter Britain by 
reducing the number of channels and visas available that migrants 
can use to apply to enter the country;
 2) To change immigration policies and place the responsibility of 
checking a person’s immigration status in- house within the housing 
sector, labour market and education system;
 3) To make it easier for the government to remove people who violate 
immigration rules; and
 4) To reduce the mechanisms that are available to people to contest 
and appeal against immigration violations. (Home Office, 2016)
The Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 have also imposed tighter 
regulations on migrants wishing to enter the UK, limiting visas for 
skilled workers and introducing stricter criteria for eligibility to stay 
permanently in the UK (Gower, 2015: 1). The Immigration Act 2016 
tightened up the student visa system and limited the number of hours 
international students are eligible to work as well as ending the post- 
study work entitlement of international students.
The term ‘hostile environment’ was implemented in 2010, when 
Theresa May became Home Secretary, and the government’s position 
towards immigration intensified, with its primary aim being to 
reduce net immigration – a core aim of the 2010 Conservative Party 
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Election Manifesto (Conservative Party, 2010: 21). The term ‘hostile 
environment’ has been replaced with ‘compliant environment’ after 
widespread critique and still represents an array of policies that include 
the in- house requirement for landlords to check the immigration status 
of tenants, eligibility checks within the NHS, and requirements for 
business and charities and other organisations to carry out ID checks 
to ensure their workers are eligible to be employed in the UK, as well 
as policies that permitted the removal of homeless EU migrants.
The introduction of the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 
and the ‘hostile’ or ‘compliant’ environment considerably 
impacts on ethnic minorities in the UK on a number of counts. 
The introduction of the acts has changed the language and 
vocabulary regarding how we talk about ‘migration’, ‘citizenship’ 
and ‘belonging’. It has also taken practices designed to regulate 
borders and immigration into different institutions and parts of 
society. These acts place the responsibility for checking a migrant’s 
immigration status in- house with landlords, businesses and the 
education system. Fines for employers who knowingly employ 
migrants without valid documents were increased to £10,000 in 
the Immigration Act 2014 and the Immigration Compliance and 
Enforcement team (ICE) activities were increased. These changes 
risk organisations and businesses incorrectly discriminating against 
ethnic minority people by being overly cautious in complying with 
the policies or using the policies to tacitly endorse discriminatory 
practices. For example, in the private rental sector of the housing 
market it has been found that landlords increasingly target ethnic 
minority tenants to demand their citizenship and immigration 
documents in an effort to comply with the Immigration Act 2014 
(Craig et  al, 2015). There is a paucity of research on the same 
restrictive practices being levelled against white tenants but it is 
likely that they are not scrutinised to the same degree. Flynn’s 
(2016) work also found that immigration enforcement (ICE) 
workers regularly confront members of ethnic minority and migrant 
communities in West London as they enter tube stations, demanding 
to see documentation to prove immigration status. Aggressive and 
controversial bordering practices have included the ‘go home’ 
campaign vans sent out in 2014 by the Home Office, which were 
targeted in areas of high ethnic diversity.
Other examples of practices that have implications for ethnic 
minority groups can be seen in the implementation of a new minimum 
income requirement in July 2012. The minimum income requirement 
states that UK citizens and settled residents who wished to bring their 
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spouses or partners from outside the EU into the UK have to earn 
a minimum of £18,600. This amount increases depending on the 
number of additional dependents (such as children) a citizen wants 
to join them in the UK (Sumption and Vargas- Silva, 2016: 2). Many 
ethnic minority families have transnational extended families and 
therefore the introduction of the new minimum income requirement 
restricts their rights for family reunification. An analysis by the 
Migration Observatory (2014, cited in Byrne, 2016: 8) found that 
47% of British citizens in employment would not qualify to bring a 
family member, rising to 58% of people between 20– 30 years old, or 
61% of women of any age. This is likely to have a particular impact 
on certain ethnic minority groups, which, as we see in Chapter 6 
have particularly low levels of income. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
groups, for example, are highly concentrated in routine and low- skilled 
work, and therefore are less likely to have the income to fulfil the 
minimum entry requirement. Furthermore, specific cultural practices 
within groups such as the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic 
groups that include arranged marriages often do not match up with 
the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts’ conceptions of relationships, 
making it harder for some members of ethnic minority groups to be 
able to bring their partners to the UK (Wray, 2016). As well as the 
change to the minimum income requirement threshold, ‘since July 
2012 the immigration rules for adult dependent relatives have been, in 
practice, almost impossible to meet. Applicants need to demonstrate 
that they require a level of long- term personal care that they are unable 
to get in their home country, either due to the cost or availability’ 
(Yeo, 2017: 1). This change has made it near impossible for the adult 
dependents (parents or grandparents) of British citizens to join their 
family in the UK.
Detention, deportation and dispersal
At the same time as the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 brought 
in changes to who was eligible to enter Britain, policies were 
implemented to make it easier for the government to remove people 
from the UK and also limited their scope for appeal and simplified 
the removal process. The changes on multiple fronts to who and what 
the government has deemed as ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ migration versus 
‘bad’ or ‘undesirable’ migration has resulted in criticism from migrant 
rights groups and activists (Gower, 2015). According to Darling 
(2016: 231), broader changes to the structure and service provision 
of dispersal and resettlement programmes in Britain have resulted in 
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asylum being ‘an issue of public policy from which’ profit is sought. 
For example, asylum accommodation provision has been transferred 
to private contractors.
According to Bloch and Schuster (2005: 497), detention ‘differs 
from imprisonment in that the primary purpose of incarceration 
is not punishment for a crime committed’ but a way of separating 
those the state believes have broken immigration law. Until the 
1990s there were no Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) in the 
UK and when large groups of asylum seekers entered the UK (for 
example, the Sri Lankans in 1987) they were housed in the prison 
estate (Bloch and Schuster, 2005). However, in the early 90s the 
government responded by building a permanent detention estate 
to house illegal immigrants, failed asylum seekers and later asylum 
seekers waiting their asylum outcomes (or on the fast- track asylum 
route) in order to prevent them being housed in prisons. Now the 
UK immigration estate is one of the largest in Europe and IRCs and 
holding centres are located across the UK, particularly near airports 
and seaports, to detain people arriving without documentation in the 
country and also to remove and deport people back to their country 
of origin (Silverman and Hajela, 2011). Out of seven IRCs, as of 
December 2018, six are outsourced by the government to private 
firms. Between 2009 and 2017, there have been between 2,500 and 
3,500 individuals in immigration detention at any given time with 
numbers varying between 27,000 and 33,000 entering detention in 
each year (Silverman and Griffiths, 2019).
The largest category of immigration detainees is people who have 
sought asylum at some stage – accounting for about 47% of people 
entering detention in 2017. An increasing proportion of those detained 
are EU nationals (19 in 2017). The number of children detained has 
fallen considerably over the last 18 years, with 42 children detained in 
2017. The parliamentary Joint Committee of Human Rights conducted 
an inquiry on immigration detention, which argued that decisions 
on detention should be made independent of the Home Office and 
by a judge. They also pointed out that the UK is the only country in 
Europe that does not impose time limits on immigration detention 
and suggested a limit of 28 days and that those detained should have 
access to legal advice. They also made recommendations on the care 
of vulnerable individuals and on the need to make the detention estate 
less prison- like (House of Commons, 2019).
Deportation is the state- enforced or enforceable departure of a 
non- citizen from a country and has grown as a practice the past 
three decades, with a slight decline since 2015 (although changes in 
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government classification of departures over time makes this difficult 
to report). The Home Office (2017: 1) recorded that in 2017, 12,321 
people were returned to their country of origin and this represented 
a decrease of 1% compared with 12,469 people in 2016. The top five 
countries of enforced removal or voluntary departure in 2017 were 
India (14% of the total) and Pakistan (9% of the total) and China, 
Romania and Albania (all at 6% of the total).
The state also uses dispersal (the movement of government- assisted 
asylum seekers to housing outside London and the south- east) as a 
method of bordering, with the Home Office, in 2000, creating a 
specific branch, the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), to 
deal exclusively with asylum seekers. The role of NASS was to process 
asylum applications and provide support with respect to housing and 
subsistence throughout the duration of their application (Robinson 
and Andersson, 2003). Frontline services that work directly with 
asylum seekers have found that dispersal and related bordering practices 
disadvantage ethnic minority groups disproportionately. Many asylum 
applicants who are dispersed across the UK have family members 
who are British citizens or settled residents and therefore dispersal 
undermines the supportive elements of social and family networks by 
moving applicants to places that are often far from these connections, 
thus taking a social and psychological toll. Problematically, the NASS 
and Home Office’s arguments for dispersal are built on economic 
arguments put forth to lessen the demand and burden on housing and 
resources in London and the south- east. However, in reality, these do 
not take into account some of the challenges that asylum applicants 
face by being dispersed to places that are more deprived, less diverse 
(increasing the risk of hostility and racism) and unfamiliar with housing 
international migrants.
Resettlement has also been used by the British state, as part of its 
arsenal to regulate and control asylum seekers from a collection of 
Home Office programmes such as the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement 
Scheme (VPRS) that has been used to formulate Britain’s response to 
Syrian refugee crisis across continental Europe. Compared to detention, 
resettlement exists as a relatively minor bordering practice, in terms 
of the number of asylum seekers/ refugees it deals with. Britain has 
taken in a meagre number of Syrian asylum seekers compared to other 
EU countries (for example, Sweden and Germany). Britain’s declared 
intention with the VPRS scheme was to take in 20,000 Syrian refugees 
in need of protection by 2020. By March 2017, 7,307 Syrian asylum 
seekers had been assisted with the scheme.
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Box 1: Case study
Contested belonging: the case of the Windrush generation
Earlier in this chapter we described how the formerly expansive definition of 
British citizenship formalised in the British Nationality Act 1948 was gradually 
restricted. This process excluded many Commonwealth citizens from rights to 
enter and settle in the UK along primarily racialised lines, culminating in the 
establishment of ‘patriality’ in 1971 (mentioned earlier). The Windrush scandal 
of 2018 shed light on how Home Office practices and the aggressive ‘compliant 
environment’ linked to the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 unsettled the 
status of some Commonwealth citizens who had settled in the UK prior to 1972.
Although these have been called the ‘Windrush generation’ after the ship, 
the SS Empire Windrush, which brought the first mass migration from the 
Caribbean to Britain in 1948, the scandal has affected migrants from a range of 
Commonwealth (and other) countries. Although this generation were citizen- 
migrants, entering Britain with full rights, they have encountered problems under 
the new immigration policies in proving their status and rights. For example, 
some arrived as children travelling on their parents’ passports and had never 
applied for travel or citizenship documents. Newly introduced immigration law, 
which requires people to have documentation to work, rent property and access 
benefits including health care, has meant that some migrants have lost jobs, 
been refused free access to NHS care and faced destitution. The Immigration 
Act 2014 also removed protection for Commonwealth citizens, who had up 
until then been exempt from deportation. As a result some citizen- migrants 
who had entered legally and had rights to reside in the UK have been detained 
or deported.
It is still unclear how many people have been directly affected by this scandal. 
The Windrush Taskforce has dealt with more than 6,000 individual possible 
cases by January 2019. It has issued documentation confirming status to more 
than 2,000 individuals and granted citizenship or indefinite leave to remain or 
no time limit to more than 4,000 individuals who arrived in the UK as minors 
(Javid, 2019). It is unclear how many people of the Windrush generation have 
been wrongfully deported, although it may be as many as 83, of whom 12 have 
subsequently died (Javid, 2019). The government has recently announced that 
it will pay up to £200 million in compensation to those whose lives have been 
damaged by the Home Office’s misclassification of thousands of long- term 
residents as illegal migrants (Gentleman, 2019).
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Deprivation of citizenship
Throughout the chapter we have talked about the different ways the 
state has implemented policy designed to deter migrants from staying in 
Britain for the long term, or creating obstacles that make it difficult for 
them to regularise their stay and proceed on a pathway to naturalisation 
and citizenship. However, since 1981 the state has also implemented 
powers of citizenship deprivation. Deprivation of citizenship is ‘when 
an individual with British citizenship status – whether through birth, 
naturalisation or being a citizen of a British overseas territory or 
otherwise – has that citizenship removed by the British government’ 
(CAGE, 2019). Ethnic minority people are more likely to have, or be 
deemed to have, the right to dual citizenship and are therefore more 
vulnerable to having citizenship removed. The Immigration Act 2014 
amended the National Act 1981 by inserting three subsections to 
expand the powers by which and the circumstances when citizenship 
can be removed. For example, subsection 40(4a) grants the Home 
Secretary the power to deprive a person of British citizenship obtained 
through naturalization, even if it would render the person stateless. 
The increased powers came into force following the case of the Iraqi- 
born Hilal al Jedda and the British state’s frustration over their failure 
to deprive him of his citizenship because the action would render him 
stateless (Ross and Rudgard, 2014).
The new powers permit the state to remove British people’s 
citizenship if the state believes it is conducive to the public good, or if 
a person’s citizenship has been obtained through means of fraud, false 
representation or concealment of material fact (Home Office, 2016). 
The measures have drawn attention following anxieties over the rise 
of the number of British citizens who have travelled to the conflict in 
Syria. Most recently, the state’s powers have come under scrutiny as 
the result of the case of Shamima Begum, the British schoolgirl who 
had journeyed to Syria with two school friends to join ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria). However, the powers have been criticised 
for their targeting of ethnic minorities, particularly Muslim people 
(Dearden, 2019). The British state has suggested the new powers are 
reactive, as well as acting as a deterrent to citizens wishing to travel 
abroad to join groups deemed to be terrorist organisations (Dearden, 
2019). Yet what is relatively unknown is the exact number of people 
against whom the British state has used these powers.
A freedom of information request showed that between 2006 and 
2015, 35 decisions were taken to remove the citizenship of people on 
the basis of this being conducive to the public good, while 45 decisions 
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were taken to deprive people of citizenship because their citizenship 
was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment 
of material fact (McGuiness and Gower, 2017). More recently, data 
published by Dearden (2019) highlighted that there had been a large 
increase of citizenship deprivation cases relating to decisions that were 
deemed conducive to the public good. Dearden (2019) suggested that 
cases had increased from 14 in 2006 to 104 in 2017, and explained that 
the 600% increase related to cases such as that of Shamima Begum, 
where the state had used the powers to target those it viewed as having 
been involved in terrorist activity.
Conclusion
Britain has a long history of migration, which has been shaped 
particularly by its history of empire and its relationship with Europe. 
The question of immigration continues to be highly contentious 
and is framed in ways which can have a particular impact on ethnic 
minority communities, whether or not they are citizens or migrants. 
The 2016 EU referendum provided an example of the ways in 
which immigration and border control are particularly politically 
contentious, despite arguments about the economic contribution of 
migration (Vargas- Silva, 2015). Since 2010, policies that have rested 
on targets for net immigration and the creation of a ‘compliant’ or 
unwelcoming environment, particularly for those migrants deemed 
‘uncontrolled’ or undesirable, have particularly affected ethnic 
minority communities. In- house ID checking in housing and 
education, while representing an attempt to reduce immigration 
numbers, has permitted acts of discrimination and racism against BME 
groups, LGBTQ migrants and asylum seekers. Many of these practices 
and policies have targeted BME groups specifically – both directly 
and indirectly – producing state- permitted forms of discrimination, 
including with reference to certain culturally embedded traditions 
such as arranged marriages.
Britain has recently entered uncharted territory as the result of the 
electorate’s vote for Brexit. For Britain, the uncertainty regarding its 
relationship with Europe and the rest of the world as well as its position 
on trade and immigration has opened up the following as yet unresolved 
questions that are important for immigration:
• What type of immigration status will be offered to long- term EU 
residents living in Britain and will there be a minimum threshold 
imposed for EU migrants who can apply for this status?
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• How will the government balance its need for migrant labour versus 
its self- imposed targets to decrease net migration?
• What changes to immigration policy will be introduced after the 
ending of free movement of EU nationals to and from the UK?
While these questions are still yet to be answered, Britain’s moves 
to restrict immigration, and its definitions of desired and undesired 
migration and the ways in which this is racialised, become more 
complex.
Note





Minority ethnic groups, policing and 
the criminal justice system in Britain
William Shankley and Patrick Williams
Key findings
• The majority of employees in the criminal justice system in England 
and Wales (93.4% of police officers; 93.2% of court judges; 89.6% of 
tribunal judges and 94% of prison officers) come from an ethnically 
White background.
• While the rates of stop- and- search have declined steadily across 
all ethnic groups between 2010/ 11 and 2016/ 17, Black groups 
continue to face the highest rates of stop- and- search by police, 
with the rate being eight times that of white people in 2016/ 17.
• Ethnic minority groups are increasingly and disproportionately 
represented in the youth criminal justice system population.
• Ethnic minority people are increasingly and disproportionately 
incarcerated (rising from 26% in 2008 to 45% in 2018).
• Policy and politicians’ focus on ‘the gang’ leads to criminal justice 
practices against racialised communities without an evidence base. 
Joint Enterprise powers have also been used disproportionately 
against ethnic minority defendants.
• Stop- and- search powers continue to be used disproportionately 
against ethnic minority people.
• Data analysed by Inquest shows a disproportionate number of ethnic 
minority people in custody compared to white people.
Introduction1
The criminal justice system (CJS) is a core public service, which is 
divided into three separate systems in the United Kingdom with 
different powers and institutions for England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland (Gov.uk, 2018c).
In England and Wales the CJS is comprised of the police, Crown 
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of over 300 different organisations and institutions working together 
to deliver criminal justice. The purpose of the CJS as a whole is ‘to 
deliver justice for all, by convicting and punishing the guilty and 
helping them to stop offending while protecting the innocent’ (Gov.
uk, 2018e: 1). The CJS is responsible for detecting crime and bringing 
perpetrators to justice by carrying out the orders of, for example, 
the courts, to collect fines, supervise community and custodial 
punishment (Clinks, 2018). In England and Wales, the Ministry of 
Justice oversees the Magistrates Courts, the Crown Courts, the Legal 
Services Commission and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service 
(HMPPS). In comparison, the Home Office oversees the police and 
finally, the Attorney General’s Office oversees the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the Serious Fraud Office, and other government lawyers with 
the authority to prosecute cases.
Scotland and Northern Ireland, meanwhile, have devolved powers 
that extend to their CJS. Law in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
is divided into two main categories:  civil and criminal law. In 
Scotland, the Scottish government has executive responsibility for 
the Scottish legal system, with functions exercised by the Cabinet 
Secretary for Justice (MyGov.scot, 2018a). The Cabinet Secretary 
for Justice has political responsibility for policing, law enforcement 
and the courts of Scotland, as well as the Scottish Prison Service. 
The key institutions involved in the Scottish CJS include the police, 
the courts, Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, as well as 
correctional institutions (prisons, for example). By comparison, 
Northern Ireland has its own judicial system, headed by the Lord 
Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. The Department of Justice is 
responsible for administering the courts (Northern Ireland Courts 
and Tribunal Service) and has responsibility, as well, for policy and 
legislation about criminal law, legal aid policy, the police, prisons 
and probation (NIdirect, 2019). The justice system is made up of 
a number of agencies that include the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland, the Probation Board for Northern Ireland and the Criminal 
Justice Inspection Northern Ireland.
There have long been recognised inequalities in the CJS in the 
employment of and treatment of ethnic minorities. The systematic and 
institutional racism which was highlighted by the Macpherson report in 
1999 persists in the UK with ethnic minority people disproportionately 
represented in the CJS at every level, from stop- and- search to arrests, 
conviction and imprisonment and deaths in custody. The Lammy 
review published in September 2017 explored the over- representation 
of ethnic minorities in the prison population in England and Wales and 
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raised particular concerns around the disproportional representation 
of ethnic minorities in the youth justice system – with 41% of youth 
prisoners being ethnic minorities in 2016. Public confidence in the 
CJS is critical, particularly as it represents a coercive arm of the state. 
Police data (ONS, 2017) for England and Wales find that, over the 
years 2014– 17, fewer Black Caribbean (71%) and Mixed (70%) people 
had confidence in the police compared to White British (78%) and 
Asian (79%) people.
This chapter will examine the statistical evidence of ethnic minority 
experience in respect to the institutions of the CJS. The first section 
concentrates on ethnic minorities and their relationship with the police, 
including questions of police discrimination and the employment of 
ethnic minorities in the police force and CJS. The second section 
considers the use of measures such as joint enterprise and how they 
have been used disproportionately against ethnic minority defendants. 
The chapter examines evidence of a process of racialisation in the 
interface between ethnic minority people and institutions associated 
with the CJS. This is where certain crimes, for example, gangs and 
terrorism, are racialised and associated with black and Asian people 
more than other ethnic groups, leading to higher rates of surveillance, 
arrest and prosecution.
Policing and discrimination
The police forces in the UK, as branches of the state, have a duty to 
serve and protect the British public by enforcing the law (Cashmore, 
2001). These organisations are also obliged to follow those same laws 
while at work. However, as Bowling et al (in El- Enany and Bruce- 
Jones, 2015:  7) have noted, ‘police powers were exempted from 
the first three Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976’. Thus 
anti- discrimination laws have historically had no influence over how 
policing processes were carried out, leaving the police able to act 
with impunity and without challenge to their inadequate provision of 
service (for example, in failing to respond to ethnic minority victims of 
racist violence) or discrimination in their actions. An example of the 
implications of the lack of coverage of the police by anti- discrimination 
laws was the criminalisation of black youth through disproportionate 
uses of the stop- and- search powers by the police in the early 1980s. 
This culminated in national uprisings across the country (Solomos, 
1988). The consistent misuse of these powers has regularly been found 
to have done significant damage to ethnic minority communities’ 
relations with, and trust in, the police forces in Britain (Bowling and 
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Phillips, 2007). The stop- and- search policies have been cited as one of 
the central issues in the complaints that ethnic minority groups make 
about the police (Delsol and Shiner, 2006). These discriminatory 
practices have been found to ‘drain trust’ in the police and subsequently, 
the CJS more generally (Lammy, 2017: 17).
The year 2000 potentially signalled a significant turning point 
in these processes. Following the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, the 
1999 Macpherson report, which documented the findings of the 
public inquiry, made clear that the Metropolitan Police’s handling of 
Lawrence’s murder was marred by institutional racism (Garner, 2017; 
and see Miller 2010). The findings stated that the Metropolitan Police 
force was unable to provide a satisfactory service to people ‘because of 
their colour, culture or ethnic origin’ (Bowling et al in El- Enany and 
Bruce- Jones, 2015: 9). Following the recommendations of the 1999 
Macpherson report, to ensure that ‘all bodies were fully compliant’ 
with the Race Relations Acts of 1976 – including the police – an 
amendment to the law was made (Moore, 2011: 4). The new Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 meant that the police could be 
held accountable for acts of racial discrimination. Nonetheless, the 
disproportionate targeting of ethnic minority people under stop- and- 
search laws continues to be a point of contention as will be discussed 
later in this chapter.
One of the recommendations from the 1999 Macpherson report was 
to examine the representation of ethnic minority people, particularly 
Black Britons, in the police force. Historically, the police force, 
alongside other institutions within the CJS, has been a racially white 
institution with an over- representation of white officers (Cashmore, 
2001; Johnston, 2006). While the employment of a more diverse police 
force alone is unlikely to change the processes of institutional racism 
within the CJS, the under- representation of ethnic minority police 
remains a concern.
Figure 3.1 shows that, despite some increases in ethnic minority 
police, the majority of the police force in England and Wales 
remains composed of ethnically White British (93.4%) police 
officers. This figure exceeds the White British group’s share of the 
total population (86.9%). Meanwhile, all ethnic minority groups 
(Asian, Black, Mixed, Other) remain under- represented in the 
police forces of England and Wales compared to their share of the 
population. Furthermore, in the CJS, data from 2018 show that 6.8% 
of court judges and 10.6% of tribunal judges were from an ethnic 
minority background, statistics far below their 14% share of the 
total population (Courts and Tribunal Judiciary, 2018). Examining 
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the legal profession (where the ethnicity was known) white judges 
made up the highest percentage of both court and tribunal judges 
(93.2% and 89.4%). Meanwhile, judges from an Asian background 
made up the second highest percentage of court judges (3.1% of 
court and 4.8% of tribunal judges). Nevertheless, these statistics still 
represented an under- representation of their employment in these 
roles in the CJS compared to the pan- Asian group’s share of the 
population (6.8%). Moreover, the data also show that 16.7% of non- 
legal tribunal members came from an ethnic minority background, 
which indicated an increase of approximately 0.4 percentage points 
since 2017 (Courts and Tribunal Judiciary, 2018).
Furthermore, among prison officers the 2018 data show that just 
over 94% of prison officers in England and Wales (where the ethnicity 
was known) came from an ethnic White background. Such statistics 
suggest an over- representation of the White group in relation to its 
share of the total population (86%). Comparing the demography of 
prison officers between 2015 and 2018, the percentage of prison 
officers from a Black ethnic background increased, from 2.3% to 2.7%. 
Equivalent data are not available to make a comparative analysis on 
the ethnic composition of the workforce across the police, court and 
tribunal judges, and prison officers in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
















Source: Home Office (2018b). 
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Stop- and- search
A further recommendation of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry addressed 
ethnic disparities in the police’s utilisation of stop- and- search powers 
(Miller, 2010; Delsol and Shiner, 2006). The recommendations 
resulted in reforms to stop- and- search powers, some of which 
included:  the requirement of the police to record the self- defined 
ethnicity of those they stopped, reasons for the search, outcomes of 
the encounter, and that a copy of these records that should be given 
to the person in question (Miller, 2010: 957). There are different 
stop- and- search powers available to the police to stop people, for 
example, section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 gives police the right:
to search people in a defined area during a specific time 
period when they believe, with good reason, that: serious 
violence will take place and it is necessary to use this power 
to prevent such violence; or that a person is carrying a 
dangerous object or offensive weapon; or that an incident 
involving serious violence has taken place and a dangerous 
instrument or offensive weapon used in the incident is 
being carried in the locality. (Metropolitan Police, 2017: 1)
S60 stop- and- search powers differ from the other powers because 
they can only be used if a decision is made by a senior police officer 
(Metropolitan Police Information, 2017).
Generally, the overall rates of ‘stop- and- search’ (those made under 
section 1 PACE [Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984] and section 
60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) have declined 
at a steady rate across all ethnic groups, including (Figure 3.2), over 
the period 2010/ 11 to 2016/ 17. The fall in the rate of ‘stop- and- 
search’ has been most acute for Black ethnic groups. In 2010/ 11, there 
were 112 searches for every 1,000 black people; in 2016/ 17 that fell 
to 29 searches for every 1,000 black people. However despite these 
reductions, a disproportionality remains.
The most up- to- date data (2017/ 18) show that, despite the overall 
decline in the rates of stop- and- search for all ethnic groups, the rate 
for the Black ethnic minority groups, in particular, have remained 
higher than for other ethnic groups and the White majority ethnic 
groups. Shiner et al (2018: 13) noted that black people were stopped 
and searched ‘more than eight times the rate of white people in 2016/ 
17’. The RDA (Race Disparity Audit) (2018) added that in 2017/ 18, 
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for example, there were 3 stop- and- searches recorded for every 1,000 
white people, compared with 29 stop- and- searches for every 1,000 
black people (Figure 3.2). Thus ethnic disparities in stop- and- search 
continue, despite recommendations and amendments to the law. The 
2017/ 18 data also show that there is a high stop- and- search rate among 
the White Other group. This high rate among the White Other groups 
relates to the criminalising of homelessness among central and Eastern 
European migrants in particular, a violation of the EU free movement 
rights (Pronczuk, 2018).
Area
While the disproportionality is clear in the national stop- and- search 
data, different patterns emerge when the data are analysed between 
different police forces. The data show high rates of stop- and- search 
among black people occurred across all police forces where data were 
Figure 3.2: Rates of stop- and- search per 1,000 members of the population by 





































































Notes: Includes searches under section 1 of PACE and section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994.
Source: Table SS_ 13 in ‘Stop- and- search statistics data tables: police powers and procedures 
year ending 31 March 2017’. For access to data/tables see: www.gov.uk/ government/ statistics/ 
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available. In 2017/ 18, the biggest difference in stop- and- search rates 
between black and white people was in Dorset, where black people 
were 17 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white 
people (Shiner et al, 2018). The rate of black stop- and- searches was 
also high in the West Mercia area, where black people were 15 times 
more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. Finally, 
the Metropolitan Police force in London had the highest overall rate 
of stop- and- search, at 16 incidents for every 1,000 people (Home 
Office, 2018; Shiner et al, 2018). Similar data have not been collected 
across police forces in Scotland or Northern Ireland to reflect ethnic 
disparities within specific areas.
Figure 3.3: Top five areas for stop- and- search (per 1,000) by ethnic group
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Source: Home Office (2018c).
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Victims of crime
There is a dearth of evidence on ethnic minorities as the victims of crime 
in the UK. Figure 3.4 suggests that people from the Mixed White/ Asian 
and Mixed Other ethnic groups were the most likely to say they were 
the victims of crime (at 29% and 26% respectively). The percentage of 
White British groups who said they were victims of crime fell from 
17% to 14% between 2013/ 14 and 2017/ 18 and is the lowest of all 
groups, apart from the White Irish. No other ethnic group experienced 
a significant change during the same period. No similar information has 
been collected for Scotland or Northern Ireland to undertake a similar 
analysis of ethnic minorities’ experience of being the victim of crime.
Furthermore, Figure 3.5 shows that white men were more likely 
than white women to say they were victims of crime in the previous 
Figure 3.4: People aged 16 years and over who said they were victims of crime, 
































Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, year ending March 2018 (ONS, 2018). 
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12 months, with 16% and 15% respectively. While Figure 3.5 suggests 
some differences between men and women in the Mixed, Black, 
Asian and Other groups, unlike the White group, the sample for 
these groups is small and any generalisations based on the figures 
are unreliable.
Terrorism- related policing
The issue of domestic- related terrorism has had an increasingly 
high profile in media, politics and law in the last 25 years with the 
introduction of significant counter- terrorism policing methods and 
new laws. These have included the Terrorism Act 2000 (Choudhury 
and Fenwick, 2011; Anderson, 2012; Ip, 2013) used as a primary 
counterterrorism tool (Quinlan in El- Enany and Bruce- Jones, 
2015: 16). The act has expanded police powers to stop, search, question, 
detain and arrest individuals suspected of engaging or planning to 
engage in terrorism- related activities (Quinlan in El- Enany and 
Bruce- Jones, 2015: 16). These expanded powers, particularly section 
44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, have been particularly damaging to 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of people aged 16 years and over who said they were 
















Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, year ending March 2018 (ONS, 2018).
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police– community relations. Section 44 gave the police the remit to 
stop and search people in order to look for ‘articles’ which might be 
used to carry out a terrorist attack. However, they were not required 
to satisfy the ‘reasonable suspicion’ provision to question potential 
suspects (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). Section 44, before its repeal, 
had a ‘disproportionate impact on Asian ethnic minorities’ (Parmar, 
2011: 370). The stops made with this power were shown to produce 
low rates of terrorist arrests (Parmar, 2011), which was indicative of 
its ineffectiveness in actually preventing terrorist activity. For example, 
from the year 2000/ 01 to 2008/ 09, out of the 542,400 stops that were 
made under section 44, just 283 resulted in arrests for terrorism (0.05%) 
and none resulted in convictions (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011: 31). 
Heavy criticism of section 44 and its misuse, including a ruling of the 
European Court of Human Rights declaring it to be a violation of 
human rights, eventually led to its repeal (Choudhury and Fenwick, 
2011; Quinlan in El- Enany and Bruce- Jones, 2015).
The Metropolitan Police was observed to be the force which utilised 
section 44 most extensively before its repeal in 2011 (Choudhury 
and Fenwick, 2011: 32). In the year ending 2011, the Asian group 
made up 34% of all stop- and- searches. However, following policy 
changes and the increase of stop- and- searches under section 60 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, the number of stops of Asian 
people gradually fell to 24% in 2014 (Figure 3.6). Figure 3.6 shows the 
stop- and- searches of persons made by the Metropolitan Police under 
section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by self- defined ethnicity between 
2011 and 2017. It is possible that this fall in the proportion of stops 
of people defining themselves as Asian may have been a temporary 
police reaction to the major concerns raised over the force’s racial 
profiling tactics under section 44 of Asian ethnic minorities (Parmar, 
2011; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011), although this is not easy to 
decipher from the data.
Worryingly, the data show the percentage of arrests of the pan- Asian 
group since 11 September 2001 is far higher than for other ethnic groups. 
Related 2017 data show that 46% of the arrests made of the pan- Asian 
group resulted in a subsequent charge and a high percentage resulted 
in a conviction (50%). Yet, Figure 3.6 shows that other ethnic groups 
(White, Black, Other) have experienced low proportions of arrests and 
even fewer have resulted in convictions. As Choudhury and Fenwick 
(2011: 74) importantly note, the information required by the police to 
decide whether or not to make an arrest for terrorism- related offences 
is qualitatively different to the ‘admissible evidence’ needed in court that 
can lead to subsequent convictions. This perhaps helps to explain the 
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strikingly low number of convictions following arrest in the data since 
September 2001 (695 convictions out of 3,753 arrests, or 19%).
The link between these incidents and the data in Figure 3.6 is at best 
an extremely tentative one. Nevertheless, the wider point here is to 
shift the conversation away from the often- heard debate about ‘Islamic 
extremism’ in the post- September 2001 climate to prompt questions 
about the form and consistency of contemporary extremism(s) in 
Britain and how government, policing and the wider CJS might 
respond to it in future.
Young people in the youth justice system (under- 18s)
The Lammy review (2017: 4) noted that its ‘biggest concern is with 
the youth justice system’, despite claims that it is ‘regarded as one of 
the success stories of the criminal justice system’ because of the overall 
reduced rates of offending, re- offending and custody. These positive 
representations do not translate directly to ethnic minority youth 
experiences in the youth justice system, as is seen later in this chapter. 
The current youth cohort also represents an important indicator of 
Figure 3.6: Percentage of arrests for terrorism- related offences between 2001 




















































Source: Table A.11 – ‘Statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act in England and 
Wales 2000 and subsequent legislation’.
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the future make- up of adult offender populations and the continued 
intergenerational damage that can be done to families who endure 
encounters with the police, the CJS and the youth justice system in 
Britain. Ethnic minorities in Youth Offender Institutions constitute 
44% of the population who are incarcerated. As such, they present ‘an 
ever- ready cohort to transition to the adult estate when they become 
21 years of age’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018).
Data show two patterns among young people who receive cautions 
in the youth justice system when their ethnicity is taken into 
consideration. First, the rate of cautions of white young people has 
declined from 89.7% of all cautions in 2005/ 06 to 82.8% in 2017/ 18 
(Figure 3.7). Second, the proportion of cautions of ethnic minority 
youths has increased; for example, the percentage of black young people 
cautioned has increased from 5.9% of all young people cautioned in 
2005/ 06 to 11.4% in 2017/ 18. Furthermore, the percentage of Asian 
young people cautioned has increased from 3.6% of all young people 
cautioned in 2005/ 06 to 4.9% in 2017/ 18. Finally, the percentage 
of Other ethnic group has increased from 0.8% of all young people 
cautioned in 2005/ 06 to 0.9% in 2017/ 18. Thus the current ethnic 
minority youth cohort is experienced a worsening situation over time.
Figure 3.7: Percentage of youth cautions by ethnic group, England and Wales, 





















Source: Race Disparity Audit (Gov.uk, 2017).
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The Youth Justice Board (2018) published a report on young people 
and children in the youth CJS and suggested the average custodial 
sentence length for indictable offences given to children has increased 
by five months over the last ten years, from 11.4 to 16.7 months (Youth 
Justice Board, 2018). Moreover, at any one time over the past year 
(2018) an average of just below 900 children were in custody and, even 
though overall the pattern indicates there has been an average fall of 
70% over the last ten years, the pattern has slightly increased by 3% 
over the past year. The report also suggests that children in custody 
were largely incarcerated because of crimes categorised as violence 
against the person, and such crimes had increased (compared to other 
crimes) over the past year (Youth Justice Board, 2018).
As Williams and Clarke (2018) suggested, the ethnic make- up of 
the youth criminal justice population is indicative of the future ethnic 
demographics of the adult incarcerated population. This ethnic make- up 
is shifting, with fewer white children and more ethnic minority children 
in incarceration. As Figure 3.8 shows, the percentage of incarcerated 
white children fell from 74% in 2008 to 55% in 2018. By comparison, 
the rates of children in youth custody from a black background increased, 
from 15% in 2008 to 25% in 2018. Children from a black background 
now account for a quarter of the youth custody population in 2018 
Figure 3.8: Percentage of children in custody by ethnicity, youth secure estate in 


















Source: Youth Justice Statistics: 2017 to 2018 (Home Office, 2018d).
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(Youth Justice Board, 2018). The data also show an increase in the 
percentage of Asian and Other/ Mixed groups in the youth CJS, although 
not as pronounced as for the Black ethnic group (Figure 3.8), whose 
school- age population (under- 18) amounted to a 4.6% share of the total 
school- age population and indicated their large over- representation.
Ethnic minorities and custody
The data show that the percentage of people by ethnicity in custody in 
England and Wales has remained relatively constant between 2009 and 
2017 across all groups (Figure 3.9). No similar data have been made 
available for ethnic minorities in custody in Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. Figure 3.9 suggests the percentage of people in custody across 
the White and Asian ethnic groups rose slightly between 2009 and 
2016, with 78% in 2009 to 79% in 2017 for White groups; 6% in 
2009 to 7% in 2017 for the Asian group. The results show the under- 
representation of the White group’s share of the population (85.1%) 
compared to an under- representation of the Asian group’s share of the 
population (0.8% Bangladeshi, 3% Indian, 2% Pakistani and 1.7% Asian 
Other). The percentage of people in custody for the Black and Mixed 
group remained constant between 2009 and 2017, with 3% in 2009 
Figure 3.9: Percentage of adults in custody in England and Wales by their 


























Source: Race Disparity Audit (Gov.uk, 2017b).
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to 3% in 2017 for the Mixed group and 10% in 2009 to 10% in 2017 
for the Black group; an over- representation of Black groups compared 
to their share of the population of England and Wales (3.6%). Finally, 
the Other including Chinese group decreased from 2% in 2009 to 1% 
in 2017, a finding slightly higher than their cumulative share of the 
population (Chinese as 0.9% and other 0.7%). While the ethnic make- 
up of people in custody has changed very little in the past ten years, 
there has been a lot of debate about the number of ethnic minorities 
compared to white people who have died in custody as is discussed 
in the next section.
Deaths in custody
In Britain, institutional racism and police violence has been a 
keenly debated topic in particular since the Macpherson report in 
1999 (Bruce- Jones, 2015). According to statistics by Inquest (2018) 
a disproportionate number of people from an ethnic minority 
background have died as the result of constraint in police custody; 
since 1990, they number 151 out of 1,713 or 10%. Inquest’s statistics, 
covering the period 2002– 12, are even more striking: of 380 deaths in 
police custody in England and Wales (or as a result of contact with the 
police), 69 were from ethnic minority communities – 18%. Of the 509 
cases of ethnic minority deaths in custody in suspicious circumstances 
that the Institute of Race Relations analysed from its database of cases 
between 1991 and 2014, the majority, 348, took place in prison, 137 
in police custody and 24 in immigration detention (cited in El- Enany 
and Bruce- Jones, 2015: 4). Furthermore, one in three of the official 
classification of deaths was as a result of self- harm, and in 64 cases the 
person was known to have mental health problems. Medical neglect 
was a contributory factor in 49 cases, and in 48 the use of force appears 
to have contributed to a person’s death (for a broader discussion on 
ethnic inequalities and health; see Chapter 4).
The racialisation and criminalisation of ethnic minority 
groups
One mechanism for the criminalisation of Black, Mixed, Asian and 
other minority ethnic communities is the notion and utilisation of the 
racialised term ‘gang’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018). The concept of 
the gang and its relationship to ethnic minority groups, particularly 
blackness, has an extensive history in Britain (Gilroy, 1987a; Keith, 
1993). Williams and Clarke (2018) have argued that the more recent 
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focus by policymakers and politicians on the gang has resurfaced after 
the social unrest in England in the summer of 2011. Labelling the social 
unrest as a product of an endemic gang problem in the country led 
to a flurry of anxieties where ‘the media, politicians, think tanks and 
academics were quick to evoke the already established view of the gang 
problem’ (p.7). While the government acknowledged there were some 
inherent problems with these racialised assumptions informing their 
approach to crime, this did not stop various policies and programmes 
being rolled out to target gangs as the site of serious criminality, for 
example, the Home Office’s programme Ending Gangs and Youth 
Violence (EGYV). However, despite the dominance of the racialised 
gang narrative, in their analysis of policing in Manchester, Williams 
and Clarke (2016) found that white people overwhelmingly committed 
the largest proportion of police- defined incidents of serious youth 
violence (76% of the sample). Meanwhile ethnic minority ‘people, 
and in particular young black men, were more likely to be identified 
as gang involved’, with 89% of those registered as ‘gang nominal’. 
Katz and Jackson- Jacobs (2004) add that in over a century of scholarly 
work there has yet to be any reliable evidence that links gangs with 
violent crime. Therefore, we have to ask the broader question: why 
has the government continued to pursue policies that target gang 
violence when it lacks any conclusive evidence to suggest the gang 
should continue to be a focus of their crime policy? A more recent 
example of the way the term ‘gang’ has been evoked in policy is how 
the notion has been attached to multiple crimes such as modern- day 
slavery, child sexual exploitation and crimes related to drugs and the 
county lines, and to knife crime. These are presented as racialised 
crimes and associated with gangs despite the lack of an evidence base 
to support this.
County lines, knife crime and racialisation
According to Quinn (2019), there has been a 152% increase in knife 
crimes in Kent between April 2010 and September 2018, with similar 
increases in knife crimes in Hertfordshire (89%), Staffordshire (88% 
increase) and Essex (44% increase). Reporting on the rise in knife 
crime in the Home Countries is regularly explained using the county 
lines framework that explains how violent crime travels in a similar 
way to drugs. This is supported by Assistant Chief Constable Nick 
Downing (head of the serious crime directorate for Kent and Essex 
police) suggesting ‘we don’t have a gang issue in Kent. What we do 
have is a drug issue from county lines coming in and we need to 
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combat that’ (Quinn, 2019: 1). However, this explanation serves to 
maintain the racialisation of this kind of crime, detaching the factors 
that contribute to violent crime from the Home Counties. Whittaker 
and Densley (2019) explain that poverty is the key reason why many 
young people in these areas participate in crime that stretches from the 
urban centres such as London. This has been amplified by the broader 
effects of austerity, which have reduced youth centres and the funding 
for youth activities.
Joint enterprise, racialisation and custodial sentences
The proportion of people of different ethnicities prosecuted and then 
convicted of a crime provides one measure of ethnic inequalities in 
convictions administered by the justice system. Figure 3.10 shows 
that between 2009 and 2017 there has been an increase in the 
Figure 3.10: Conviction ratios of offenders in England and Wales by ethnicity, 


























Source: Courts and Tribunal Judiciary (2018).
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conviction ratio across all ethnic groups. In 2017, the data show 
that White offenders had the highest conviction ratio at 85.3%; 
whereas black offenders had the lowest conviction ratio at 78.7% in 
2017. While there seems meagre ethnic disparity with respect to the 
conviction ratios across ethnic minority groups, practices undertaken 
by prosecutors in the judicial system highlight ethnic disparities in 
prosecution processes.
Joint enterprise (JE) ‘is a doctrine in common law which has been 
developed by the courts in cases where more than one person is to be 
prosecuted for the same offence’ (Williams and Clarke, 2018: 5). The 
doctrine is used as a ‘collective punishment of groups where suspects 
may have played different roles, and in many cases, where a suspect was 
not in the proximity of the offence committed’ (Williams and Clarke, 
2018: 7). The reason JE has emerged as such a controversial apparatus 
used by the CJS is because its interpretation of the ‘common purpose’ 
provision, where this has been used to make a case for prosecution 
against all participants when a crime, for example, murder has been 
committed by only one member of the group. This is the case even 
if members of the group did not participate in or intend to commit 
that crime, depending on how the prosecution defines the group. 
Taken together with the racialisation of certain criminal labels such 
as the gang, the use of JE can go some way to explain why there is a 
disproportionality in the number of ethnic minority people serving 
custodial sentences compared to White people. The Cambridge 
Submission (cited in Williams and Clarke, 2018) found that the 
proportion of Black/ Black British people serving custodial sentences 
on the basis of JE offences was 11 times higher than their share of the 
general population (37% compared to 3.3%). This suggests that JE 
powers are used disproportionately against black people.
Conclusion
The CJS is an expansive body of the state whose work seeks justice, 
from the initial stages of the police force and stop- and- search 
policies to various court processes that impose custodial sentences 
on those indicted and finally the probation service that attempts to 
support offenders back into the community and reduce re- offending 
(recidivism). However, this chapter has shown that ethnic minorities 
face multiple challenges at various stages of the CJS. The chapter finds 
that policies, such as stop- and- search, that have grown out of anxieties 
over terrorism and other forms of violent crime, are disproportionately 
used against ethnic minority communities rather than White British 
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people. While such policies are historically situated, the contemporary 
racialisation of specific types of crime has led to stop- and- search being 
applied unevenly across ethnic groups and that, even though in many 
instances police action has been reviewed and found guilty of systemic 
and institutional racism and discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
there remains a disproportionate wielding of this power by the police 
force in Britain.
Inquiries such as that into the murder of Stephen Lawrence have shed 
light on the institutional racism inherent in the Metropolitan Police and 
their handling and dealing with ethnic minorities who are victims of 
crimes. That inquiry also draws attention to the lack of diversity within 
police forces up and down the country. This chapter shows that the 
police remain dominated by White British police officers and, while 
recruitment practices that stem from inquiries such as the one linked 
to the Stephen Lawrence case have increased the number of ethnic 
minority police officers, police data from 2016/ 17 show that ethnic 
minorities still constitute proportions of the police force that are less 
than their share of the total population (Gov.uk, 2018d).
While there has been an increase in terrorist- related attacks across 
the UK and mainland Europe, the chapter has found that police forces 
have excessively and disproportionately used the ‘stop- and- search’ 
powers particularly against non- White minorities. It is concerning 
that a high proportion of arrests using stop- and- search have resulted 
in relatively minor conviction rates for all groups apart from the pan- 
Asian group. This suggests that the racialisation, particularly of Asian 
minorities by the police, and their presumed links to terrorism, have 
led to policies such as stop- and- search amplifying racial undertones 
towards minority communities. The arena bombing in Manchester 
and attacks across London and mainland Europe have contributed 
to the escalation of anxieties about terrorism, with the public urging 
the government and police to do more. However, the problem is that 
these events have come during a heightened period of austerity cuts 
to the police force and other public institutions that have reduced the 
numbers of officers available for community policing. It seems that 
cuts in this environment could open up the risk of ethnic minorities 
becoming increasingly racially profiled with the heightened use of 
the stop- and- search policy. Another issue is there appears less anxiety 
regarding White terror or far- right ideology, which seems surprising, 
particularly given the murder of the MP for Batley and Spen, Jo Cox, 
in June 2016.
The chapter also found a worrying link between the narratives on 
gangs and the way that ethnic minorities, mainly black people, are 
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treated in the CJS. A collection of high- profile cases has led to the 
prosecution being successful in convicting black defendants under the 
common law of joint enterprise. This approach has led to some ethnic 
minority people who have been accused of a crime being convicted 
because the legal cases have framed them using the gang label, and this 
has consequently led to custodial sentences. The problem is that the 
term ‘gang’ is regularly applied to ethnic minorities, more specifically 
black defendants than White British defendants, which shows the 
racialisation of the term ‘gang’ and how it has been encapsulated in 
the CJS and has led to extensive custodial sentences.
The chapter calls for more work to be done to uncover precisely what 
mechanisms contribute to ethnic minority people and households being 
more likely to be the victims of crime, as there is a tendency within 
the research in the UK to focus on policing, and ethnic minorities as 
the defendants and accused, rather than the victims of crime.
Note
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Key findings
• Ethnic inequalities in health outcomes, experiences of health care 
and employment in the NHS workforce are substantial and, in the 
main, have not changed over time.
• Ethnic minority people have an increased risk of poor health 
compared with white people, but there is considerable variation in 
this across groups and across particular health conditions.
• There is a substantial body of evidence demonstrating that the 
multidimensional social and economic inequalities experienced 
by ethnic minority people, including racism, make a substantial 
contribution to ethnic inequalities in health.
• Despite the evidence on these inequalities, the issue of ethnicity has 
taken a marginal position in policy work on inequalities in health, 
with some significant pieces of policy work almost completely 
neglecting ethnic inequalities in health, in part because they are often 
reified as reflecting biological and cultural difference. A reorientation 
of the public health focus to one that considers the social character 
of ethnicity, and the socially and economically determined nature of 
health, could help the development of meaningful policy in this area.
• Evidence suggests that the provision, through the NHS, of publicly 
funded primary care with universal access and standardised treatment 
protocols has resulted in equality of access and outcomes across 
ethnic groups.
• However, there are inequalities in access to secondary health care 
and dental care, and in satisfaction with care received.
• Ethnic minority people report less good experiences than White 
British people of almost every dimension of General Practice 
services. And ethnic minority people who had been diagnosed 
with a cancer saw their General Practitioner several more times 
than White British people before they were referred to a hospital.
• Stereotyping, discrimination, racism and cultural incompetence 
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This is illustrated in the chapter using evidence in relation to severe 
mental illness, interpreting services and sickle cell and thalassaemia 
disorders.
• Ethnic minority people are over- represented in the NHS workforce, 
but experience marked inequalities in type and grade of employment. 
This is reflected in pay bands, representation among senior staff and 
representation on NHS Trust boards.
• Only 7% of NHS Trust board members across England are from 
an ethnic minority group and more than two fifths of NHS Trusts 
have no ethnic minority board members.
Introduction
The relationship between ethnicity and health has received 
intermittent focus in work concerned with ethnic inequalities. 
However, a close examination of issues related to health is particularly 
useful for three reasons. First, it is here that we can see how broader 
social and economic inequalities translate into profound outcomes for 
ethnic minority people; and also how policy and practice typically 
translate the two deeply social phenomena of ethnicity and health into 
essentialised constructs that are typically reduced to biology. Second, 
by examining the ways in which health and social care are provided, 
and the outcomes of that care, we can explore how an institution that 
is central to our lives serves to address, or amplify, broader racialised 
social structures. Third, the provision of health and social care services 
continues to rely heavily on the labour of ethnic minority and migrant 
people, therefore an examination of the experiences and outcomes 
for ethnic minority employees in the NHS sheds light on the broader 
context of ethnic inequalities in the labour market. In this context, 
it is worth noting that a mix of racialised discourses have:  framed 
‘migrants’ as intruders and a drain on the NHS; located the prevalence 
of certain diseases in cultural norms; and positioned ethnic minority 
health care staff as ‘fillers’ and as less competent and desirable than 
White British workers.
Regrettably these discourses have had a surprising persistence 
and have been promoted in political and popular arenas. In 1948, 
those arriving on the Windrush to help rebuild after the Second 
World War and fill the gaps in health and transport were subject to 





Migrants arriving in the first wave of mass migration 
endured verbal and physical abuse both within and 
outside the workplace. White trade unionists resisted the 
employment of migrants and imposed a quota system. 
Within the NHS, concern that importing overseas workers 
was likely to create tensions was recognised in a 1949 Home 
Office memo: ‘It has been found that the susceptibilities of 
patients tended to set an upper limit on the proportion of 
coloured workers who could be employed either as nurses 
or domiciliaries.’ (Jones and Snow, 2011)
This too colloquial approach to ethnic minority people – wanting 
them to work where ‘natives’ wouldn’t or couldn’t, and not wanting 
so many living and working in Britain – was perhaps best exemplified 
by Enoch Powell who, in 1963, as the Conservative Health Minister, 
launched a campaign to recruit trained doctors from overseas to fill 
the labour shortages in the NHS.
18,000 doctors were recruited from India and Pakistan. 
Powell praised these doctors, who he [Powell] said, ‘provide 
a useful and substantial reinforcement of the staffing of 
our hospitals and who are an advertisement to the world 
of British medicine and British hospitals.’ (Jones and 
Snow, 2011)
Five years later Powell gave his infamous ‘rivers of blood’ speech, in 
which he not only proposed stopping immigration but further proposed 
that there should be re- emigration. The content and tone of the 
speech was overtly racist, referring to wide- grinning piccaninnies and 
Negroes as offensive and noisy, and White people as being strangers 
in their own country who were unable to get access to hospital beds. 
In contemporary Britain, at the same time as the NHS is recruiting 
overseas and ruing the staff shortages caused by Brexit, we are once 
again being presented with hypocritical arguments about ‘migrants’ 
being a drain on the NHS. Importantly, as argued later in this chapter, 
this hostility and consequent social and economic disadvantage directly 
harms the health of ethnic minority people. In this context, it is valuable 
to consider how much things have changed since the 1960s and how 
legislative and policy frameworks have, or have not, addressed ethnic 
inequalities in relation to health.
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Ethnic inequalities in health
Over the last few decades, following the 1997 Independent Inquiry 
into Inequalities in Health (chaired by Sir Donald Acheson), there have 
been numerous policy initiatives around inequalities in health, with 
the Department of Health’s Strategic Review of Health Inequalities 
in England post- 2010 (chaired by Sir Michael Marmot) being the 
most recent example. Given the range of these activities, it is perhaps 
surprising, to see that the issue of ethnicity has taken a marginal and 
somewhat contested position in this policy work, indeed the Marmot 
review (Marmot, 2010) almost completely neglected this issue. This 
marginalisation and neglect almost certainly reflects two contrasting 
viewpoints:  that ethnicity somehow reflects exceptional genetic or 
cultural factors that drive differences in health experience; or that 
ethnic differences are simple reflections of class inequalities that 
are adequately captured by general discussions of socio- economic 
inequalities in health.
Nevertheless, differences in health across ethnic groups have been 
repeatedly documented in the UK (Marmot et al, 1984; Rudat, 1994; 
Nazroo, 2001a; Erens et al, 2001). In broad terms, a general measure 
of self- reported general health has shown ethnic minority groups to 
have an increased risk of poor health compared with the White groups, 
but considerable variation in this across groups. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1, which uses data from the 1999 Health Survey for England, 
and shows that Bangladeshi people have a more than three times higher 
risk of saying that their health is fair or bad rather than good, with a 
figure of more than two times higher for Pakistani people and almost 
two times higher for Indian and Black Caribbean people (Erens et al, 
2001). Figure 4.2 disaggregates this comparison by age and shows that 
ethnic differences in health emerge from early adulthood and increase 
dramatically with increasing age. This means that the level of reporting 
fair or bad health, rather than good health, for White English people 
aged 61– 70 is equivalent to that of Caribbean and Indian people aged 
46– 50, Pakistani people aged 36– 40 and Bangladeshi people aged 26– 30.
However, the extent of the difference in health varies across health 
conditions as well as across ethnic groups. In more detail, morbidity 
and mortality data have identified the following kinds of differences in 
health across ethnic groups (in comparison to White British groups):
• higher, but variable, rates of diabetes across all non- White groups;
• higher rates of heart disease among ‘South Asian’ people, but 




































































Source: 1999 Health Survey for England (Erens et al, 2001).
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• higher rates of hypertension and stroke among Caribbean and 
African people;
• higher rates of admission to psychiatric hospitals with a diagnosis 
of psychotic illness for Black Caribbean and Black African people;
• higher rates of suicide among young women born in South Asia, 
or, more particularly, born in India;
• higher rates of sexually transmitted illnesses among Black Caribbean 
people; and
• higher rates of congenital abnormality and childhood disability 
among Muslim children.
Unfortunately, such findings and the analyses that underlie them do 
no more than provide a description of differences in health, but their 
complexity and specificity makes it tempting to read explanations 
from the ethnic categories used to characterise populations. For 
example, it is easy to speculate on what it is to be South Asian that 
might lead to a greater risk of heart disease (genetics, diet, and other 
health behaviours?) or what it might be about Caribbean families and 
cultures that lead to the high risk among young people of psychotic 
illness or sexually transmitted illness. Or how marriage patterns 
might lead to high rates of congenital disease in Muslim children. 
Given the ease with which explanations can be based on such 
stereotypes of racial difference/ boundaries and cultural practices, it is 
not surprising that this is the direction that public health policy has 
moved in – ethnic differences in health are easily understood to be a 
consequence of supposed biological and cultural differences, which 
are reified, generalised and personalised across all of those who are 
seen to be members of a particular ethnic minority group. But such 
explanations, which are based on racialised identities, have rarely 
been tested. In fact, a reorientation of the public health focus to one 
that considers the social character of ethnicity, and the socially and 
economically determined nature of health, could help the development 
of meaningful policy in this area.
In fact, there is now considerable evidence that the social and 
economic inequalities faced by ethnic minority people make a substantial 
contribution to ethnic inequalities in health. As the other chapters 
in this book demonstrate, inequalities in economic position across 
ethnic groups are marked and complex, covering economic activity, 
employment levels, educational outcomes, housing, geographical 
location, area deprivation, racism and discrimination, citizenship 
and claims to citizenship. This complexity requires a challenging and 
multi- faceted examination (Nazroo, 1998). Indeed, the few studies 
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that attempt to address the complexity of the economic inequalities 
faced by ethnic minority people demonstrate that much, if not all, of 
ethnic inequalities in health are the product of social and economic 
inequalities (Nazroo, 1998, 2001a). And there is now clear evidence 
that morbidity and mortality within all ethnic groups – regardless of 
the condition focused on – is strongly patterned by socio- economic 
position. For example, richer South Asian people have low rates of 
cardiovascular disease rather than the high rate that is presumed to be 
present regardless of socio- economic position (Nazroo, 2001b). This 
variation within groups indicates the lack of an inherent link between 
ethnic (minority) category and disease outcome. Explanations that are 
reductive to a cultural or genetic root are not sufficient.
There is also a growing body of evidence that both physical and 
mental health are adversely affected by: experiences of racial harassment; 
fear of experiencing racial harassment; experiences of discrimination; 
and the belief that there is general prejudice and discrimination against 
ethnic minority people (Krieger et  al, 1996; Karlsen et  al, 2002; 
Williams et al, 2003). These ‘indicators’ of racism and discrimination 
reflect general perceptions of society as racist (belief that minority 
groups are discriminated against, fear of racism), personal threat (fear 
of racism and experiences of harassment), and experiences of events 
that undermine status and identity (experiences of harassment and 
experiences of discrimination). And these effects have been found to 
accumulate across domains of exposure to racism and discrimination, 
and over time (Wallace et al, 2016).
Related to this, there is also evidence that the aggregation of ethnic 
minority people in areas with those of similar ethnicity is beneficial, 
particularly for mental health, once the effects of area deprivation are 
controlled for (Bécares et al, 2009). This is likely to operate through 
a combination of feelings of increased security (lower exposure to 
racial harassment and discrimination) and increased social support. 
Indeed, there is some evidence demonstrating that ethnic minority 
people rate the areas where they live much more highly than would 
be implied by official indices of deprivation precisely because these are 
locations where a sense of inclusive community for people like them 
has developed (Bajekal et al, 2004).
So, although a concern with the detailed aetiology of specific 
conditions occurring at higher rates for particular ethnic groups 
might lead to a focus on the putative proximal causes of biological 
change (genetic and behavioural differences), research on distal 
social and economic causes shows clearly that these are key drivers 
of ethnic differences in health. But this is not just a simple reflection 
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of class disadvantage, the complex and multidimensional nature of 
the economic and social inequalities faced by ethnic minority people 
reflects the processes of racialisation faced by ethnic minority people. 
This requires specific policy responses if such inequalities are to be 
addressed, but effective responses require a fundamental rethink of 
approaches to race, ethnicity and migration.
Policy frameworks
Key policy initiatives in the last decade have been via the Race 
Relations Amendment Act 2000; the Equality Act 2010; the NHS 
Equality Delivery System (EDS), revised in 2013 (NHS, 2013a) to 
become EDS2; and the Workforce Race Equality Standard (WRES) 
(NHS, 2016a) developed in 2015 (discussed in section 4 of this chapter, 
on employment). The government also launched the Public Health 
Outcomes Framework in 2010 (NHS England Analytical Services, 
2017), following the Marmot review. The framework uses a series of 
indicators to assess key aspects of health over time, but it does not have 
a focus on ethnicity. Public Health England also produce ‘Outcome 
Framework Equity Reports’ (Public Health England, 2017). These 
reports focus on 18 key indicators of health and determinants of health 
selected by Public Health England’s (PHE) Health Equity Board to 
form a dashboard of indicators that include core overarching health 
outcomes, public health priority areas and social determinants of 
health. One of the difficulties with this approach is that the narrative 
to accompany the measures is descriptive and lacks the socio- political 
analysis needed to consider ethnic inequalities.
Also, NHS organisations need to heed the equality requirements of 
the NHS Constitution, the Care Quality Commission Standards1 and 
a range of other tailored assurance frameworks. For example, there is 
an assurance operating manual for Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs)2 which includes a suite of equality indicators designed to 
hold them accountable to NHS England on employment practice 
(via the WRES), providing equitable and fair services, and ‘reducing 
the inequality challenge for their population’ (NHS England, 2017).
The Care Quality Commission inspection framework has 11 
standards and within these there are equality considerations, such as 
person- centred care that meets individual needs and preferences; and 
dignity and respect, which includes ensuring everybody is treated as 
equals. Additionally, the Care Quality Commission have published 






Regulation of Health and Social Care Services (2014). These publications 
are about promoting human rights and ensuring equity in access, 
experience and outcomes.
Thus, health and social care agencies have needed to attend to a 
wide range of indicators of ethnicity and equality over time. However, 
these policies may be misdirected, or insufficiently targeted. Progress 
is slow and ethnic inequalities in health outcomes have persisted. This 
is perhaps because, as argued earlier, the practices of health and social 
care agencies tend to essentialise ethnicity rather than deal with the 
complexity of socio- economic factors or the experience of racism. It 
is also apparent, from a review of health and social care organisations’ 
websites, that equality policies and practice vary in quality and in 
what they cover. There is a tendency to approach legal and policy 
requirements in a linear way rather than use a considered analysis of 
all requirements, overarching intentions and contexts. This can lead to 
an introspective and selective examination of ethnic health inequalities. 
Unless broader attention is paid to the structural and societal factors 
that cause ethnic inequalities in health, progress on reducing them 
will be minimal.
The Care Quality Commission says that to tackle equality and human 
rights at a service level:
Health and social care leaders need to look beyond 
provider boundaries. They need to ensure the community 
involvement of individuals. They need to develop broader, 
more holistic services that meet the needs of diverse 
communities. (Care Quality Commission, 2017)
However, beyond the involvement of communities and vague calls for 
holistic services, there is a need for attention to be paid to the impact 
of discrimination and racism and their impact on health. While there 
are some academic texts and third sector race equality organisations 
which do recognise this, there are no policies that adequately focus 
on this issue.
Access to, experience of, and quality of health  
(and social care) services
In 2010 the NHS’ EDS was created with one of its four sections 
designed to ensure equitable access. The Equality Act 2010 requires 
that health organisations show how they are providing equality of 
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opportunity. Interestingly the UK’s scores on ‘responsiveness’ and 
‘measures to achieve change’ in the Migrant Integration Policy Index 
for Health 2016 (Johnson and Jayaweera, 2017) are the highest in the 
EQUI- HEALTH sample of 34 countries. However, since 2010, and 
even more so post- Brexit, there has been:
Firm political determination to eliminate any possibility 
that migrants might ‘exploit’ the NHS (even those who 
pay taxes and NI contributions into it like everybody else) 
[and this] has reduced entitlements, and many measures to 
bridge the gap between migrants and health services have 
lapsed into disuse. (Johnson and Jayaweera, 2017: 26)
It is possible that where ethnic minority people have a poorer 
experience or receive poorer quality health care, this contributes 
to ethnic inequalities in health. In the UK there remains (almost) 
free universal access to health care and this is reflected in an equal 
or greater use across ethnic minority groups of primary care health 
services (except possibly in the case of Chinese people), although some 
inequalities exist for use of hospital services and marked inequalities 
exist for dental services (Nazroo et al, 2009). Similarly, for conditions 
managed in primary care it seems that the outcomes of care (levels of 
undiagnosed or poorly managed illness) are as good for ethnic minority 
people as they are for White English people (Nazroo et  al, 2009). 
Nazroo suggests that the provision, through the NHS, of publicly 
funded primary care with universal access and standardised treatment 
protocols has resulted in greater equality of access and outcomes 
across ethnic groups. This suggests that quality of health care does not 
contribute to ethnic inequalities in health. Nevertheless, the experience 
of care seems poorer for ethnic minority people. In primary care, ethnic 
minority people are more likely to be dissatisfied with various aspects 
of the care received (Rudat, 1994; Airey et al, 1999), to wait longer for 
an appointment (Airey et al, 1999), and to face language barriers during 
the consultation (Rudat, 1994). And there is a convincing body of 
evidence suggesting that the higher admission rate of Black people for 
severe mental illness is disproportionate and reflects the ways in which 
they are racialised (Nazroo, 2015). Later we consider some examples 
of access to and experience of health care, which demonstrate that a 
more nuanced approach to assessing access and experience can point 
to how inequalities in ethnic minority health outcomes may arise. This 
is followed by a consideration of the additional layers of institutional 
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racism that ultimately add to the failure to address inequalities in health 
outcomes.
Access to and experience of health services
Szczepura, writing in 2005, was concerned to show that providing 
services was not the same as providing equity of access or quality of 
experience. She proposed three important factors that were necessary 
conditions for quality experiences of health care: having equal access via 
appropriate information (which may be reflected in uptake of service); 
having access to services that are relevant, timely and sensitive to the 
person’s needs (perhaps reflected in satisfaction levels); and being able 
to use the health service with ease and with the confidence that you 
will be treated with respect (which may also be reflected in satisfaction 
with services).
This approach can be applied to studies of ethnic minority patients’ 
experiences of health services. One example is the National Cancer 
Experience Patient Survey (2016), which worryingly reported that 
ethnic minority people see the GP several more times than the White 
British people before they get referred to a hospital. Potentially this 
means detecting cancer later. Further, for nearly every question in the 
survey, the experience was reported as significantly less good for ethnic 
minority groups than for the White British group.
Applying Szczepura’s first point, it could be that patients do not 
have appropriate information in order to know what to say about 
their symptoms and so present information in a way that registers with 
the GP, or it could be that health services are not giving appropriate 
information to help people of different ethnicities recognise symptoms. 
In any case the result is that services, particularly as experienced by 
Asian people, are less ‘timely’ or ‘sensitive to needs’ (Szczepura’s second 
point) than others. With regard to her third point, ethnic minority 
people scored lower than White people for both respect and overall 
experience – see Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
This deeper look under the surface of access to cancer services reveals 
that while there may be no explicit barrier in general access, there is 
a differential in access to the right service and treatment, which could 
in turn lead to differential (and poorer for ethnic minority people) 
health outcomes. Similarly, there may be evidence of equity of access 
in primary care with regard to GPs, but the GP Experience Survey 
2017 shows that on almost every measure (out of 50 questions) ethnic 
minority people report less good experiences than White British 
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people. This is particularly marked for Bangladeshi, Pakistani and 
Chinese groups, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Equitable access to health and social care services does not mean, 
therefore, that there is equity of experience or even outcomes. Further, 
as discussed later in this chapter, discrimination and institutional racism 
also impact negatively on the quality of care.
Racialisation, institutional racism and the impact on access to and 
quality of care
Stereotyping, discrimination, racism and cultural incompetence can be 
detected across health and social care services. In the following sections 
three examples are given of the different ways in which this impacts 
on the lives of ethnic minority people.







Source: National Cancer Experience Patient Survey (2016).
Figure 4.3: Rating of the experience of respect and dignity while in hospital for 











Ethnic minority people, particularly those in Black groups, are over- 
represented among those with a diagnosis of severe mental illness, are 
more likely to have adverse pathways into care, more likely to receive 
compulsory treatment (to be sectioned) and more likely to experience 
adverse outcomes of care (Nazroo, 2015). In 2003 an inquiry was 
conducted into the death of Rocky Bennett in a mental health 
institution. It concluded that institutional racism was present in mental 
health institutions and that the experience of racism and racist abuse 
had precipitated the struggles Rocky had had with other patients and 
staff and that ultimately led to his death. Following the Bennett inquiry, 
a five- year ‘Delivering Race Equality (DRE) in Mental Health Care’ 












Source: GP Experience Survey (2017).
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programme was established (Department of Health, 2005). However, 
the DRE failed to address underlying factors relating to racism and 
socio- economic factors, its objectives were insufficiently specific and 
allowed an in- practice reframing of the problem as one of cultural 
competence For example, the inquiry report recommended that 
to reduce and eliminate ethnic inequalities in mental health service 
experience and outcome it would be important to:
develop the cultural capability of mental health services; 
and to engage the community and build capacity through 
Community Development Workers (CDWs). (Department 
of Health, 2005)
It might be expected that, although the policy response did not 
adequately recognise race and racism, there might have been some 
improvements in access, a reduction in disproportionality of diagnosis 
and in sectioning of Black people. However, evidence from the most 
recent, and the last, in- patient census designed to monitor progress in 
ethnic inequalities in treatment reported:
Overall, the findings of the sixth Count me in census3 
show little change from previous years. They continue to 
show differences in mental health admission and detention 
rates between Black and minority ethnic groups and 
white groups, and also differences within minority ethnic 
groups. Although the total numbers of mental health 
inpatients have fallen since 2005, ethnic differences in 
rates of admission, detention under the Mental Health Act 
and seclusion have not altered materially. (Care Quality 
Commission, 2011)
These findings were an echo of the 2010 annual report from the Care 
Quality Commission. Indeed, in 2016 the Five Year Forward View on 
Mental Health (NHS, 2016b) stated that the DRE programme concluded 
with no improvement in the experience of people from ethnic minority 
communities receiving mental health care. And it went further to 
say that data since 2010 showed little change. However, it made no 
specific recommendations to address these inequalities, reflecting a 
broader policy vacuum in this area, as noted by the commission set up 
to review the provision of acute in- patient psychiatric care for adults 




Since 2010, there has been no targeted national policy 
aimed at improving mental health care for ethnic minority 
communities and campaigning groups have expressed 
concern that mental health services lack a sense of strategic 
direction for reducing inequalities in ethnic minority mental 
health. (NHS, 2016b)
So, although theoretically there is equitable access to mental health 
services, the experience and quality of those services is discriminatory. 
Further, fear of racism, which could lead to incorrect diagnoses or 
inappropriate compulsory treatment, may delay access, precipitating the 
involuntary admission feared in the first place. Health professionals for 
their part may stereotype or misunderstand symptoms. The Breaking 
the Circles of Fear report had picked up on this in 2002:
Black people mistrust and often fear services, and staff are 
often wary of the Black community, fearing criticism and 
not knowing how to respond, and fearful of young Black 
men. (Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2002)
As the Bennett inquiry said in 2003:
At present people from the Black and minority ethnic 
communities, who are involved in the mental health 
services, are not getting the service they are entitled to. 
Putting it bluntly, this is a disgrace. The NHS is national. 
(Sallah et al, 2003)
Interpreting services
Although not a legal right, interpreting services are necessary for basic 
clinical practice and in order to meet the professional standards set by 
the Care Quality Commission and the NHS Equality and Delivery 
System. However, the increasing emphasis in the last decade on 
proficiency in English before citizenship is granted has allowed a drift 
from attempts to provide high- quality translation services to a rapid 
decline in these justified by the expectation of fluency in English and 
by an argument around prioritising resources. This means that the 
provision of interpreting services is patchy. For example, a study by 
Healthwatch Islington (2017) found that respondents were not always 
aware that there was a service and when they did receive it, it was not 
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always a quality service. Among the responses, one woman reported 
that she did not feel comfortable discussing gynaecological conditions 
through a male interpreter; others said the dialect or accent was difficult 
to understand, and that sometimes racial profiles were used to make 
assumptions that a certain interpreter was needed when they were not.
Johnson and Jayaweera (2017), when writing about interpreting 
services for migrants, said:
The best provision is still in London, but even there, it is not 
universal or always of ‘gold standard.’ Central & North- West 
London NHS Trust maintains a bank of paid interpreters, 
many of whom would not be legally recognised as qualified 
interpreters by the national body (National Register of 
Public Service Interpreters), being trained only to level 
3. There is a very large reliance on the linguistic skills of 
the very diverse mix of staff in the NHS, and many Trusts 
do maintain registers of language competent staff, not all 
of whom are medically or linguistically qualified, and few 
of whom are paid or insured for this role.
This means that the quality of health care offered by the NHS is 
compromised by inadequate resourcing of interpreting services, leading 
to poor coverage, poor quality of the service, stereotyping of patients 
and their needs, and a lack of respect for the individual needs of patients.
Sickle cell and thalassaemia disorders
It has taken years of joint efforts from campaigning groups, such as 
the Organisation for Sickle Cell Anaemia Research (OSCAR) and 
researchers, to ensure attention is paid to the treatment of sickle cell and 
thalassaemia disorders within the NHS. Screening of newborn children 
for sickle cell only started in 2003, even though it has been shown to be 
highly effective in preventing mortality and unnecessary pain. However, 
although there is now an annual update of those registered with sickle 
cell disease and improved screening and understanding of the disorders, 
a lack of resources or appropriate awareness has been a consistent issue 
with severe consequences. For young people, painful episodes can lead 
to significant periods away from school. Section 100 of the Children 
and Families Act 2014 in England places a duty on the appropriate 
school authority, who must make arrangements for supporting pupils 
at the school with medical conditions, but a lack of resources and 




care they need. Dyson et al (2016) described how stereotypical and 
racist perceptions of the people involved can be a barrier to accessing 
services and add to the pain and misery of the disease. Additionally, 
this connects with broader claims that immigration presents a ‘drain’ 
on the NHS.
Summary
From the preceding considerations of access to and experience of 
cancer and GP services, mental health and interpreting services, and 
attention paid to sickle cell disorders, it becomes apparent that access 
alone tells us very little about the quality of the experience. The latter 
is important to the impact of health services on health outcomes for 
ethnic minority groups. However, even when the data clearly point to 
poorer experiences for ethnic minority people, responses tend not to 
locate analyses or responses beyond the service provider and focus on 
‘cultural considerations’. Given what is known about institutional and 
structural racism and discrimination, and the impact of socio- economic 
status on health, this is an insufficient response if the issues are to be 
tackled with any effectiveness.
Employment
As an employer, the NHS has the opportunity to provide significant 
leadership. For example, in 2017 the NHS directly employed 
1.2 million people, indirectly many more, so employment practices 
within the NHS are able to impact on the labour market nationally 
and regionally. However, while ethnic minority people are over- 
represented in the NHS workforce – 22% of NHS staff, compared with 
13% of all workers – there are marked ethnic inequalities in terms of 
grades and location of employment. To address this the Department 
of Health introduced its Race Equality Action Plan (Department of 
Health, 2005), which had been developed as a result of the Macpherson 
inquiry’s findings of institutional racism in public sector and the 
subsequent requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
(RRAA) 2000. However, it seems that little progress has been made.
Kline (2014, 2015) showed significant ethnic differentials in pay 
bands, representation among senior staff and representation on boards. 
Although his study was largely focused on London, he found the 
picture to be very similar elsewhere in England. His finding that 
representation at senior levels of the NHS was getting worse, despite 
several years of employment monitoring and other initiatives, including 
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the Equality Act 2010 and the NHS EDS2, is perhaps of most concern. 
He found that:
• The proportion of London NHS Trust Board members from an 
ethnic minority background was 8%, an even lower proportion than 
was found in 2006 (9.6%).
• The proportion of chief executives and chairs from an ethnic 
minority background had decreased from 5.3% in 2006 to 2.5% 
in 2014.
• There had been no significant change in the proportion of non- 
executive ethnic minority Trust Board members, continuing the 
pattern of under- representation compared to both the workforce 
and the local population.
• The proportion of senior and very senior managers who were from 
an ethnic minority background had not increased since 2008, when 
comparable grading data were available, and had fallen slightly 
since 2011.
• The likelihood of White staff in London being senior or very senior 
managers was three times higher than it was for ethnic minority 
staff. (Kline, 2014)
Partly as a result of this report, the NHS introduced the Workforce 
Race Equality Standard (WRES) in 2015. There have now been three 
years of reporting against this standard and some of the key findings 
of the latest WRES data on senior level employment showed that the 
proportion of very senior managers (VSMs) from ethnic minority 
backgrounds increased from 5.2% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016. Although 
in percentage terms this is a meaningful improvement, it does not 
reflect the proportion of NHS staff who have an ethnic minority 
background (22%) and while there are nearly 14 White staff per trust 
on a VSM grade, on average just over one ethnic minority member 
of staff per trust is on VSM grade, and in many trusts there are none. 
That, in turn, impacts on the likelihood of executive board members 
being from ethnic minority backgrounds, which remains significantly 
lower than ethnic minority representation in both the overall NHS 
workforce and in the local communities served. Board membership 
percentage across England was 7.1% and, significantly, 43.5% (84) of 
trusts reported having no ethnic minority board members.
Other concerns highlighted by the WRES data in 2016 (NHS, 
2016a) are that ethnic minority staff have a less good experience of 
being employed than their White counterparts. For example: ethnic 
minority staff in the NHS are significantly more likely to be disciplined 
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than White staff members and remain significantly more likely to 
experience discrimination harassment, bullying or abuse from other 
staff at work from colleagues and their managers. It is of note that 
the WRES seems to recognise that there is deep- seated resistance 
within the NHS to criticisms and that there may be excessive reliance 
on training, processes, and individuals raising concerns, rather than 
employers proactively identifying and addressing problems.
Conclusion: the need for policy development
It is clear that there has been little policy development to specifically 
address ethnic inequalities in health at a national level, only occasional 
and fragmented implementation of policy at a local level, and no 
real evaluation of the impact of targeted, or general, policies on 
ethnic inequalities in health. Where policy has been developed and 
implemented, it has largely been concerned with addressing questions 
of accessibility to and delivery of services, typically with a focus on 
language and communication and equity of access. But as we have seen, 
equity of access is an insufficient indicator of the quality of health care 
or outcomes for ethnic minority people.
However, there is not a policy ‘vacuum’, rather there has been a 
series of reactive NHS policies since 2000 which have all failed to 
make significant progress in tackling differentials in health care. In part 
this is due to an over- emphasis on personal, cultural and sometimes 
organisational factors, rather than addressing relevant social and 
economic inequalities. Turning attention from economic or societal 
problems by locating the kernels of the problems in the ‘other’ is a 
typically divisive tool for maintaining the power of a government to 
implement controlling measures that more often than not penalise 
poorer and disadvantaged people. Recent discourses around culture, 
community and segregation that are populist and that disregard the 
evidence base do nothing to help tackle social inequalities. Indeed, 
they are likely to aggravate ethnic inequalities by increasing economic 
disadvantage, prejudice, and experiences of racism and discrimination.
This manifests in a policy leaning toward an emphasis on the 
importance of cultural assimilation to a White British norm that, 
together with the securitisation agenda, vehement anti- immigrant 
feeling and Brexit, has meant that it is now even more difficult to find 
or initiate responses to the impact of racism and discrimination on the 
health of ethnic minority people. Rather than trying to challenge this 
agenda, it has perhaps been easier for policy leads and senior managers 
to find explanations for differentials in health care in cultural or lifestyle 
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factors. So, for example, it is well known that ethnic minority groups 
are up to six times more likely to develop diabetes than White people, 
however, there is a need to look beyond the typical focus on diet and 
exercise for solutions. For example, Patel et al (2016) identified socio- 
economic barriers to healthy behaviours, such as prioritising work 
over physical activity to provide for the family; different perceptions 
of a healthy body weight and fear of racial harassment or abuse when 
exercising. In addition, it is likely that socio- economic factors operating 
across life courses and over generations contribute significantly to this 
greater risk.
Discourses which locate the causes of ethnic inequalities in health, 
access to health care, and employment experiences in the NHS in 
essentialised notions of ethnicity as culture or genetics will inevitably be 
insufficient for finding solutions. There is a need for social accounting 
as well as economic (and environmental) accounting within the NHS. 
And there is a need for long- term policies that promote equitable 
life chances and that address racism and the marginalisation of ethnic 
minority people. Attention to reforming institutional cultures, 
including politics and government, is crucial. There is a need to tackle 
more complex and seemingly intractable issues of economics and racism 
at the interdependent structural, institutional and personal levels.
Notes
 1 The Care Quality Commission inspects health and social care providers.
 2 CCGs play key roles in addressing equality and health inequalities as commissioners 
of services across a local area, as employers and as local and national system leaders.
 3 In 2010 the last Count Me In survey was completed and information was obtained 
from 32,799 patients (including 2,959 outpatients on a community treatment order) 
at 261 NHS and independent health care organisations in England and Wales. 







Ethnic inequalities in the state 
education system in England
Claire Alexander and William Shankley
Key findings
• The demography of the pupil population in state education in 
England shows the pupil population is more diverse than the broader 
population. The same is true for Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.
• The 2016/ 17 GCSE grades data for England show that there is 
disparity in attainment between different ethnic groups: Chinese 
and Indian pupils were the most likely to achieve A* to C in maths 
and English; meanwhile, Black Caribbean, Pakistani and Gypsy and 
Irish Travellers were the least likely to achieve A* to C grades in 
maths and English.
• The 2016/ 17 data show rates of permanent exclusion continue to 
be a significant issue for Black and Gypsy and Irish Traveller pupils 
compared to other ethnic pupil groups.
• Recent Prevent policies targeting radicalisation have been criticised 
for producing highly racialised surveillance of Muslim and 
South Asian pupils, threatening the relationships between local 
communities and schools.
• The 2016/ 17 data show that White British continue to be over- 
represented in apprenticeship schemes compared to ethnic minority 
people.
• In contrast to apprenticeship schemes, ethnic minority pupils 
disproportionately enter further or higher education. Ethnic 
minority groups constitute 26% of all undergraduate students in 
England. However, they are less likely to attend Russell Group 
Universities, with the Black group particularly under- represented.
• The 2016/ 17 data show that all ethnic minority groups are less likely 
than White students to receive a ‘good’ (2:1 or first class) degree. 
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universities achieve a higher proportion of good degrees than those 
who attend New Universities.
• The 2016/ 17 data of those working in higher education institutions 
show an under- representation of academic staff from all UK- born 
ethnic groups, notably from Black and Muslim groups. There is an 
over- representation of non- UK national staff from Chinese, Indian, 
and Black African groups compared to the low representation of 
non- UK staff from Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Mixed and Other 
Black groups.
• The 2016/ 17 data highlight the under- representation of ethnic 
minority women, particularly at professorial level in higher 
education institutions.
• The UK Race Equality Mark offers the potential for higher 
education institutions to improve conditions for ethnic minority staff 
and students in a similar way to the Athena Swan Award. However, 
it is not compulsory and not linked to other metrics of academic 
rigour or teaching excellence.
Introduction1
Education has long been a key site in the struggle for racial and ethnic 
equality in Britain. Seen as both a mechanism for social mobility and a 
means of cultural integration and reproduction, schools (as institutions) 
and schooling (as a practice) lie at the heart of the pursuit of a successful 
future for an equal multi- ethnic Britain. Nevertheless, 35 years on from 
the Swann report (Department of Education and Science, 1985), which 
argued for Education for All, and 20 years after the Future of Multi- ethnic 
Britain report (Parekh et al, 2000), issues of racial and ethnic inequality 
in our schools are as pertinent as ever. Education remains a primary 
arena for both the maintenance of entrenched racial stereotyping and 
discrimination, on the one hand, and anti- racist activism, on the other. 
Concerns over structural racism, low educational attainment, poor 
teacher expectations and stereotyping, ethnocentric curricula and high 
levels of school exclusions for some groups remain entrenched features 
of our school system. While there has been progress and change, recent 
years have seen the erosion of the fragile gains made in the wake of 
the Macpherson report (1999) and the Race Relations Amendment 
Act 2000, which imposed a duty on schools to promote race equality. 
In their place we have seen a refocusing on ‘fundamental British 
values’, a narrowing of the curriculum, the embedding of the Prevent 
agenda in schools and universities, and the use of schools as internal 
border sites, focusing on new migrant and asylum seeking children 
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and families (Alexander et al, 2015). These measures have introduced 
a ‘hostile environment’ within schools, and imposed an exclusionary 
and utilitarian version of citizenship, which has pushed issues of race 
equality and diversity to the margins.
At the same time, the face of Britain’s schools is changing. Nearly 
17% of children aged 0−15 in England and Wales are from Black 
and minority ethnic backgrounds, making up 26% of primary and 
secondary schools in England in 2018 (DfE, 2018d).2 Patterns of 
settlement mean that in urban areas, the school population will often 
be predominantly Black and Asian. The picture is complicated by 
the dramatic increase of white non- British pupils, now the second 
largest ethnic minority in schools (at nearly 8% in primary schools 
and 6% in secondary schools), while ethnic minority composition 
is increasingly diverse, with growing numbers of Black and Asian 
Others and an increasing Mixed population (over 5% in primary and 
secondary schools).
Recent figures (DfE, 2015a) suggest that educational attainment for 
ethnic minority young people is improving, with Indian and Chinese 
young people consistently outperforming White British students, 
Bangladeshi and African descent young people achieving near or above 
the national average for GCSE attainment, and African Caribbean 
and Pakistani descent young people showing clear gains in the past 
decade. These changes are reflected in the increasing numbers of ethnic 
minority young people going on to university. Nevertheless, ethnic 
minority young people are over- represented in pupil referrals units and 
exclusions and, while they enter higher education in greater numbers, 
they remain under- represented at Russell Group universities (Alexander 
et al, 2015) and on apprenticeship schemes, and over- represented in the 
figures for unemployment and the prison system (see Chapters 3 and 
6 on the criminal justice system and the labour market respectively).
Education thus marks a key point of transition, between family, 
community and broader society, and into the world of work, which 
has implications for the maintenance and future transformation of 
inequalities in housing, health and wellbeing, employment and so 
on. This chapter maps the changes in racial and ethnic inequalities 
in education, focusing on primary, secondary and tertiary/ higher 
education. It will examine the changing patterns of educational 
inequality, and the policy contexts in which these are embedded, 
focusing on diversity within and across ethnic groups, and across the 
educational life cycle. It will also focus on issues of staffing as well as 
on pupils and students, to explore the institutional framework of the 
education system and how inequalities may be replicated over time.
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The availability of data and the disproportionate concentration of 
ethnic minority people in England result in this chapter focusing 
mainly on educational inequalities in England. Where possible, and 
where the data are available, this chapter will compare the patterns 
across ethnic groups in the other constituent countries of the UK. The 
chapter will show that there remain significant ethnic inequalities in 
the education system at all levels and that, in understanding the nature 
of these inequalities, it is important to be attentive both to the diverse 
experience of different ethnic minorities but also to questions of class 
and gender.
A brief history of race and education policy: from SENs  
to Prevent
Ethnic and racial inequalities in education in Britain should be situated 
within broader debates and policies around the expansion of education 
to all children in the postwar period. These debates have focused on 
the inequalities between private and state education systems and, from 
the 1960s, on the educational divide between grammar and secondary 
modern schools, with many concerned that the bipartite, selective 
system of education had led to ‘two nations in education’ (Mays, 1962, 
cited in Tomlinson, 2014: 18), entrenching social divides centred on 
family and class. The Labour government’s policy of comprehensive 
education in 1964 retained exemptions for private and religious 
educational establishments (Tomlinson, 2005). Under the Conservative 
administration, with Margaret Thatcher presiding first as education 
minister and then Prime Minister, the 1970s saw the rolling back of 
comprehensive education, giving local education authorities (LEAs) 
the choice to provision comprehensive education or retain grammar 
schools. This already complex picture was radically transformed further 
with the proliferation of free schools, academies and faith schools from 
the 1990s onwards (Byrne and De Tona, 2019).
The position of ethnic minority pupils within the mainstream 
education system, whatever its form, has been recognised to be 
one consistently defined through disadvantage and discrimination, 
with Black and minority ethnic (BME) pupils often placed under 
separate provision to address ‘Special Educational Needs’ (SEN) 
(Coard, 1971; Rattansi, 1992). However, it was not until the 1980s 
that ‘underachievement’ became a central policy focus, first with the 
Rampton report (1981) and then with the Swann report (1985), titled 
Education for All. These interventions should be understood against the 
backdrop of the ‘riots’ of 1980 and 1981, and again in 1985, which 
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focused attention on second- generation Black Caribbean young 
people and broader structural inequalities, but also the wider policy 
shift away from ‘assimilation’ to ‘integration’. In the education arena, 
this was particularly framed through a move towards ‘multicultural’ 
education (Rattansi, 1992; Tomlinson, 2014). Moreover, the Swann 
report, in 1985, showed a stronger awareness of issues of socio- 
economic conditions, and of differences between ethnic groups, in 
structuring the experience of ethnic minority pupils. The report made 
71 recommendations about the role of education in a ‘complex and 
diverse multicultural society – and indicated a positive policy position 
towards race in the education system’ (Tomlinson, 2014:  38). The 
report’s insistence on ‘Education for All’ reflected both a recognition 
of the need for measures to tackle racial inequality in schools, and a 
shift towards a multicultural ethos aimed at mandatory teacher training 
and developing more inclusive curricula (Tomlinson, 2014). However, 
as Rattansi (1992) has argued, the report promoted understandings of 
inequality as stemming from an ethnically essentialist view of identity, 
which perpetuated a division between ‘West Indian’ underachievement 
stemming from deprivation and racism and ‘Asian’ achievement, arising 
from ‘culture’.
The establishment of the National Curriculum for England and Wales 
in 1988 took as a central concern the ways in which it should ‘take 
account of the ethnic and cultural diversity of British society and the 
importance of the curriculum in promoting equal opportunity for all 
pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or gender’ (in Parekh, 2000: 142). The 
1990s saw a strong focus in education policy on targeting inequalities 
in attainment across ethnic groups, with the 1997 White Paper 
‘Excellence in Schools’ reiterating the government’s ‘core commitment 
to equality of opportunity and high standards for all’ ( Department 
for Education and Employment, 1997: Foreword and 6) and stressing 
the need for schools to take ‘practical steps to raise ethnic minority 
pupils’ achievements and promote racial harmony’ However, as the 
Parekh report (2000: 143) noted, such policies and practices remained 
piecemeal and lacked national leadership and statutory power. The 
report noted further that ethnic monitoring was uneven and unhelpful, 
that the impact of diversity policies to date should be assessed, and 
that diversity training for teachers, governors and inspectors needed 
to be mandatory.
The Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 made public bodies, 
including schools, accountable for race equality and required them 
to record and monitor racist incidents (Bhopal, 2018). However, 
successive Coalition and Conservative governments have weakened 
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this duty and the policy was eventually replaced with the Equality 
Act 2010. This legislation was rolled out across all public sector 
institutions in 2011 and required all public bodies to promote equality 
for all protected characteristics, including race (Bhopal, 2018). The 
dilution of a dedicated focus on race equality has been exacerbated 
by the fragmentation of the education system with the proliferation 
of academies, free schools and faith schools. The extent to which this 
increasing diversity of schools has the potential to exacerbate existing 
racial inequalities (Florian et al, 2016) remains an issue of concern, 
whether in view of the lack of real school choice for ethnic minority 
families when seeking to access them for their children (Weekes- 
Bernard, 2007; Byrne and De Tona, 2019), the failure of some free 
schools to comply with equality legislation (Gillborn, 2005), or the 
often difficult educational experiences that some ethnic minority 
pupils face within them (Gillborn, 2005). The National Curriculum 
has been overhauled to herald a return to ‘traditional’ subjects and 
teaching methods which have sought to overturn decades of more 
diverse, socially inclusive and multicultural curricula (Alexander et al, 
2015; Alexander and Weekes- Bernard, 2017).
This retrenchment is nowhere more apparent than in the introduction 
of the Prevent Duty in schools and universities in 2015. Underpinning 
the Prevent Duty is a guideline which states that ‘Section 26 of the 
Counter- Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on certain 
bodies’ “specified authorities” listed in schedule 6 to the Act)’, in 
the exercise of their functions, ‘to have due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (DfE, 2015b; Bhopal, 
2018:  74). The Prevent Duty spans multiple state institutions, but 
in schooling it has been formulated to support schools, early years 
childcare providers and later years providers to identify children 
who may be vulnerable to radicalisation (DfE, 2015b). In particular, 
schools are expected to instil ‘British values’ into the curriculum 
to help children combat the threat of extremism and radicalisation 
(DfE, 2015b).
The Prevent Duty has been heavily criticised as detrimental to 
ethnic minority groups, particularly by targeting Muslim pupils and 
their families (Qurashi, 2018). Some have criticised the policy as a 
vehicle for explicit and implicit forms of racism to be committed 
against non- white students under the banner of anti- terrorism 
(Awan, 2012; Taylor, 2018). More recently, a report by the United 
Nations (UN) rapporteur highlighted that the Prevent Duty could 
actually contribute to extremism rather than deter it by singling out 
specific ethnic/ religious groups (Alston, 2018). As Bhopal notes 
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(2018), the Prevent Duty has painted ethnic minority pupils as a 
threat to social order. Moreover, the Prevent Duty has ruptured the 
traditional teacher– student relationship as it has forced teachers to 
monitor children they believe are at risk of radicalisation and, as a 
consequence, threatened the trust and the pastoral element of this 
relationship (Bhopal, 2018).
Ethnicity and schooling in Britain: a contemporary portrait
Access
The most recent data from the Department for Education show that 
for the school year 2016/ 17, 7.05 million pupils were registered as 
attending state- funded primary, secondary and special schools across 
England and Wales. This covers the years of compulsory schooling 
in the UK, from the ages of 4 to 16. However, in the past ten years, 
compulsory education has been extended across the UK to the age of 
18 (Gov.uk, 2018b).
Figure 5.1 shows the demography of the pupil population in the state 
education system (primary and secondary) in England for 2015/ 16 
versus the population of England broken down by ethnicity. It shows 
there are significant demographic changes to the school- age population 
in England compared to the ethnicity of the broader population for 
England from the 2011 Census. Figure 5.1 shows the pupil population 
was comprised of 69% White British, 10% Asian, 6% Black, 6% Other 
White, 5% Mixed and 0.4% Chinese, with White British pupils making 
up a lower share of the pupil population compared to their broader share 
of the English population. In comparison, all ethnic minority groups, 
except the Chinese, make up a larger share of the pupil population 
than their share of the English population.
More generally, in England, ethnic minority people are unevenly 
residentially concentrated in urban centres, particularly London (Finney 
and Simpson, 2009), and this has implications for school demography. 
Policymakers regularly question the so- called ‘London effect’ and 
why attainment levels in the capital are significantly higher than the 
national average (Burgess, 2014). According to Burgess (2014), the 
success of London schools can be attributed to their above national 
average share of ethnic minority and immigrant pupils, who, as we 
can see in other sections of this chapter, perform on average higher 
than White British pupils.
By comparison, the ethnic profile of the student population across 
the other constituent countries of the UK is different from England. 
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Scottish Statistics (2017b), for example, suggest 85% of pupils were 
White Scottish or White Other British (including White Welsh and 
Northern Irish), with the largest ethnic minority groups being the 
White Other (5%), Asian Pakistani (2%) and Mixed (1%) groups. 
Moreover, the statistics also indicated that the Gypsy and Traveller pupils 
had increased by 52% from 737 in 2011 to 1,121 in 2017. Meanwhile, in 
Wales, the 2011 Census suggests that the ethnic minorities’ population 
now makes up 4% of the Welsh population, with the student population 
showing 91% of pupils are recorded as White British in 2015 and the 
other 9% comprised of over 100 ethnic groups (Lewis and Starkey, 
2015). In Northern Ireland, the share of the ethnic minority population 
is relatively small compared to England, although the country has 






























Source: School attendance and absence, Race Disparity Audit (Gov.uk, 2017b).
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experienced an increase of White diversity as the result of the expansion 
of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007(Burns et al, 2015).
Attainment
As already noted, a primary focus of education policy around racial 
inequality in schools has focused on perceived ‘underachievement’ of 
ethnic minority pupils – most usually linked to a deficit model of ethnic 
minority pupils, families or ‘cultures’. At the same time, the picture 
of differential attainment of ethnic minority pupils has changed, and 
become more complex over time and according to place. Educational 
attainment is an important measure of ethnic inequality in the education 
system, and provides a lens through which we can observe how inequality 
emerges at key stages through a pupil’s schooling career (Key Stage 1 and 
2, GCSE and A level). The attainment of pupils by their ethnicity can 
tell us about the disadvantage across different groups at various points 
during their compulsory education, although comparison over time can 
be hindered by changes in these forms and levels of assessment.
Even as early as the Rampton report (1981), there was an awareness 
of differences between Black and Asian children, and in performance 
within ‘Asian’ groups, notably between Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
pupils, and Indian and East African Asian pupils. There were 
differences, too, between the attainment of girls and boys. More recent 
studies have illustrated an even more complex picture, with Indian and 
Chinese pupils, often outstripping their White British counterparts, 
the improvement of Bangladeshi and Black African pupils, while 
the Black Caribbean, Gypsy and Irish Traveller and Pakistani groups 
consistently and significantly underperform (Gillborn et al, 2017). This 
picture is complicated further by the growth of mixed populations 
and of increased ethnic ‘superdiversity’ in Britain’s classrooms, with 
the arrival of new migrant and asylum seeking communities, which 
as yet are not fully reflected in the data.
GCSE
GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) and GNVQs 
(General National Vocational Qualifications) are taken towards the 
end of compulsory schooling at the age of 16. The data from 2016/ 
17 show that in total 527,859 pupils took GCSE examinations at the 
end of Key Stage 4 in England in state- funded schools and, of these 
pupils, the ethnicity was known for 99% of the sample. Of the pupils 
taking GCSE examinations in 2016/ 17, 77% were White, 10% were 
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Asian, 5% were Black, 5% were Mixed, 1.5% were Other ethnicity 
and, finally, 0.4% were Chinese.
Historically, there has been a consistent rise in the patterns of GCSE 
attainment between 1993 and 2013; with the proportion of students 
achieving at least five higher grade GCSE passes almost doubling 
(Bosworth and Kersley, 2015; Gillborn et al, 2017). GCSE attainment 
over time, and recently, across ethnic groups highlights great variation 
across ethnic groups but also signs of improvement across all groups 
(Gillborn and Gipps, 1996; Gov.uk, 2018b). Data from the Department 
for Education 2016/ 17 show that Chinese and Indian students were 
the most likely ethnic groups to achieve A* to C in maths and English, 
a pattern well established since the late 1980s (Demack et al, 2000). 
Meanwhile, data show the Black Caribbean, Pakistani and Gypsy 
and Irish Traveller students were the least likely to achieve A* to C 
in English and maths (DfE, 2018a; Gov.uk, 2018b). Significantly, 
Bangladeshi pupils (a group who have historically performed poorly) 
overtook their White British peers in 2011. Similar progress has not 
been observed for the Pakistani, group who continue to be the lowest 
achieving South Asian group.
The major story, however, has been the poor performance of the Black 
Caribbean and Gypsy and Irish Traveller pupils at GCSE level, which 
has been consistently lower than other ethnic groups (Tomlinson, 2014; 
Bhopal, 2018). While Black Caribbean pupils’ GCSE performance has 
steadily improved over time, there is still a distinct gap between their 
attainment compared to that of White British pupils and ethnic minority 
pupils from the Chinese and Indian groups. There is unlikely to be a 
single factor responsible for Black Caribbean attainment. Demie (2018) 
has suggested array of factors, including: poor leadership by headteachers 
on matters of equality; stereotyping; the low expectations of teachers 
for Black Caribbean pupils; as well as the exclusionary nature of the 
curriculum (Doharty, 2015). Socio- economic disadvantage and the 
broader impact of poverty, poor housing and institutional racism also needs 
to be taken into account (Demie, 2018). By comparison, the patterns of 
GCSE attainment for the Black African pupils present a more positive 
picture, with their attainment levels overtaking White British pupils in 
2013. The most recent GCSE attainment data (2016/ 17) show that Black 
African students perform relatively well compared to other ethnic groups.
The GCSE attainment levels of Gypsy and Irish Traveller pupils 
are also consistently lower than other ethnic groups. Bhopal (2004) 
attributes Gypsy and Irish Travellers’ poor GCSE attainment to a range 
of issues: for example, a transient lifestyle, discrimination and racism 
by education institutions and wider British society (Lymperopoulou 
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and Shankley, 2018), a lack of familiarity with the education system 
or an open dialogue with teachers and other staff at schools, as well 
as issues related to class. In terms of GCSE attainment, Gypsy and 
Irish Traveller students can also be limited in obtaining good GCSE 
grades by the high levels of illiteracy among adults, which affects their 
ability to navigate the education system and to help and support their 
children’s studies (Bhopal, 2004).
Ethnicity, gender and class
While it is clear that there are differential patterns of GCSE attainment 
across ethnic groups, this picture is complicated by gender and class. 


















Source: Key stage 4 and multi-academy trust performance 2017 (DfE, 2018e).
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Broader patterns of GCSE attainment over time consistently show 
that girls overall outperform boys at GCSE level (Gillborn and Mirza, 
2000; Tomlinson, 2014). Recent data (2016/ 17) show on average, 
GCSE (attainment 8 – which measures pupils’ performance in eight 
GCSE level qualifications3) scores were higher for girls than boys 
across all ethnic groups, with girls achieving on average a score of 
49.0, compared with 43.7 for boys. More specifically, the data show 
girls from the Chinese ethnic group achieved the higher average score 
out of all ethnic groups and among boys and girls. By comparison, the 
data show that boys from a Black Caribbean background scored the 
lowest average score, at 36.9, compared to Black Caribbean girls who 
scored 44. There is a range of explanations for the gender differences 
in educational attainment between girls and boys that include issues of 
differences in gendered expectations, the difference in the way teachers 
treat girls and boys, and the importance of role models (Gillborn and 
Mirza, 2000; Tomlinson, 2014).






























Source: Key stage 4 and multi-academy trust performance 2017 (DfE, 2018e).
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Class has also frequently been used to explain the differences 
between not only ethnic minority pupils’ GCSE attainment but 
also the differences in educational attainment among the broader 
population. The broader patterns of GCSE attainment suggest that 
pupils from a higher socio- economic background performed better 
on average. Gillborn and Mirza (2000:  18) analysed the historical 
patterns of educational attainment by a student’s class and found on 
average that ‘children from the most advantaged backgrounds were 
more than three times as likely to attain five or more higher grades 
at GCSE than their peers at the other end of the spectrum’. Gillborn 
and Mirza’s study used free school meals (FSM) as an indicator of class, 
and while FSM is generally viewed more as a measure of household 
poverty, it is a useful if imperfect measure to examine broadly how 
class could affect educational attainment. Their results showed pupils 
who were eligible for FSM performed worse than those not eligible for 
FSM. The 2016/ 17 data show that when FSM is used in combination 
with ethnicity, the Gypsy and Irish Traveller students were the ethnic 
group most eligible for FSM and were also the least likely to achieve 
an A* to C in maths (7%) or English (7%). While it seems clear that 
class and gender are significant factors that explain some of the pupils’ 
attainment, Gillborn and Mirza (2000) found that, even when class 
and gender were controlled for, ethnic differences were still evident.
A levels/ vocational training
Since 2015, the Education and Skills Act has made education 
compulsory in England until the age of 18 and requires students to 
continue in full- time education, start an apprenticeship/ traineeship, 
or spend at least 20 hours or more volunteering while in part- time 
education/ training (Gov.uk, 2018b). This change to compulsory 
education has not extended to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. 
Department for Education data for 2016/ 17 show 222,084 students 
were entered for at least one A  level or applied A  level, with the 
ethnicity known for 181,348 of the students (82%). The data show that 
76% of the students are White, 12% are Asian, 5% are Black, 5% are 
Mixed, 1% are Chinese and 2% are from Other ethnic groups. Again, 
compared to each group’s share of the population, ethnic minorities 
are over- represented.
Considering the broader data (including students for whom the 
ethnicity was not known), 13.4% of students achieved three A grades 
or better at A level. In specific ethnic minority groups, 22.5% of the 
Chinese group achieved three A grades or better, which was the highest 
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across all ethnic groups. A similar pattern was found for Chinese school 
leavers in Scotland (2016/ 17) where 90.8% of leavers achieved one or 
more passes at Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework (SCQF) 
level six or better. This result was far higher than the percentage for 
White Scottish leavers (60.5%) (Gov.scot, 2017b). As with GCSE 
level examinations, a combination of their immigration history, socio- 
economic and socio- demographic profile may explain their high 
levels of attainment compared to other ethnic groups (see Chapter 1). 
Nonetheless, we need to be careful in the interpretation the data on 
the Chinese students as they remain disproportionately represented in 
the private education system in the UK (Gillborn and Mirza, 2000). 
Therefore, to determine if their attainment is consistent across education 
at this level would require data from the private and state school system, 
which is difficult to obtain. A level attainment across other ethnic groups 
shows variable results with, for example, the Indian group achieving 
15.3%, Pakistani 7.3%, Black African 5.6%, and finally 3.5% of Black 
Caribbean students (Figure 5.5). The data also show that no Gypsy and 
Irish Traveller student in 2016/ 17 achieved three A grades or better at 
A level (there were only 13 students in this group).
Racism in schools
A key element of the experience of ethnic minority pupils in schools, 
but one which has perhaps been less examined or monitored, is the 
everyday experience of racism. This may arise in relationships between 
pupils, but also in the relationships between pupils and teachers, and 
in wider issues around the curriculum and the ‘hidden curriculum’ in 
schools’ cultures (as discussed earlier in relation to the Prevent agenda) 
(Doharty, 2015; Richardson, 2015; Tomlinson, 2014).
The concern around racism between pupils is a long- standing 
one – an early example, which influenced policy, was the murder of 
13- year- old Ahmed Iqbal Ullah in the playground of Burnage High 
School in Greater Manchester in 1986. The types of racism that have 
been documented in schools include physical fighting and name calling 
as well as verbal abuse against pupils and their families (see Varma- 
Joshi et al, 2004; Tomlinson, 2005; Cemlyn, 2009). However, data on 
racist incidents are unevenly monitored; the limited data that exist on 
cases of racist incidents reported are confined to hate crime statistics. 
Bulman (2018) found that between September 2016 and July 2017, 919 
incidents of hate crimes were reported in or around schools in England. 
This equated to five offences occurring per day, of which 71% were 
attributed to race and ethnicity. Bulman (2018) found that compared 
 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
108
to the previous year there had been an increase in the number of hate 
crimes occurring in schools from 568 to 919. However, it is unclear if 
this is an issue of an increase in racism in schools or of reporting, and 
it is likely these figures are only the tip of the iceberg.
























Source: A level and other 16 to 18 results: 2017 to 2018 (DfE, 2018f).
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What is clear, however, is the relative inability of schools to address 
racist events, with studies by the Department for Education Statistics 
(2004), Myers and Bhopal (2015) and Andreouli, Greenland and 
Howarth’s (2015) illustrating variation in reports of racism between 
institutions and localities. Although the Race Relations Amendment 
Act 2000 required all schools to report racist incidents (Hart, 2009), 
these studies revealed the differences in racist incident reporting 
practices across different locations. While there is limited quantitative 
data concerning the exact extent of racism in schools, these studies 
have found that, particularly in schools with largely white populations, 
there may be limited awareness of racism and a lack of staff knowledge 
about how to prepare children for a cultural and ethnically diverse 
society (Department for Education Statistics, 2004). Staff are unwilling 
or ill- equipped to deal with racist incidents, as it was not covered 
adequately in their teacher training (Maylor, 2015). Andreouli et al 
(2015) and Myers and Bhopal’s (2015) studies revealed that teachers 
often felt that racism was located elsewhere (in multi- ethnic urban 
environments only) or in a different period (pre- Macpherson), while 
parents of ethnic minority children who attended schools in rural 
areas were viewed as troublemakers and their claims played down as 
minor incidents (Myers and Bhopal, 2015). The experience of ethnic 
minority students outside urban centres is increasingly important as 
ethnic diversity spreads geographically across the country.
However, racism is not confined to the way schools as institutions 
enact anti- racist legislation, it has also been found in the fashion in 
which teachers treat pupils from different ethnic backgrounds. Again, 
this has been a source of long- standing concerns and activism from 
black parents (Rattansi, 1992), and a focus of research on teachers’ 
stereotypes and low expectations, particularly of Black Caribbean 
pupils. In recent years, similar concerns have emerged around the 
stereotyping of Muslim pupils, reflecting the broader climate which 
views Muslims as a social problem (Bhattacharyya, 2008; Mac an Ghaill 
and Haywood, 2014) – a perspective consolidated by the Prevent duty, 
as discussed earlier.
Racism and exclusions in schools
A particular indication of racism within schools may be the exclusion 
rates of ethnic minority groups compared to the White British 
population (Gillborn and Demack, 2018). School exclusions refer to 
times pupils are removed from schools for either a permanent or fixed 
period for up to 45 days in a school year (Gov.uk, 2018b).
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As noted earlier, the exclusion of ethnic minority pupils in schools 
has been a long- standing issue of concern, particularly with Black 
Caribbean communities (Mac an Ghaill, 1988; Gillborn et al, 2017; 
Richardson, 2018). These trends have been exacerbated in recent 
decades by the marketisation, increased selectivity and target pressures 
across the school system. Gordon (2001) suggests exclusions from state 
educational institutions have been on the rise since the early 1990s, 
with BME students showing a greater than average rate of exclusion 
(both temporary and permanent) compared to White British pupils 
(Bhopal, 2018; Gillborn and Demack, 2018). The pattern of Black 
exclusions appears consistent from Early Year Foundation Stage (ages 4 
and 5) through to Key Stage 4 (ages 15 and 16). However, it seems the 
issue is more pronounced during the final three years of compulsory 
secondary education, when students are due to sit their GCSE exams 
(Gillborn and Demack, 2018), raising concerns around ‘off- rolling’. 
Figure  5.6, using the data from Gov.uk (2018b), shows the Irish 






















































































































































































Note: The data for the Chinese group have been removed because the cell count was too small and 
therefore removed to protect the anonymity of the pupil/ pupils.
Source: RDA 2016/ 17.
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Traveller, Gypsy/ Roma and Black Caribbean groups have the highest 
rates of permanent exclusions, with the level of fixed exclusions for 
the Black Caribbean group three times that of the pupil population 
as a whole (Bhopal, 2018: 69). By comparison, Figure 5.6 shows that 
pupils from the Asian (Asian Other, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani) 
groups have the lowest rates of exclusions. Moreover, Crenna- Jennings 
(2017) suggests that students with special education needs and disability 
(SEND) are more likely to be permanently excluded than non- SEND 
students. When ethnicity, gender and SEND intersect, the most recent 
data indicate that Black Caribbean boys with SEND are 168 times more 
likely to be excluded than White girls who are non- SEND.
The disproportionality of exclusions among Black students has 
been attributed by Parsons (2018) to racist attitudes and stereotyping 
by teachers and school administrators. According to Crenna- Jennings 
(2017) the disproportional exclusion rate of Black pupils is deeply 
entrenched within statutory categories which were formulated in the 
1960s and 1970s. These categories were conceived and assigned to 
children thought to be of so- called limited ability and perceived to have 
a tendency to experience mental health issues. More recently, Joseph- 
Salisbury and Connelly (2018) have also shown how the stigmatisation 
and pathologisation of hairstyles racialised as Black can lead to the 
disciplining and exclusion of Black students. Crenna- Jennings (2017) 
also suggests that exclusion rates may link to broader inequalities 
some ethnic groups experience, in the labour and housing market for 
example. Exclusion has serious knock- on effects for opportunities 
in the labour market (IPPR, 2017; Demie, 2019), However, we can 
also see the resilience of ethnic minority communities in setting up 
supplementary education (Reay and Mirza, 1997) and also increases 
in home schooling as a response to high rates of exclusion (D’Arcy, 
2014; Bhopal and Myers, 2018).
Ethnic minority employment in education
Mac an Ghaill and Haywood’s (2014) study found evidence that young 
people of all ethnic groups perceived a clear social distance between 
ethnic minority pupils and the demographics of staff in state schools 
in England. This is centred on class and also ethnicity. Studies show 
that this can have an effect on how the pupils are treated, but also 
the expectations of teachers with regards to pupils’ behaviour and 
attainment. Recent data from the Department for Education Statistics 
for 2016/ 17 suggest there were 498,100 teachers in state- funded schools 
in England (including classroom teachers, headteachers, deputy and 
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assistant heads). For the academic year 2016/ 17 (England), the data 
suggest that 86.2% of staff were White British (401,400 teachers) 
with 13.6% coming from all other ethnic groups (including White 
minority groups). In addition, there were more female teachers than 
male teachers across almost all ethnic groups (Gov.uk, 2018b).
Table 5.1 shows, for 2016/ 17, teachers from the White British ethnic 
group make up the majority of teaching staff in state schools in England 
and are over- represented compared to their share of the working- age 
population from the 2011 Census. Data from Gov.uk (2018b) on the 
ethnicity of headteachers in England, for example, show that 93% of 
headteachers (20,700) were White British. Table 5.1 also shows all 
other ethnic groups are under- represented in the teaching profession 
apart from the White Irish and the Other Mixed group. Statistics 
Scotland (Gov.scot, 2017a) suggests for 2016/ 17 that only 7% of school 
teachers in Scotland recorded a non-white ethnic background, with 
the majority stating they were from a white ethnic background (93%). 
Nonetheless, a significant issue is that currently there are no publicly 
available data to disaggregate the ethnicity of the workforce by primary 
and secondary education as well as by region.
The lack of ethnic minority teachers in the sector has become a 
cause for concern, particularly in non- STEM (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) subjects (see, for example, the Royal 
Historical Society report by Atkinson et al, 2018). The Why Isn’t My 
Teacher Black? campaign, for example, refers to a collection of writing 
Table 5.1: Ethnicity of the teaching workforce in state schools (primary and 
secondary) in England compared to each group’s share of the working- age 
population, by gender, 2016– 17
WHITE IRISH
OTHER WHITE
WHITE AND BLACK CARIBBEAN

























































Note: Arab and Gypsy and Irish Traveller ethnic groups are not included because they were not sampled 
in the survey on the ethnicity of the teaching workforce in state schools in England.
Source: School workforce in England: November 2017 (DfE, 2018g).
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and blog posts that highlight the issue in the education sector (Peacock, 
2014; Young, 2018; The Guardian, 2018). In their study of recruitment 
practices in initial teacher education, Wilkins and Lall (2011) found 
that while ethnic minority recruitment has been increasing, rates of 
completion of training for ethnic minority recruits were lower than 
for White British trainees. According to Wilkins and Lall (2011), some 
of the reasons for the lack of completion by ethnic minority recruits 
were linked to their fears of social isolation in the teaching profession as 
well as some of the stereotypical attitudes they encountered from some 
White British peers, as well as instances of overt racism, particularly 
while they were on school placement.
Leaving school: race, ethnicity and non- compulsory 
education
Once students finish their A levels or training, they can enter the labour 
market or apply to higher education courses at a university or further 
education institution. Recent decades have seen a significant increase 
in the proportion of young people who enter into higher education, 
from an elite 5% of young people attending university in the 1960s 
to a current 40% of working- age adults with a college or university 
degree (Gibney, 2013). In 1999, New Labour introduced the Widening 
Participation Scheme to increase the number of young people who 
attended university to 50%. This move was intended to get more 
people from different social backgrounds into higher education, and as 
a consequence increased the number of ethnic minority students who 
were able to attend university and gain a university degree (Department 
for Education Statistics, 2004; Bhopal, 2018). The data show this trend, 
with ethnic minority groups disproportionately entering further or 
higher education.
The data (Figure 5.7) show that all ethnic minority groups (apart 
from Gypsy/ Roma) have higher levels of continuing education after 
Key Stage 5 than their White British counterparts. The highest 
levels are found among the Chinese (84%), Black African (80%) and 
the Indian (79%) groups, whereas the lowest levels of continuing in 
education are found in the Gypsy/ Roma (39%). Correspondingly, 
the highest levels of entry into employment after Key Stage 5 are 
among the White British (25%), Gypsy/ Roma (24%) and Mixed 
(18%) whereas the lowest levels of entry into employment after 
Key Stage 5 are among the Chinese (5%), Black African (8%) and 
Bangladeshi (9%) groups. Finally, data show the highest levels where 
non- sustained education or employment are accessed after Key Stage 
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5 are for the Irish Traveller (17%) group whereas the lowest is for 
the Chinese (4%), Black African (6%), Indian (6%) and Bangladeshi 
(6%) groups. Considering the data by order, we can see low levels 
of continued entry into education after Key Stage 5 are apparent 
for all white groups. Khattab (2018) argues that one of the reasons 
for the over- representation of ethnic minorities pursuing further or 
higher education after Key Stage 5 is a strategy to counterbalance the 
anticipated labour market discrimination and ethnic penalties they 
will experiences as well as their perception of the value of education 
as a means for social mobility.











































































































































































NO SUSTAINED EDUCATION/EMPLOYMENT UNKNOWN
Note: Ethnic groups shown in increasing order of share of the ethnic group that continued on in the 
education system. Figures overlain on each section of the bars show the per cent of each ethnic group who 
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Further education
One option for students after Key Stage 5 is to enter into vocational 
training to learn a specific skill or trade. In April 2017, the 
apprenticeship levy was introduced across the UK, and required all 
UK employers with a pay bill over £3 million per year to pay the 
levy, to be spent on training and assessment (Powell, 2019). Further 
education provides a pathway to train in many vocational subjects. Data 
from the Department for Education (2018b) suggest that in 2016/ 17, 
11.2% of those starting an apprenticeship were from an ethnic minority 
background, which is below their share of the population.
Even though the number of apprenticeships has increased since 
2008, this increase has not been reflected in a parallel increase in the 
numbers of ethnic minority people who have started apprenticeships 
(Frumkin and Koustsoubou, 2013). Crucially, Figure 5.8 shows that 
only 10.6% of apprentices were from an ethnic minority background, 
which is below the 13% share of the population of England and Wales 
in the 2011 Census. However, the data from the Department for 
Education (2018b) show that the percentage of ethnic minority people 
who start apprenticeships has increased from 5.3% in 2002/ 03 to 11.2% 











































































































WHITE ETHNIC MINORITY UNKNOWN
Source: Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA).
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in 2017/ 18, with the number of ethnic minority apprentices growing 
from 8,900 (2002/ 03) to 42,230 (2017/ 18). A study by the Black 
Training and Enterprise Group (2019) that looked at the differences 
in ethnic minority participation in apprenticeships (2016/ 17) found 
that 0.9% of Black Caribbean, 1.5% Black African, 1.1% Indian, 
1.1 Pakistani, 0.8% Bangladeshi and 1.9% from the Mixed groups 
successfully completed a course. The statistics suggest an increase in 
ethnic minority people’s participation on apprenticeship programmes. 
Nevertheless, the dramatic growth of apprenticeships in England 
has been overwhelmingly taken up by White British young people 
(Frumkin and Koustsoubou, 2013). Some of this differential take up 
may be related to different levels of awareness of the apprenticeship 
route and also the higher proportion of ethnic minority groups that 
continues on to higher education. However, given the known patterns 
of discrimination and exclusion in employment, it is likely that racial 
discrimination is also operating in the distribution of apprenticeships. 
More research is needed in this area (Black Training and Enterprise 
Group, 2019).
Aiming higher: race, ethnicity and inequality in 
universities
As noted, the majority of ethnic minority school leavers elect to 
enter higher education (Blanden and Machin, 2004; Boliver, 2011; 
Alexander and Arday, 2015). Data from AdvanceHE for 2016/ 17 show 
that 26% of all undergraduate students in England are from ethnic 
minorities, with 43% of these from Asian, 31% from Black (Caribbean 
and African), 16.4% from mixed ethnicity, and 3.7% from Chinese 
backgrounds (Table 5.2).
More detailed analysis shows that there is variation within racial 
group, with larger proportions of African- , Indian- and Pakistani- 
descent students than other groups.
Access
However, it is crucial to be attentive to the types of institutions 
where ethnic minority students are found (Boliver, 2015, 2018; 
Tatlow, 2015) as this can be revealing of issues of inequalities in access 
across the higher education landscape. The proportion of ethnic 
minority students who attend Russell Group versus New Universities 
is commonly used as an indicator of equality of access. This is 
because Russell Group universities are viewed as more prestigious 
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research- driven universities and have the most resources (Tatlow, 
2015). Historically, Russell Group universities have lower levels of 
student admissions from people from ethnic minority backgrounds, 
as well as students from state schools and low- income backgrounds, 
indicating stratification within the higher education system in Britain 
(Bhopal, 2018). The disparity across ethnic groups as to who attends 
Russell Group versus New Universities has been linked to ethnic 
minority people’s lack of familiarity with the Russell Group admissions 
process, and broader issues of lack of recognised social and cultural 
capital (Bhopal, 2018), as well as concerns around discrimination in 
the admissions system (Boliver, 2015, 2016).
Figure 5.9 highlights that the Black group is under- represented in 
Russell Group institutions compared to other ethnic minority and 
White groups. A more detailed analysis by Boliver (2016) found that 
ethnic minority applicants are more likely to choose oversubscribed 
courses and are less likely to receive offers from Russell Group 
universities than equally qualified white applicants ‘even when the 
numerical competitiveness of courses have been taken into account’ 
(Boliver, 2016: 261). Furthermore, Boliver’s (2016: 261) analysis also 
found that ethnic inequalities in admissions were greater for degree 
subject areas at Russell Group universities where ‘the percentage 
of ethnic minority applications is higher’. While data restrictions 
imposed by UCAS (Universities and Colleges Admissions Service) 
have limited analysis of the exact mechanisms, Boliver (2016: 262) 
suggests that one explanation ‘is that, consciously or unconsciously, 
some admissions selectors might be unfairly rejecting some ethnic 
minority applicants in order to achieve an entering class with 
an ethnic mix that is ultimately representative of the … wider 

















































































Source: HESA data for 2016/ 17 (2018).
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population’. Boliver (2016) argues that more research, particularly 
qualitative research, is needed into admissions selectors’ decision 
making to ascertain the exact mechanisms underpinning this form 
of ethnic inequality.
Attainment
As well as differences in university type, and degree programme, there 
are also stark differences in degree attainment by ethnicity, and in 
particular by differences in ‘good degrees’ (that is first or upper second 
classifications) (Richardson, 2018). The difference in the percentage of 
students who receive a ‘good’ degree classification compared to their 
white counterparts is known as the ‘attainment gap’. This gap is found 
across ethnic minority groups
There is, however, a clear difference in the ethnic attainment gap 
between Russell Group and post- 1992/ New institutions, and across 
degree subjects (Richardson, 2018). Figure 5.10 shows that all ethnic 
minority groups’ students who attend Russell Group universities 
achieve a higher proportion of good degrees than those who attend 
New Universities. Figure 5.9 also shows the most notable attainment 
gap within a specific ethnic minority group and between institution 
type is for Black African followed by Black Caribbean groups. 
For example, 77.82% of Black students who attend Russell Group 
universities achieve a good degree compared to 66.33% of Black 
students who attend New Universities in Britain; a percentage point 
Figure 5.9: Ethnic composition of UK- domiciled higher education student 

















Source: HESA data for 2016/ 17 (2018).
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difference of 11.49%. While there is a difference in the number of 
ethnic minority students who attend New Universities compared to 
Russell Group universities, the findings suggest the type of university 
a student attends continues to affect the likelihood of their achieving 
a good degree at graduation.
Figure 5.10: Proportion of students from each ethnic group who obtained a ‘good 
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Source: HESA data for 2016/ 17 (2018).
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However, it is important to bear in mind the difference in access/ 
attendance between institution types:  for example, only 2,210 
Black students graduated from Russell Group universities in 2016/ 
17 compared to 19,020 Black students who graduated from New 
Universities. Once graduated, ethnic minority students then face the 
challenge of converting their degrees into access and entry into the 
labour market (Li, 2015).
HESA (Higher Education Statistics Agency) 2016/ 17 (2018) data 
show the earning differences across ethnic groups a year after graduating. 
The data suggest graduates from the Indian and Chinese ethnic groups 
had the highest average earnings one year after graduation, at £21,900 
and £21,700 respectively. Meanwhile, graduates from the Other 
Black and Bangladeshi ethnic group had the lowest average earnings 
one year after graduation, at £17,400 and £17,900. Moreover, ten 
years after graduation, graduates with highest average earnings were 
from Asian Other and Indian groups, at £33,200 and £33,100; those 
with the lowest average earnings were from the Pakistani (£24,700) 
group. Furthermore, comparing the destinations after graduation, 
HESA (2018) data for 2015/ 16 suggest that White graduates had the 
highest percentage of sustained employment, further study or both, one 
year after graduation (87.4%), followed by graduates from the Indian 
(86.3%) and Black Caribbean (86.0%) ethnic groups. Meanwhile, 
graduates from the Other Black (13.1%), Pakistani (12.2%) and 
Black African (11.5%) ethnic groups were the most likely to have no 
sustained destination compared with all other ethnic groups. (For a 
more comprehensive overview of the differences across ethnic groups 
see Chapter 6 on ethnic inequalities in the labour market.)
Employment in higher education
As with primary and secondary schooling, racial and ethnic inequalities 
in higher education can also be measured by looking at the demography 
of the staff who work within higher education institutions, and has 
been highlighted in recent years by the high- profile student- led Why 
Isn’t My Professor Black? campaign (Joseph- Salisbury, 2019), and the 
establishment of the Race Equality Chartermark (Bhopal and Pitkin, 
2018; Bhopal and Henderson, 2019). Data from HESA (2018) for 
2016/ 17 show the breakdown of academic and non- academic staff 
working in higher education in the UK. There are two ways to look 
at ethnic inequalities in higher education:  first, the representation 
of ethnic minorities in the workforce as a whole and, second, the 
representation of ethnic minorities at different levels of the workforce 
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(for example, professorial versus non- professorial). It is apparent that 
ethnic minority academics are under- represented in higher education, 
with less than 10% of academic staff of ethnic minority origin.
Looking at the workforce within higher education as a whole, we can 
see that staffing varies significantly by ethnic group and UK/ non- UK 
nationality. Table 5.3 shows that, among non- UK national staff, Chinese, 
Indian, Other Asian and Black African groups are over- represented 
compared to their proportion of the UK population. Meanwhile, 
Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Mixed and Other Black groups are under- 
represented. However, all BME groups are under- represented in relation 
to their proportions of the working- age population (See Table 5.1).
The profile of staffing becomes starker at more senior levels, with a 
marked disparity at professorial level, with only 8.4% ethnic minority 
professors, meaning 91.6% of professors in the UK are from White 
backgrounds. As Figure 5.11 illustrates, there are small numbers of Black 
professors (4.6%), and an over- representation of Chinese professors 
(15.8%). Again, this is likely to be skewed by the presence of non- 
UK professors. As Figure 5.11 shows, there is a significant difference 
between men and women in both professorial and non- professorial 
grades in higher education by ethnicity (Wright et al, 2017; Solanke, 
2018). Figure 5.11 shows ethnic minority women are particularly poorly 
represented in professorial roles in higher education in the UK and White 
groups dominate all academic roles across men and women. Considering 
Table 5.3: Ethnic composition of UK/ non- UK staff, percentage of total
WHITE AND BLACK CARIBBEAN








































Source: HESA data for 2016/ 17 (2018).
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the percentage of each ethnic group in the working- age population, 
Figure 5.11 shows that all ethnic minority groups are under- represented 
compared to their share of the working- age population and at different 
levels of the academic hierarchy (professorial and non- professorial level).
In addition, the 2017/ 18 Higher Education Statistics Agency staff record 
suggests an ethnic disparity among non- academic staff, with 84.34% of 
the staff reporting they were from a White background, 2.90% Black, 
5.50% Asian, 2.38% Other and 5.88% not known (HESA, 2018). Here 
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we can see that the Black and Other group are over- represented in non- 
academic roles compared to their share of the working- age population, 
whereas the White and Asian groups were under- represented compared 
to their share of the working- age population.
Arday (2015) explains the poor levels of representation of ethnic 
minorities in higher education as a consequence of recruitment 
practices, but there are also broader perceptions around universities as 
‘white’ spaces (Arday and Mirza, 2018; Joseph- Salisbury, 2019). These 
exclusionary practices also explain the restrictions on ethnic minority 
staff members progressing to more senior positions, with many early 
career researchers describing the existence of a glass ceiling, which 
prevented many of them from progressing further in their disciplines. 
In addition, Bhopal (2015:  38) found among ethnic minority staff 
respondents, that many experienced ‘covert exclusionary processes 
that relate to their ethnicity’. Many felt they experienced differential 
treatment compared to their White counterparts, as well as more overt 
incidents of racism (Atkinson et al, 2018). Moreover, some experienced 
feelings of a lack of trust, questions over their credibility as well as 
‘over- scrutinisation’ which their white colleagues did not experience 
(Bhopal, 2015; Mirza, 2015; Rollock, 2019).
It is significant that while the numbers of ethnic minority 
students have increased over time, the proportion of ethnic minority 
academics has not increased at a similar rate. Importantly, the 
presence or absence of ethnic minority staff members can affect the 
experience of ethnic minority students attending their institutions 
as they can provide informal support and role models (Arday, 2015; 
Joseph- Salisbury, 2019).
Campaigning for equality
While the ethnic inequality of the workforce in schools and universities 
has become a recent focus in academic writing (Arday and Mirza, 
2018), it has also become an issue for students, activists and the media – 
for example in the high- profile campaigns Why Isn’t My Professor 
Black?, Why Is My Curriculum White?, I Too Am Oxford and the 
Rhodes Must Fall campaign.
Two charter schemes have been introduced in higher education 
aimed at tackling inequality around gender and race in the sector. The 
Athena Swan award was introduced in 2005 and requires universities 
to demonstrate their commitment to gender equality to receive an 
award. The second, more recent scheme has been the Race Equality 
Mark, introduced in 2016, which provides a framework specifically 
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to address matters of race in higher education where universities 
demonstrate their commitment to racial equality in their institutions 
to receive an award (Bhopal et  al, 2015; Bhopal and Pitkin, 2018; 
Bhopal and Henderson, 2019). However the Race Equality Mark is not 
compulsory or linked to any metric of academic rigour or success such 
as the Research Excellence Framework (REF) or Teaching Excellence 
Framework (TEF). It is likely that universities will only sign up if they 
believe it a benefit in terms of their reputation (Bhopal, 2016) and it 
is startling that in its first year only 21 institutions applied, and only 8 
were awarded. This latter number has only risen to 12 institutions in 
2019. The growth of the award has been much slower than its sister, 
Athena Swan award, and it seems unlikely to gain the same traction 
(Bhopal and Pitkin, 2018; Bhopal and Henderson, 2019).
Conclusion
This chapter clearly illustrates that ethnic inequalities persist across the 
education system in Britain, despite changing demographics in UK 
schools. One enduring concern has been the attainment gap between 
white and (some) ethnic minority pupils in state schools in Britain – a 
pattern that has been consistent across GCSE and A level examinations. 
New data from 2016/ 17 show us that there is now great variation across 
groups, with Chinese and Indian pupils outperforming other groups 
at both GCSE and A level examinations, whereas Black Caribbean, 
Pakistani and Gypsy and Irish Traveller groups perform consistently 
poorly compared to other groups. Analysing attainment by intersecting 
characteristics of gender and class highlights that girls continue to 
perform better than boys, and those from a higher class background 
perform better than those from a lower class background: nevertheless 
ethnic differences remain.
While attainment is a significant concern, schools continue to be 
viewed as a significant site where the British government believes it can 
solve social problems, with the most recent example being embedded 
in the Prevent policy. However, the policy has been criticised for 
disproportionately targeting Muslim and/ or South Asian pupils. Its 
use has been blamed for creating a chasm of mistrust between schools 
and Muslim communities across the country, with little focus on 
other forms of radicalisation. The role of schools as site of internal 
border controls for migrant and asylum seeking children also needs 
greater scrutiny.
These issues are replicated in the further and higher education 
sectors, with ongoing concerns around under- representation in 
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apprenticeship schemes and ethnic inequality in access, attainment 
and employability at universities. Campaigns such as Why Isn’t My 
Professor Black? point to the inadequate representation of ethnic 
minorities among academic staff, as well as a lack of diversity across 
ethnic groups and, particularly, by gender. These campaigns have 
sought to highlight the structural barriers that have prevented ethnic 
minorities’ representation and visibility across institutions. The 
campaigns to ‘decolonise the curriculum’ have also brought attention 
to ethnic inequality and exclusions in the curriculum, and sought to 
improve the representation and role that ethnic minorities have in the 
formation and pursuit of knowledge.
Finally, the introduction of the Race Equality Charter Mark (REC) 
could be a positive change to the higher education landscape in 
Britain. Similar to the Athena Swan Award (which has increased the 
representation of women in STEM subjects), the REC has the potential 
to bring about institutional change across higher education institutions 
that commit to this scheme, demonstrating the sector’s commitment 
to racial equality. Nevertheless, to date, few universities have signed up 
to the scheme and/ or received the bronze award. It remains to be seen 
if the REC will have the same traction and commitment as Athena 
Swan, and whether it will have the force to achieve broad cultural 
change within higher education institutions.
Notes
 1 The authors would also like to thank David Gillborn, Kalwant Bhopal, Bridget 
Byrne and Remi Joseph- Salisbury for comments on the chapter.
 2 DoE, Schools, pupils and their characteristics:  January 2018, https:// assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ 
file/ 719226/ Schools_ Pupils_ and_ their_ Characteristics_ 2018_ Main_ Text.pdf
 3 A student’s Attainment 8 score is calculated by adding up the points for their eight 
subjects and dividing by 10 to get their Attainment 8 score. Students don't have 








Ethnic minorities in the labour 
market in Britain
Ken Clark and  William Shankley
Key findings
• Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show significant differences in 
levels of economic activity across ethnicity groups and, within 
groups, by gender, including a sustained ethnic penalty in earnings 
suffered by some groups. (1) While the LFS shows variation across 
ethnic groups by gender, there is evidence of employment rate gaps 
between white groups and non- white groups narrowing over time. 
Removing students from the analysis also narrows the employment 
rate gap; (2) Self- employment rates differ between men and women, 
with Pakistani men and Chinese women showing the highest rate 
of self- employment. High rates of self- employment for non- white 
groups can be linked to discrimination in the paid labour market 
which makes self- employment an attractive alternative.
• Broader economic and labour market policy has been found 
to disproportionately impact on ethnic minority workers 
and households. (1)  The introduction of Universal Credit 
disproportionately affects ethnic minority groups particularly 
women. Their immigration history and socio- economic profiles 
reduce their resilience to any sanctions imposed; (2) Despite higher 
coverage rates, the national minimum (or living) wage may not be 
paid to individuals from some ethnic minority groups (particularly 
Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Chinese). This is partly the result of 
non- compliance by employers.
• There is great variation in the representation of non- white workers 
in the public sector, with the state education system (primary and 
secondary), armed forces and non- medical positions in the National 
Health Service (NHS) dominated by white groups, while ethnic 
minority groups are well represented in medical roles in the NHS. 
Future policy needs to address exclusionary practices in specific 




Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
128
• Key pieces of public policy, such as the Ethnic Minority Employment 
Task Force (EMETF) and the McGregor- Smith review, have 
attempted to reduce ethnic labour market disadvantage, however 
these have had, at best, limited success to date.
Introduction1
In February 2017 an independent UK government review highlighted 
the continued disadvantage that ethnic minority people face in 
the labour market compared to their White British counterparts 
(McGregor- Smith, 2017). Such disadvantage has been a notable feature 
of the experience of non- white workers for decades and can be seen in 
measurements of different dimensions of labour market outcomes such 
as activity, employment, self- employment and earnings. Much scholarly 
attention has been devoted to this issue and new data sources have 
become available. It is now more widely understood that differences 
between different non- white groups can themselves be substantial and 
there is a more nuanced awareness of the differences between groups. 
It is less clear, however, that the enhanced portfolio of evidence has 
been matched by successful policy action to address ethnic inequalities. 
While policymakers have attempted to address inequalities in a variety 
of ways, the continued disadvantage that we observe suggests that their 
efforts so far have been limited at best.
In this chapter, we provide an up- to- date snapshot of how individuals 
from ethnic minority backgrounds in the UK compare in their labour 
market behaviour to those from other groups including the White 
British majority. This is contextualised by a discussion of how a number 
of powerful external drivers have changed, and continue to change, 
the nature of work and labour markets. We then discuss two major 
policy initiatives from central government which were specifically 
designed to address ethnic labour market inequalities, as well as other 
policy developments, with a view to assessing what has or has not 
worked in the past and what is likely to be effective in the future. We 
also consider public sector employment as a particular site where the 
government can have a direct influence on employment and work 
conditions and where a moral responsibility to promote equality can 
be exercised by the state.
The labour market is fundamental to individuals’ life chances and 
welfare. National living standards depend ultimately on productivity, 
which in turn depends on the size of the workforce and its quality, in 
terms of human capital. Equally important to questions of fairness in 
society and social cohesion is the question of how labour and its rewards 
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are distributed between different groups. It is with this perspective in 
mind and amid a landscape of transforming labour markets, increasing 
precarity and the uncertainties associated with Brexit that we position 
our analysis of the labour market experiences of ethnic minority groups.
The changing UK labour market
The period since mass migration from former colonies first led to 
sizeable non- white populations living in the UK has seen the British 
labour market undergo considerable change driven by a number of 
interrelated developments at both national and international levels. 
Deindustrialisation has been a constant theme, driven in part by 
globalisation and technological change which, in turn, have contributed 
to rising wage inequality and polarisation in job types. Women have 
joined the labour market in larger numbers and the issue of workplace 
diversity has become a more central concern. Wider economic and 
social trends have led to a legislative change which has simultaneously 
reduced worker protection in some areas, such as trade union activity, 
but which has also strengthened protection against discrimination 
(for example the Equality Act 2010). A transforming labour market 
impacts all workers but it need not impact them all equally and each 
of these wider developments has played a particular role in influencing 
how workers from particular ethnic backgrounds participate in, and 
benefit from, work.
Long- term patterns of deindustrialisation and the move to a service- 
based economy have led to the offshoring of a substantial proportion 
of traditional manufacturing industry. There is a certain irony in the 
fact that while manufacturing jobs were moving from the UK in the 
global North to rising economies in the global South, the UK was 
experiencing waves of Commonwealth immigration in the opposite 
direction. Kalra (2000) notes how South Asian workers who came to 
Britain prior to the 1980s were employed in industries which were 
in long- term decline, and how the employment experience of men 
from this group was a journey from ‘textile mills to taxi ranks’. While 
labouring in manufacturing industry could be intensive and physically 
demanding, there was a regularity to the hours, some degree of 
employee protection and rights, and a lower degree of risk compared 
to the more precarious world of marginal service sector employment 
and self- employment as taxi drivers or in takeaways.
In tandem with the offshoring of industrial employment, technological 
change in the form of the increasing use of information technology and 
automation in the workplace has had a profound effect on the demand 
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for labour. Many jobs traditionally undertaken by workers are now 
done by computers or machines and further technological disruption to 
labour markets is a recurring theme for writers who attempt to predict 
the future of work (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). However, it is 
clear that the development of technology affects some sectors more 
than others. For instance, while the textile sector saw many jobs lost to 
automation, a need for health and social care to respond to the ageing 
population is likely to remain. In occupations like these, automation 
and outsourcing cannot occur to the same extent as manufacturing 
because they require specific ‘human’ skills such as empathy or levels 
of manual dexterity that machines cannot at present replicate. Such 
jobs in many countries have often attracted non- white immigrants and 
are often a route into the labour market for women.
The feminisation of the workforce has also impacted on labour 
markets more generally. The employment rate for women in the UK 
was 53% in 1971 compared to around 71% in 2018, however there is 
substantial ethnic differentiation in this rate as noted later in this chapter 
(ONS, 2019). Many women entered the labour market in low- paid, 
part- time employment, where they were in competition with younger 
male workers and those from ethnic minority backgrounds. As well as 
more egalitarian social attitudes, the growth of the service sector has 
increased female labour force participation and, as noted by Goos and 
Manning (2007), there is a link to the increasing educational attainment 
of women. Male educational attainment has also increased on average, 
with the expansion of higher education and increases in minimum 
school leaving ages. Again, the degree of human capital investment 
and the returns it generates have not been uniformly distributed across 
ethnic groups.
The increasing supply of skills in the labour market associated with 
greater educational participation is in part a response to the needs 
of an economy in which automation, technological change and 
globalisation have fundamentally changed patterns of labour demand. 
The implications of this for workers include rising wage inequality, 
particularly in the period between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, 
and polarisation of the occupational structure of the labour market. 
Skill- biased technical change (Goos and Manning, 2007), the idea that 
technological innovations disproportionately increase the demand for 
skilled workers relative to the unskilled, presents a convincing argument 
for increased wage inequalities and has been used to explain why some 
ethnic minority groups perform better than others (McCall, 2002).
There has also been a series of shifts in the relationship between the 
employer and employee over the period, driven in part by changing 
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patterns of work but also facilitated by policy changes, which have 
reduced the strength of worker protection legislation. Unionisation has 
been in decline in the UK since the late 1970s when the proportion 
of employees who were members of a union was over 50% compared 
to 23% in 2017 (DBEIS, 2018a). In line with further globalisation 
and technology- driven connectedness, recruitment agencies now 
play an increasing role (locally, nationally and internationally) as an 
intermediary or conduit by connecting prospective workers with 
employers. Recent years have also seen increasing concern about 
non- standard, less formal patterns of paid employment, such as the use 
of so- called ‘zero- hours’ contracts and the rise of the ‘gig’ economy 
(Kuhn, 2016). While some legislation, such as that to limit trade union 
activity, might be thought to work against securing improvements 
for ethnic minorities in the labour market, there has also been a 
suite of legislation specifically directed at reducing discrimination in 
a range of contexts including employment. The Equality Act 2010 
collated and superseded four previous Acts of Parliament and other 
statutory provisions and protects people against discrimination on the 
grounds of nine protected characteristics one of which is race. Such 
concern with fairness in the workplace is consistent with an increased 
interest from business in workplace diversity and its perceived benefits 
(Clark, 2015a).
A snapshot of ethnic minorities in the labour market
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present a snapshot of the labour market outcomes 
for different ethnic groups by sex in the UK based on the quarterly 
LFS. The data set refers to men aged 16 to 64 and women aged 
16 to 59 who were interviewed between January 2015 and June 
2018. A  range of labour market indicators is presented including 
the activity (or participation) rate, employment rate, unemployment 
rate, self- employment rate and the mean weekly earnings of those in 
employment. The employment rate is also re- calculated excluding 
students from both the numerator and denominator of the calculation. 
This follows the approach taken by Clark and Drinkwater (2007) to 
account for differential rates of educational participation between 
different ethnic groups. If a large proportion of a group is in education 
then these people are counted as non- employed which tends to reduce 
the employment rate measure. Nonetheless, those who continue 
in post- compulsory education have higher employment rates on 
graduation than those who do not; hence including students may bias 
our measure of ethnic differences in employment rates where there are 
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Notes: Variables used: ETHEWEUL, SEX, ILOEFR (economic activity), INECACO5 (self- employed), 
GRSSWK (wages), men (ages 16 to 64)/ women (ages 16 to 59).
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey (merged data from 14 waves of data, January 2015 to June 2018).


































79.9 76.2 78.7 3.8 6.9 619.0
78.9 74.9 78.5 4.6 10.2 443.4
72.0 67.5 72.0 5.9 6.8 469.0
41.1 37.8 41.1 12.8 5.1 329.0
41.3 34.9 37.1 13.8 3.2 355.9
61.8 60.1 73.1 3.2 10.6 531.1
69.1 60.2 68.3 10.3 4.4 377.5
77.0 71.5 76.7 6.5 5.4 428.0
Notes: See notes to Figure 6.1.
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey (merged data from 14 waves of data, January 2015 to June 2018).
large disparities in rates of educational participation between groups 
(see Chapter 5 on education for more details).
Economic activity
A basic indicator of how well different groups are integrated into the 
labour market is the level of labour market participation or economic 
activity. A respondent to the LFS is classified as active if they are either 
working or not working but looking for work. Among men, Table 6.1 
suggests that the ethnic minority groups that show the highest levels 
of economic activity are the Indian and white groups (White Irish 
and White Other) whereas the groups that show the lowest levels of 
economic activity are the Chinese (68.7%), Bangladeshi (77.8%) and 
Pakistani (77.9%) groups. Among women, Table 6.2 suggests that the 
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lowest levels of economic activity are for the Bangladeshi (41.3%) 
and Pakistani (41.1%) groups. There are a number of explanations for 
the ethnic and gender differences across ethnic minority groups with 
regard to their economic activity. One reason for the high activity 
rate among the white ethnic minority groups is their relatively high 
proportion of labour migrants, their relatively young average age and 
their lack of caregiving commitments. Meanwhile, many families 
from South Asian groups (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) are 
responsible for caregiving (child and adult dependents) in line with 
traditional attitudes to gender roles. Cumulatively, these themes 
explain the high levels of economic inactivity, particularly for 
women, in Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups (Khoudja and Platt, 
2018). Moreover, Carter et  al (2015) find that ethnic and gender 
norms are prevalent in minority business structures and can act to 
prevent women from becoming entrepreneurs. Inactivity may also 
reflect that some individuals are ‘discouraged workers’ who have 
dropped out of the labour market because of a perceived lack of 
employment opportunities. Students and those who are long- term 
sick or ill are also classified as inactive, which means that groups with 
high proportions of students tend to have lower activity rates. This 
is particularly so for the Chinese group.
Employment
Employment rates are often used as a measure of labour market 
success. Joblessness is a powerful predictor of poverty and the analysis 
of employment rates can shed light on welfare disparities across ethnic 
groups. For this reason, reducing the employment rate gap between 
white and non- white workers was one of the central ambitions of 
UK government policy in the 2000s. The raw employment rates in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 measure the percentage of the age group who are 
either in paid employment or are self- employed. The data suggests 
that there is a high level of variation in employment rates between 
groups. For men these range from 88.3% for the White Other group 
to 66.5% for the Chinese. Most of the largest non- white ethnic groups 
have lower employment rates than the majority White British group, 
the exception being the Indians. For women, reflecting the previous 
discussion of participation rates, the variation in outcomes between 
groups is even wider than for the men. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women are notable for the employment rates which are less than half 
those of White British women. Indeed all the non- white groups have 
lower employment rates than the White British.
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Source: 2001– 18 Labour Force Survey.
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Ethnic minorities in the labour market in Britain
135
Excluding students from the employment rate calculation to account 
for differential rates of educational participation between groups makes 
a considerable difference to the observed patterns and demonstrates the 
usefulness of this approach. The gap between White British and other 
ethnic groups is substantially reduced. For example, excluding students 
increases the White British employment rate by 3.5 percentage points 
but the equivalent figure for Pakistani men is nearly 10 percentage 
points higher. This has the effect of reducing the employment rate gap 
between these groups from 6.8 percentage points to 0.6 percentage 
points. A similar pattern exists for the Bangladeshi men. The most 
dramatic increase in the employment rate is for Chinese men where 
the rate jumps from 66.5% to 82.2%. This reflects the relatively young 
age structure of these groups and the resulting high proportions in 
education. For example, analysis of the LFS shows that 7.1% of White 
British, 3.2% of White Irish, 7% of White Other, 9.2% of Indian, 
14.8% of Pakistani, 14.7% of Bangladeshi, 21.5% of Chinese, 19.9% 
of Black African and 9.6% of Black Caribbean men are full- time 
students. The ethnic minority women who show the highest levels 
of employment (excluding students) are the White British (78.8%), 
White Irish (78.7%) and White Other (78.5%) groups. Gaps remain 
between the White British women and non- white ethnic groups 
even after removing students from the calculation, especially for the 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
Taking account of the large proportions of students in some ethnic 
groups does close the gaps between those groups and the majority 
group. Similarly, there is some evidence of employment gaps closing 
over time. Comparing Figure 6.1 with similar calculations undertaken 
by Clark and Drinkwater (2007), which used data from 1991 Census 
microdata, show considerable improvement in the position of non- 
white groups, particularly for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men where 
their (raw) employment rates have increased by around 20 percentage 
points. Figure 6.1, drawn from a longer run of LFS data illustrates 
a similar pattern for Pakistani men and men from Black Caribbean 
and Black African backgrounds. Despite a dip around the time of the 
financial crisis, the long- run trend has been for the employment rate 
gap to close.
Figure 6.2 performs the same exercise for women and finds that 
while the employment rate for Black Caribbean and Black African 
women has remained fairly constant over time, Pakistani women have 
begun to close the gap with White women, particularly since 2005.
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Rates of unemployment
Among those active in the labour market, the proportion that are 
unemployed is a key measure of barriers to labour market success. 
The unemployment rate can also reflect the riskiness or precarity of 
their employment situation. Sandhu (2016) notes that high rates of 
unemployment among ethnic minority men and women can have 
disproportionate effects on their welfare given how the benefits system, 
and in particular the new Universal Credit regime, penalises larger 
families. Among men, Table  6.1 suggests that the ethnic minority 
groups that experience the highest rates of unemployment in the UK 
are the Black Caribbean (10%) and Black African (8%) groups whereas 
the lowest rates of unemployment are among the White Irish (2.5%) 
and Other White (2.6%) groups. By comparison, among women, 
Table 6.2 suggests the highest rates of unemployment are for the Black 
African (10.3%) group whereas the lowest rates of unemployment are 
among the Chinese (3.2%) and White Irish (3.8%) groups. The low 
levels of unemployment found among the Chinese and the White Irish 
groups can partly be explained by their high rates of employment in 
routine, low- skilled and poorly paid employment (Clark et al, 2018).
Unemployment has negative consequences for workers of all 
ethnicities, however higher rates for some groups compared to others 
can have particularly pernicious and long- term consequences. Li and 
Heath (2008) note the hypercyclicity of non- white employment rates. 
This means that during recessions, when there is a reduction in the 
demand for labour, non- white unemployment rates rise faster than 
those of the white majority group. Thus during these periods, the 
ethnic differential in unemployment rates grows. Heath and Li (2018) 
find similar ethnic- specific effects in the form of more pronounced 
‘scarring’ effects of unemployment on some ethnic groups. Scarring 
is the idea that experiences of unemployment can have longer- term 
consequences for the labour market outcomes of workers as it leads to a 
loss of human capital or can act as a negative signal to future employers. 
Heath and Li (2018) find that Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean men, 
as well as Pakistani and Black African women, experience greater 
scarring effects that their white peers.
Di Stasio and Heath (2019) examined the hiring practices of UK 
employers by applying for jobs using fake CVs which differed only 
by the ethnicity of the applicant (ethnicity was signalled by name). 
The results suggested that ethnic minorities needed to send 60% 
more applications to get a positive response from employers than a 
white British person, with discrimination particularly high against 
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Pakistani applicants (Di Stasio and Heath, 2019). The implication is 
that discrimination continues to exclude ethnic minorities, to different 
degrees, from accessing the labour market, and the different levels of 
discrimination that various minority groups face appear to contribute 
to their differential rates of unemployment.
Comparing the different regions in Britain, unemployment rates 
across ethnic minority groups vary, with the disparity between 
unemployment rates more stark in London (where 9% of ethnic 
minority groups including men and women are unemployed compared 
to 4% of white groups), the West Midlands (where 11% of ethnic 
minority groups are unemployed compared to 5% of white groups) 
and finally, the north- west region (where 9% of ethnic minority groups 
are unemployed compared to 5% of white groups). These regional 
disparities may reflect different geographical and sectoral concentrations 
of ethnic minority groups (Lymperopoulou and Finney, 2016).
For all workers, regaining access to jobs while unemployed can be 
a challenge. A report by Hall et al (2017) for the Runnymede Trust 
showed that ethnic minority women faced the biggest challenges 
following the most recent recession and subsequent austerity measures. 
A significant issue is that funding cuts have impacted training courses 
used by ethnic minority women to improve their access to the labour 
market. The introduction of the Universal Credit system has further 
penalised women who participate in these courses as the courses are not 
counted within the formal criteria to receive Job Seekers Allowance. 
A particular challenge is the type of work ethnic minority women 
participate in, which the report shows is predominantly part- time 
(73.3%). Issues of caring responsibilities and obligations (both child and 
adult dependents) are a major barrier to women’s employment levels, 
as well as the types of employment they can access. Benefit cuts have 
exacerbated the financial challenges facing working women with these 
having a disproportionate impact on non- white women.
Self- employment
Table  6.1 shows the ethnic minority men who show the highest 
levels of self- employment are the Pakistani group (23.3%) whereas 
the group that shows the lowest levels of self- employment is the Black 
African (11.6%) group. In comparison, Table 6.2 shows that the ethnic 
minority women who show the highest levels of self- employment are 
the Chinese (10.6%) and Other White (10.2%) groups. High rates of 
self- employment, particularly for men, are frequently observed for 
immigrant and minority groups in a variety of countries (Clark, 2015b) 
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and are often viewed as a sign of dynamism and economic progress. 
However, closer inspection suggests that much of the self- employment 
undertaken by South Asian men in the UK is low- status, low- reward 
work, such as taxi driving or running small food outlets. Indeed Clark 
and Drinkwater (2007) suggest that the high rates of self- employment 
for non- white men in the UK are due to racial discrimination in the 
paid labour market, which makes self- employment relatively more 
attractive; ethnic minority men are pushed out of paid employment 
rather than pulled towards self- employment by its inherent merits.
Earnings
Another measure of the socio- economic attainment of ethnic minority 
groups is their earnings. Among men, Table 6.1 reports mean weekly 
earnings from the LFS and suggests that the ethnic minority groups who 
show the highest average (mean) weekly wages in the labour market are 
the White Irish (£854), Chinese (£745) and Indian (£720) groups, 
whereas those with the lowest mean weekly wages are the Bangladeshi 
(£386) and Black African (£490) groups. By comparison, among 
women Table 6.2 suggests the ethnic minority groups that show the 
highest mean weekly wages in the labour market are the White Irish 
(£619) and the Chinese (£531), whereas those with the lowest mean 
weekly wages are the Pakistani (£329) and Bangladeshi (£356) groups.
These are dramatic disparities and will reflect many differences 
between the groups, including the age structure of the group, 
educational qualifications, region of residence, occupation and a host 
of other differences. Using statistical methods to control for these 
factors can establish the extent to which average differences in the 
characteristics of different groups contribute to the observed gaps in 
earnings. Many such statistical studies have been done in the UK over 
the last thirty years and a consistent pattern emerges where Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean groups have lower 
average earnings, even after differences in other factors thought to 
affect earnings are taken into account. Thus it cannot be claimed 
that the observed ethnic differences in pay are wholly the result of a 
difference in education or the age structure of the relevant populations, 
and the inescapable conclusion is that an important ‘ethnic penalty’ 
exists. A recent study by the Resolution Foundation (Henehan and 
Rose, 2018), for example, shows that, after controlling for a wide 
variety of personal and occupational factors including age, education, 
sector, industry and job tenure, Black male non- graduates had hourly 
wages around 9% less than equivalent White workers. The equivalent 
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figure for graduates was even higher at around 17%. For Pakistani 
non- graduates the ethnic pay penalty was around 14% and that for 
graduates 12%. For women graduates and non- graduates, there were 
pay penalties of up to 10% for Black, Pakistani/ Bangladeshi and Indian 
groups relative to White women.
Public policy and ethnic minorities in the labour market
Two significant pieces of labour market policy have attempted to 
address the access to and position in the labour market of ethnic 
minority groups in Britain. The first is the EMETF, instituted by the 
New Labour government in 2003. The second is the McGregor- Smith 
review established by the Cameron government in February 2016 and 
which reported under the May government in 2017. In the period 
between the review being commissioned and its report being published 
Theresa May also established the Race Disparity Audit – an initiative 
to gather data on the different experiences of people from different 
ethnic groups across a range of public services. The first audit results 
were published in October 2017.
The EMETF was a response to a 2003 Cabinet Office report by 
the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit titled Ethnic Minorities and the 
Labour Market (Clark and Drinkwater, 2007; Bloch, 2008). The report 
provided a comprehensive overview of how ethnic minority groups 
fared in the labour market and concluded that many groups showed 
high rates of unemployment, comparatively low levels of income 
among those working, and underachievement in the labour market 
as well as poor self- esteem. Collectively these factors were shown to 
have a negative effect on national income and economic growth but, 
more personally, on ethnic minority individuals’ social and economic 
inclusion (Bloch, 2008).
The EMETF, which was a cross- departmental initiative, identified 
three main policy strands. First, it sought to build the employability 
of ethnic minority individuals by enhancing their human capital. 
Second, it aimed to identify and remove the barriers to ethnic minority 
employment by connecting ethnic minority individuals more effectively 
with employers. Finally, it intended to reduce the discrimination ethnic 
minority people faced from employers and to support a broader equal 
opportunities framework in the labour market. The EMETF was a 
high- profile initiative, which engaged stakeholders and advisors from 
business, the trade unions and academics. Its provenance in the Strategy 
Unit ensured that, while housed in the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), it had impact and influence across government and 
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the DWP was given a specific target in the form of a Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) to reduce the employment rate gap between white 
and non- whites.
The authors are not aware of any comprehensive government 
or academic evaluation of the EMETF. As noted, there was some 
convergence in the employment rates, the chosen measure of success, 
across the period when the Task Force was operational. However, the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Commons was 
critical of the department’s progress towards its employment target 
(PAC, 2008). In particular, the PAC noted that the employment rate gap 
between whites and non- whites remained ‘unacceptably high’ (PAC, 
2008: 5) and that it had fallen only by 2.8% despite the expenditure of 
£40 million per annum. The PAC also criticised the DWP for failing 
to consolidate or learn from the various pilot projects that it had run 
in various parts of the country with a view to developing the three 
policy strands outlined earlier. Finally, PAC (2008: 7) noted that in 
spite of the DWP’s work through the EMETF, ‘discrimination remains 
a significant barrier to employment’.
The McGregor- Smith review (2017) provided an up- to- date and 
large- scale review of the significant challenges ethnic minority groups 
continue to face in the labour market. The review recommended 26 
improvements to address ethnic inequalities workplaces and the labour 
market. The recommendations included the following:
(2) Publicly available data: Listed companies and all businesses and 
public bodies with more than 50 employers should publish a 
breakdown of employees by race and pay band.
(5) Free unconscious bias training: All organisations should ensure 
that all employees undertake unconscious bias training.
(10) Reverse mentoring:  Senior leaders and executive board 
members should undertake reverse mentoring with individuals 
from different backgrounds, to better understand their unique 
challenges as well as the positive impacts of diversity.
(12) Challenge school and university selection bias:  All employers 
should critically examine entry requirements into their business, 
focusing on potential achievement and not simply which 
university or school the individual went to.
(18) Transparency on career pathways:  New entrants to the 
organisation should receive a prior induction, including basic 
and clear information on how the career ladder works, pay and 
reward guidelines and how promotions are awarded.
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(19) Explain how success has been achieved: Senior managers should 
publish their job history internally (in a brief, LinkedIn style 
profile) so that junior members of the workforce can see what a 
successful career path looks like.
(22) A guide to talking about race: Government should work with 
employer representatives and third sector organisations to develop 
a simple guide on how to discuss race in the workplace.
(26) One year on review: Government should assess the extent to which 
the recommendations in this review have been implemented, 
and take necessary action where required. (McGregor- Smith, 
2017: 32)
As this list of recommendations shows, the focus of the review is very 
clearly on employers who are viewed, if not as the ultimate cause of 
‘the problem’ then at least as the most effective site for policy action. 
There is, in comparison to the EMETF, much less focus on the 
human capital of minority groups themselves, or the role of local and 
national government in either funding initiatives in specific localities 
to help non- white workers there or, indeed, to strengthen and enforce 
anti- discrimination law.
The review’s recommendations were made relatively recently so it 
is perhaps not surprising that initial evidence suggests that there may 
have been only a limited impact. A government- commissioned progress 
report one year on noted that on a ‘scorecard’ of ten areas where the 
action had been recommended only two had seen positive progress, 
eight had seen no change and one had actually gone backwards (DBEIS, 
2018c). On the other hand, the review’s proposal to publish ethnicity 
pay gaps in the same way as gender pay gaps has gained some traction, 
with a government consultation in progress to consider how this should 
be implemented (TUC, 2019; DBEIS, 2018d).
More widely, a variety of other types of policy, which are not 
specifically targeted at ethnic minority groups, might nevertheless 
have disproportionate effects on ethnic minority workers. As already 
noted, Hall et al (2017) examine how the changes to the Universal 
Credit system affect ethnic minority people, with a particular focus 
on women. The authors forecast that by April 2021 anyone in 
employment, and who lives in a household that claims Universal 
Credit, will be approximately £1,200 worse off than under the 
previous system. Hall et  al (2017) explain this loss is the result of 
cuts, primarily to the work allowance that contributes to 57% of the 
benefits total. Furthermore, Hall et al (2017) find that claimants who 
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are unemployed would be approximately £500 a year worse off. The 
report also suggests that families with children will be worse off than 
those without children. However, ethnic minority people are not the 
only marginal group that Universal Credit affects and the changes also 
affect working class and physically and mentally impaired claimants. 
The report also finds that social and cultural factors (for example, 
language and digital exclusion) are important. They create barriers 
for ethnic minority people and limit their resilience against broader 
changes, such as the implementation of the Universal Credit system, 
by making it harder for them to navigate and work around problems 
that arise in the system.
Another policy with the potential to affect the labour market 
situation of ethnic minority groups, given their relatively low 
earnings, is the National Minimum Wage (NMW, latterly rebranded 
as National Living Wage, NLW). Indeed the Low Pay Commission 
(2018) reports that coverage of the NMW/ NLW is higher for ethnic 
minority workers at 13.2% of workers compared to 9.6% of white 
workers. However, data analysed by Peters (2015) suggest that non- 
compliance with the NMW by employers is a particular problem for 
minority groups. Specifically, he suggests that, among hourly paid 
workers between 2000 and 2013, 10.6% of Pakistani workers and 
17.8% of Bangladeshi workers reported being paid at less than the 
statutory minimum. Peters speculates that this is due to the nature 
of the employment undertaken by such workers, which may be 
concentrated in relatively informal types of activity particularly in the 
catering sector. Ram et al (2017) confirm this conjecture using case 
study evidence from small firms in four low- paying sectors including 
restaurants, clothing, food manufacture and processing and food retail. 
Ram et al note that many firms do not comply with the minimum 
wage and may rely on ‘helpers’, who are paid below the legal minimum 
and who are often recruited through co- ethnic friendship or other 
informal networks. Lordan and Neumark (2018) attempted to identify 
whether those jobs, which were most vulnerable to offshoring or 
automation, were most at risk of being lost in response to increases 
in the statutory minimum wage. While she found that overall the 
displacement effects of increases in the minimum were small, one 
group that was particularly at risk was the group of non- white, low- 
skilled workers in vulnerable jobs. This emphasises that while ethnic 
minority workers being in low- paying jobs means that increases to the 
wage floor are more likely to benefit such groups, to the extent that 
there are negative employment effects as a result of job displacement 
it is also such workers who are most at risk.
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Ethnic minority groups and the public sector
As well as its role in developing and implementing labour market 
policy, it is important to consider the government’s role as a major 
employer – the public sector accounts for around 17% of total UK 
employment. Evidence from the private sector has highlighted the 
benefits of having an ethnically diverse workforce for businesses. An 
influential McKinsey and Co. (2015) report highlighted how businesses 
with ethnically diverse workforces permit a diverse array of voices to 
play a role in the decision- making process, particularly at a senior level, 
and how this can contribute to increased profitability. There is no reason 
to assume that any enhanced productivity due to the diversification 
of the workforce should be restricted to private firms so the same 
benefits should also be evident in the public sector. Diversifying the 
public sector workforce, therefore, offers the opportunity to improve 
how public services are delivered but also, since the government can 
more easily influence the terms and conditions of employment, there 
exists an opportunity to directly address racial and ethnic inequalities 
in the workplace.
There is considerable diversity in the representation of non- white 
groups in the public sector in the UK, both between parts of the sector 
as a whole and between different groups. The ‘public administration, 
education and health’ category in official statistics gives some 
information on this, although it should be noted that this is a wider 
classification than the public sector per se. Most non- white groups 
exhibit a slightly higher tendency to work in this sector compared to 
white workers. The notable exception is the Black group (comprising 
both Caribbeans and Africans), 43% of whose total employment is 
in this sector compared to 30% overall (DBEIS 2018b). The only 
minorities significantly more likely to find employment in the private 
sector are the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups, which are particularly 
prominent in the distribution, hotel and restaurant sectors. Within 
different parts of the public sector there is considerable variation: in 
2017 around 14% of civil servants were non- white compared to 7% in 
the armed forces, 6% in the police and 5% in the Fire Service. Eighteen 
per cent of NHS staff were classified as non- white, rising to 41% of 
doctors (Browning and Uberoi, 2019).
Within the NHS, 2018 data from the Race Disparity Audit (RDA) 
show that, for medical roles in NHS hospitals (excluding General 
Practitioners [GPs]), doctors classified as ‘White’ made up 58% of 
senior roles and 56% of junior roles. Non- white doctors were therefore 
slightly more highly represented at a junior level. What is most notable 
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about these figures however is how well doctors classified as ‘Asian’ are 
represented in the doctor workforce. Asians make up 31% of senior 
doctors and 27% of junior doctors. By comparison, doctors classified as 
‘Black’ make up a relatively small proportion of hospital doctors – 3% 
of senior doctors and 5% of junior doctors. Unfortunately, the RDA 
data do not allow us to break down either the Asian or Black group 
into its constituent ethnic minorities.
Appleby (2018) investigated the pay gap between doctors of different 
ethnicities and found very small or non- existent ethnic pay gaps for 
most categories of doctor. The only exception was the consultant level, 
where white doctors earned 4.9% more than non- white doctors. This 
gap varied between 3.5% for Black or Black British doctors and nearly 
5% for Asian or Asian British doctors. It is worth noting that it is not 
possible to break down the GP workforce by ethnicity in a similar 
way. However, Esmail et al (2017) find that practices which included 
more than 40% GPs who obtained their medical qualifications outside 
the European Economic Area (EEA), a group that comprises 23% 
of practices, were more likely to be in deprived areas and had lower 
average pay per patient than practices with fewer such GPs.
By comparison, the data for allied health professionals (these include, 
for example, physiotherapists and speech and language therapists) show 
that 77.5% are White and this represents the highest proportion of 
white employees in a medical grade role. In higher pay grades, data 
indicate that ethnic minorities make up a lower percentage of middle 
management roles (bands 5 to 7), senior grades (bands 8a and 9) and 
very senior management roles (grades 1 to 4). Crucially, there is a clear 
difference with respect to the ethnic minority diversity between medical 
and non- medical roles and between junior and senior leadership roles 
in the NHS (see also Chapter Five for further discussion).
Considering the demography of the civil service, data from 2016 
(ONS, 2016) show that 88% of civil servants are White, 5.8% are Asian, 
3.1% are Black, 1.4% are Mixed, 0.3% are Chinese, and finally, 0.5% 
are from the Other ethnic group. Regionally, the data show London 
has the highest percentage of staff from an ethnic minority background, 
with 16.3% Asian, 11.8% Black, 3.0% Mixed, 0.7% Chinese and 1.2% 
Other. Breaking down the data by gender, the results show that male 
civil servants are more likely to be White (90.1%) than female civil 
servants (87.8%). In terms of salary, Asian staff show the lowest median 
salary (£25,000). Consequently, the results show that, unlike the 
NHS, white employees dominate the civil service and have a higher 
share of jobs than their share of the population of working age (86%). 
Furthermore, the RDA data also show that ethnic minority groups 
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(not including white minorities) are poorly represented in the Armed 
Forces and represent only 2.4% of officers. Data on the Army also 
show, when comparing the different sectors of the armed forces, that 
the Army employs the highest percentage of officers and other ranked 
employees from an ethnic minority background.
In social services, the 2017 RDA data suggest that 73% of the 
workforce is White British compared to 10.6% of staff from an ethnic 
minority background. Moreover, 5.3% of staff come from an Other 
White background, and this represents the largest ethnic group after the 
White British group. Meanwhile, in the police force, 2017 data show 
that 93.7% of police officers are from a White background and only 
6.3% of officers are from ethnic minority backgrounds (see Chapter 3, 
where Shankley and Williams show further evidence of an ethnic 
disparity in the police and judiciary). Even though strides have been 
made to increase the recruitment of ethnic minority officers, the latest 
police statistics show there remains an ethnic pay gap. This is partly 
the result of new recruits entering junior positions and therefore data 
will continue to show evidence of an ethnic disparity until they have 
had the opportunity to progress into more senior roles.
Finally, 2016 data show that 86.5% of all teachers in state- funded 
schools in England (primary and secondary education) are White 
British, whereas 13.4% are from an ethnic minority background. 
Furthermore, 93% of headteachers were White British. It is useful to 
contextualise this by noting that the proportion of non- white children 
in state primary schools is 25.3% (Asian 11%, Black 5.5%, Mixed 
6.2%, Chinese 0.5% and Other 2%) and 24.2% (Asian 11%, Black 
5.8%, Mixed 5.2%, Chinese 0.4%, Other 1.8%) in state secondary 
schools (DfE, 2018d). Thus while the classroom teacher workforce 
is not drastically different from the working- age population in terms 
of ethnicity, it does not reflect the ethnic mix of pupils. Chapter 4 
discusses the differences in the demography of different stages of the 
state education system and some of the challenges ethnic minority 
staff face.
There is considerable variation in the patterns of representation and 
reward found for ethnic minority workers in the public sector. Albeit 
data limitations may disguise the fact that some subgroups do not do as 
well as others, there is a positive message in the figures for medical roles 
in the NHS, where some ethnic minority groups are well represented. 
However, a general, and less benign, pattern emerges in a number of 
parts of the public sector whereby the representation of non- white 
groups diminishes the further up the seniority hierarchy one looks. 
More senior leadership and non- medical roles in the NHS, as well as 
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in institutions such as the state education system or the armed forces, 
show much more of a glass ceiling effect. Our ability to know about 
these patterns and to observe employment data across the public sector 
has benefited from the RDA. It is vital that statistical bodies continue 
to publish data on the ethnic make- up of public sector institutions to 
show changes to the patterns across different ethnic minority groups. 
This information is invaluable not only for auditing purposes but also 
because it raises public awareness of the continued inequalities certain 
ethnic minority groups face. It is also important to make sure that these 
data are as detailed as possible since the consideration of the labour 
market as a whole shows very clearly that, for example, combining 
groups such as Indians and Pakistanis into a single Asian category is 
very likely to provide a misleading picture. A similar point holds for 
Black, and potentially for Mixed, groups.
Interpreting the impact of policies such as those proposed in the 
McGregor- Smith review is difficult. However, the initial signs in 
some institutions such as the police force are of modest progress. It is 
too early to tell if there will be any lasting impact on ethnic minority 
diversity because it will take some time before these employees have 
been allowed the opportunity to advance to more senior positions. 
Moreover, with respect to future policy, the variation across institutions 
beckons future policy decisions to incorporate these differences and 
target the specific practices within certain institutions to provide a 
bespoke policy to improve the access ethnic minority employees have 
to specific job roles at different pay grades and levels of seniority.
Conclusion
This chapter has documented well- established, persistent patterns in 
the labour market disadvantage of ethnic minorities in the UK. These 
patterns have been studied extensively over several decades, are well 
known in policymaking circles and, indeed, have been the focus of a 
variety of initiatives by local and central government. In the face of this 
attention, it is the persistence of the broad patterns and trends that is 
the most striking feature of the snapshot of the current data presented 
here. While it is possible to find some evidence of progress, particularly 
in the convergence of employment rates and some reductions in the 
earnings gap, the essential picture of a labour market in which there is 
no level playing field for ethnic minority workers remains.
To some extent, this surface- level stasis disguises deeper and 
changing currents. Educational attainment and the demography of 
non- white groups might suggest hope for improved employment and 
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earnings prospects for ethnic minority workers in the future. Against 
this, technology- driven deindustrialisation and new work patterns, a 
largely non- interventionist model of labour market policy which has 
reduced employment protection and social security, and relatively lax 
immigration policy have made progress more difficult.
Policy measures specifically aimed at this problem have grabbed 
headlines but it is not entirely clear what their impact has been or will be 
other than to keep the issue, sporadically, in the headlines. The question 
of ‘what works’ for improving the position of ethnic minorities in the 
labour market remains substantially open. It is striking that a recent 
attempt to make policy recommendations (Weekes- Bernard, 2017) 
echoes very closely some of the recommendations of the EMETF, 
which reported nearly fifteen years earlier. Both reports emphasise the 
importance of skills and human capital, and the need to improve the 
matching of potential employees with prospective employers. To the 
extent that we accept that these are the right policies, the question of 
why there is such an apparent ‘implementation gap’ is raised.
The government’s particular role in the labour market, not only as 
the source of policymaking and implementation but as an employer, 
assumes importance here. There is even some evidence that the private 
sector may be moving ahead on this issue more quickly than the public 
(Clark, 2015a). Adequate leadership, both by example, and by properly 
implemented and evaluated policymaking is the challenge made by 
this analysis to the UK government.
Note






Ethnic minorities and housing 
in Britain
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Key findings
• Ethnic inequalities in housing stem from the particular settlement 
experiences of postwar migrants to the UK in terms of the location 
and housing access afforded to them. This is consolidated by dramatic 
changes to the UK’s housing landscape over recent decades, which 
have, to a large extent, exacerbated housing disadvantage for 
minorities. Evidence reveals stark and persistent ethnic inequalities 
in housing:  (1) Census data analysis shows differences across 
ethnic minority households in housing tenure and overcrowding; 
(2) At least 1 in 3 households of some ethnic groups (Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani, Black African) live in overcrowded conditions compared 
to 1 in 20 white households; (3) Ethnic minority households are 
over- represented as statutory homeless in Britain and a person’s 
ethnicity is one of the key characteristics that increases the likelihood 
of experiencing homelessness; (4) New migrant groups show an 
overwhelming concentration in the private rented sector with 
associated vulnerability to housing precarity.
• Housing law, systems and practices create disadvantage for 
minorities and migrants in the UK: (1) Practices of discrimination 
and racism exist in housing, for example in restricting ethnic 
minority households from entering specific housing tenures in 
Britain; (2) The tragedy of the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, which 
disproportionately befell ethnic minorities and migrants, has shed 
light on the challenges for the social rented sector including the lack 
of housing supply. The tragedy also exposes the systemic failures of 
existing social housing structures to maintain quality housing and 
to provide clear processes of accountability for tenants; (3) Policy 
changes such as the ‘Right to Buy’ have significantly reduced the 
social housing stock and this has had an adverse impact on specific 
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scheme have helped many ethnic minority households enter owner- 
occupied housing but have also increased the financial risk that these 
first- time homeowners encounter by granting them mortgages 
that they would have previously been denied; (5) Recent changes 
to immigration law have disadvantaged minorities in housing, for 
example, the ‘right to rent’ procedures.
• Addressing ethnic disadvantage in housing requires better data 
and increased research investment to understand experiences, 
causes of disadvantage and impacts of recent policy changes. It 
also requires political commitment and collaborative action to 
make use of this evidence to bring about more equitable housing 
systems and practices.
Introduction
On 14 June 2017 fire took hold of the 24- storey Grenfell Tower 
in central London. Seventy- two people were killed. Of these, the 
vast majority were ethnic minorities, and many were international 
migrants. The fire in this public housing block was so devastating 
because of substandard building practices combined with the failure 
of the landlord, the local government Royal Borough of Kensington 
and Chelsea, to take heed of residents’ concerns. The tragedy of the 
Grenfell Tower fire brings ethnic inequalities in housing in the UK into 
stark relief: why were ethnic minorities so disproportionately affected?
Only a partial answer to this question is possible because of a relative 
neglect of attention to ethnic minorities in housing research in recent 
decades. Although there is a well- established body of literature on 
minorities and housing in continental Europe that includes work on 
housing policy, housing practices and the experiences of minorities in 
the housing market (Musterd and Andersson, 2005; Musterd and Van 
Kempen, 2009; Bolt et al, 2010; Van Ham et al, 2016) comparable 
work is lacking in the UK (Markkanen and Harrison, 2013). Housing 
studies in Britain is in dire need of up- to- date research that explores 
how increasing diversity coupled with strains in the housing market 
differently affect black and minority ethnic households.
This chapter draws on existing evidence and data, which is admittedly 
limited, to point to ethnic differences in housing experiences in the 
UK and reasons for this. The chapter provides an overview of historical 
migrant settlement and housing experiences to illustrate the long 
roots of housing disadvantage; it identifies changes in the UK housing 
landscape over recent decades that culminated in the contemporary 
housing crisis with particular implications for minorities; and it 
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evidences inequalities in housing using the most robust data available. 
What is clear from this review is that housing is an arena in which 
there are vast differences in the experiences of ethnic groups and, 
given that housing experience is so vital to other life opportunities and 
wellbeing, much greater attention to this is required from researchers, 
activists and government.
Migrant settlement and housing experiences
Postwar migrants to the UK, being predominantly labour migrants 
from (former) British colonies entering manual and public sector 
occupations in urban areas, settled to a large extent in poor, central 
areas of the largest cities, often occupying neighbourhoods vacated by 
suburbanisation (Harrison and Phillips, 2010). The location of specific 
employment opportunities in particular parts of the country, such 
as in the textile industries of Lancashire and Yorkshire, also brought 
migrants to smaller towns and cities. Within these towns and cities, 
the exact place where migrants lived, and the degree of difficulty they 
faced establishing stability, was strongly shaped by the availability of and 
access to housing and their ability to navigate housing systems (Finney 
and Simpson, 2009; Harrison and Phillips, 2010; Lukes et al, 2018). 
For example, Patterson (1963) argued that early Caribbean migrants 
were steered by housing providers to specific neighbourhoods in East 
London where there was available social housing stock to which they, 
as British subjects, were entitled.
Discrimination and racism have been found to shape the housing 
experiences of migrants and minorities historically (Rex and Moore, 
1969; Dahya, 1974; Harrison and Phillips, 2010). In the private 
rented sector and owner- occupied sectors, discrimination and racism 
by private landlords and estate agents have restricted ethnic minority 
people from entry in specific areas (Rex and Moore, 1969; Robinson, 
1986). In the social rented sector (SRS), discrimination and racism 
by local authorities have resulted in specific social renting practices 
whereby ethnic minorities have been allocated the least desirable 
housing in the least favourable estates (see Lukes et al, 2018). These 
practices amounted to the concentration of some ethnic minority 
groups in social rented housing in specific areas but also created barriers 
to them moving from this specific tenure. Such were the housing 
challenges that ethnic minority households faced in the 1970s and 1980s 
that specific policies and ethnic minority- led housing movements and 
associations were set up to increase ethnic minority groups’ access to 
good quality housing and entry into more desirable neighbourhoods 
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(Ratcliffe, 1996). In addition, policies were drafted under New Labour 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s to decrease the obstacles that certain 
groups had to overcome, specifically in the SRS (De Noronha, 2018a).
Recent migrants, including those from European Union (EU) 
accession countries, have been subject to policy changes which, 
combined with their dominance in routine and low- paid employment 
with fixed- term contracts, has resulted in their concentration in private 
rental accommodation (Robinson, 2010; Bone, 2014; Lukes et al, 2018). 
For example, they must be resident for three months before having any 
entitlement to social housing (Shelter, 2008). Moreover, the increase 
in recruitment agencies as intermediaries between employers and 
employees in low- skilled positions has had a substantial effect on the 
housing patterns and experiences of new migrant groups. For example, 
‘tied- in’ employment and housing arrangements mean that a migrant’s 
housing is dependent on their continued worker status (Shelter, 2008). 
In these cases, if a migrant’s employment ceases, their housing is also lost. 
These practices are particularly evident in industries such as agriculture 
and construction, where housing availability in specific geographical 
locations might be sparse and there is a need to accommodate short- 
term and transient migrant populations (Shelter, 2008).
A quite separate set of issues (which we do not address here) is 
evident for forced migrants (asylum seekers and refugees), who are 
often placed in precarious and temporary accommodation, in dispersed 
locations where they have no connections, while they await their 
asylum outcome. They then have to navigate a complex housing 
system, often with very limited economic and social capital, when 
they obtain refugee status (Perry 2012). This precarity is exacerbated 
by turbulent housing landscapes, including increasing privatisation of 
accommodation provision for forced migrants (Darling, 2016). See 
Chapter 2 for further discussion.
Changes in UK housing and the ‘housing crisis’
We are in a housing crisis that extends from the homeless 
on the street well into the middle class. (Cohen, 2013: 1)
The UK’s housing landscape has changed drastically over recent 
decades from an era when residents had considerable choice and social 
housing provision adequately met the needs of those who required it, 
to a situation of a shrunken, under- resourced social housing system, 
fragmented private rented sector, inflated prices in the ownership 
market and limited investment and strategy for housing provision 
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nationally (Meen, 2018). Thus, Cohen’s (2013) observation of 
a housing crisis affecting all but the very well off seems insightful 
but worrisome.
Lukes et al (2018) provide a useful overview of changes to the UK 
housing terrain in the postwar period and point to its intersection 
with immigration policy. Four policies, or policy approaches, with 
particularly significant implications for ethnic minority households, 
can be picked out. First is the ‘Right to Buy’ policy that was introduced 
by Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1974. The policy was 
instigated to permit tenants of local authorities and social housing 
associations the legal right to buy (at a large discount) the council 
houses in which they were resident. Proponents of the policy argue 
that it has given millions of households, including ethnic minority 
households, the opportunity to buy their own homes thus providing 
them with an asset of future security for their families. However, critics 
of the policy have voiced that it has contributed to the widespread 
social housing shortage across the country. This is because it was 
not paralleled by policy to build additional social housing or to fund 
programmes to maintain the existing social housing stock. Thus, 
supply did not meet demand and tenants were steered towards private 
renting. The impact of the contraction of social housing is hard to 
measure among ethnic minority households due to the paucity of 
data but for those with relatively high participation in social housing, 
such Black Caribbeans, it has brought an increased risk of housing 
insecurity (Lukes et al, 2018).
The second housing policy with notable implications for ethnic 
minorities is the ‘Help to Buy’ policy brought in by George Osborne 
and the Conservative government in 2013. Dorling (2015) articulates 
that the policy was intended to address housing inequality and the 
widening need for housing that had developed in the country in 
the previous two decades. Rising housing prices and the unstable 
and competitive labour market had made it hard for many people, 
particularly the young, to buy a home. For many ethnic minority 
households, the ‘Help to Buy’ scheme has offered the financial 
leverage to enter into the owner- occupied tenure of the housing 
market. However, the policy has been criticised for granting 
mortgages to those who previously would not have been afforded 
them, thus increasing their risk of loan default (Gimson, 2013). 
Dorling (2015) argues that policy would have been better focused 
on building more housing to contribute to the lack of social housing 
stock rather than increasing people’s entry into home ownership 
through mortgage approval.
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
154
The third housing policy that has noteworthy implications, 
particularly for migrants is the ‘Right to Rent’, which was brought 
in as an embedded part of the Immigration Act 2016. Crawford et al 
(2016) describe how part 2 of the Immigration Act extends the 2014 
Immigration Act’s article on the ‘Right to Rent’ for England. It is 
noteworthy that in Britain housing policy is a devolved matter and 
the ‘Right to Rent’ from the Immigration Act 2014 did not extend 
to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland (Crawford et al, 2016). The 
act introduces a provision to make it harder for migrants to live and 
work in the UK without official documentation. For example, it is 
easier for private landlords to evict migrant tenants without appropriate 
documentation, incentivising landlord checks and also making the 
practice of renting to undocumented tenants a criminal offence. The 
amendment to Britain’s housing policy was part of broader changes 
sought to make the UK a more hostile environment towards migrants 
and ultimately steer undocumented migrants towards leaving the 
country (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). In March 2019, in 
a case brought by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 
with supporting interventions from the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, the Residential Landlords Association and Liberty, the 
High Court ruled that the Right to Rent scheme requiring landlords 
to carry out immigration checks of tenants was incompatible with 
human rights law. The scheme was found to directly cause racial 
discrimination in the housing rental market.
The barriers that ethnic minority households face in the housing 
landscape in Britain were well illustrated by the 2018 Windrush 
generation scandal. In this case incompetence by the Home Office 
in issuing passports or official documentation for long- term leave to 
remain resulted in some British citizens and long- term residents who 
arrived as part of the postwar Windrush generation facing exclusionary 
and discriminatory practices (such as being refused tenancy in the 
private rented sector or allocation of social rented sector housing) 
(Grant, 2018; Wardle and Obermuller, 2018). It seems that the 
Immigration Act 2016 pushes migrants and some ethnic minority 
households further into precarious living in a context that the UK 
Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence (Meen, 2018) suggests 
is becoming increasingly unaffordable for low- income households.
Finally, the fourth aspect of policy that has implications for ethnic 
minorities and migrants is the promotion of gentrification, which 
Bridge et al (2011: 1) define as ‘the movement of middle- income people 
into low- income neighbourhoods causing the displacement of all, or 
many, of the pre- existing low- income residents’. A recent example of 
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gentrification has occurred at the former Olympic Village development 
in East London. Part of the London 2012 bid to host the Olympics was 
that after the event the area would be regenerated and add a mixture of 
housing to respond to the needs of the local area. However, the so- called 
regeneration effort has been marred by criticism that it has become a 
gentrification project. Rather than adding much- needed housing for 
existing residents, the project has (financially) excluded many marginal 
groups that include ethnic minority households and migrants. It has 
forced some to leave the area in search of more affordable housing, some 
to distant neighbourhoods in Essex (Bernstock, 2016).
Efforts to gentrify specific areas and create social mixing have gained 
further momentum following the use of terms such as sink housing 
estate that Slater (2018: 877) articulates has been a label ‘invented by 
journalists, amplified by free market think tanks and converted into 
policy doxa by politicians in the United Kingdom’ to justify current 
housing policy initiatives. Rhodes and Brown (2018) similarly argue 
that (negative) connotations of diverse ‘inner cities’ have been employed 
as a rationale for gentrification. These initiatives have gained further 
political clout when they have been considered as part of the broader 
and negative narratives associated with ethnic segregation (Finney and 
Simpson, 2009; Bridge et al, 2011). It seems that rather than improve 
housing availability, particularly for vulnerable and local residents, 
regeneration projects have in many cases left the voices of ethnic 
minority groups out of the decision- making processes that affect their 
local areas (Markkanen and Harrison, 2013; Finney et  al, 2018b). 
Rhodes and Brown (2018) suggest that given these new patterns and 
processes of diversity in Britain, it is necessary for us to rethink and 
re- theorise race and ethnicity over the cityscape and how housing 
security and precariousness are spatialised for marginal groups.
Evidence of ethnic inequalities in housing
A paucity of evidence
Although housing is a major social issue, there has been relatively 
little recent work on the experience of ethnic minorities, and there 
is also a paucity of data available for research purposes (Lukes et al, 
2018). The main quantitative sources giving national coverage are 
the census and the English Housing Survey. The strength of the 
census is its breadth, covering as it does the whole population and 
geographical landmass, but it has limited information, on tenure and 
overcrowding. The English Housing Survey has greater detail but 
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analysis for ethnic groups is restricted because of the sample size of 
the survey (12,000 households), use of crude ethnic categories and 
the lack of an ethnic boost sample (UK Data Service, 2017). Other 
surveys, including the UK Household Longitudinal Study, suffer 
from the same issues of sample size for examining ethnic minorities, 
especially over time or with any geographical detail. Administrative 
data sets are limited in the information they provide, as they are not 
designed for academic endeavour; and commercial data have samples 
that are difficult to calibrate to any population baseline. The 2017 
release of the Race Disparity Audit (RDA), the government’s review 
of ethnic inequalities, provides the opportunity to look at ethnicity and 
housing in greater detail. It uses a combination of the English Housing 
Survey; the COntinuous REcording (CORE) social housing lettings 
data, Ministry of Housing data as well as Communities and Local 
Government data on homelessness. While there are benefits from the 
use of multiple data sources, the RDA relies heavily on the English 
Housing Survey and this limits analysis for the reasons stated earlier. 
The 2017 disaster at the Grenfell Tower evidences the need for quality 
data on ethnicity, migration and housing but, unlike other academic 
interests (for example, education or health), housing scholarship is a 
small constituency in the UK, and there have not been comparable 
campaigns for improving data.
Ethnic minority households and housing tenure
An important indicator of housing situation in the UK is tenure, for 
which robust data are available. Traditionally, three types of housing 
tenure are measured within the housing market in Britain. First, is 
‘owner- occupied’ housing where households own or partly own 
(with use of a mortgage) their homes. Second, is the social rented 
sector (SRS), where households are provided housing through local 
authorities or housing associations and rents are subsidised by the 
state. The third type of tenure is the private rented sector (PRS), 
where tenants live in houses owned by private landlords and pay 
the rent for their tenancy to these landlords. Additionally, when we 
talk about each of the housing tenures it is important to recognise 
that these broad categories comprise varied housing in type, quality, 
cost and management. For example, in the SRS, which has been 
traditionally delivered by local authorities, housing associations play 
a major and increasing role in providing and maintaining housing. 
Housing associations are private and non- profit making organisations 
that reinvest any income surplus into maintaining existing homes 
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or financing of new homes. They are also tightly regulated by the 
state and receive a large amount of their funding from the state. In 
recognition of the specific needs of ethnic minority tenants, there are 
ethnic minority- specific housing associations in the UK that operate 
as a collective through BMENational.1
To aid the interpretation of the data, it can generally be understood 
that owner occupation is the most desirable tenure in the UK as it is 
presumed to provide ‘greater security, more freedom, financial advantage 
and therefore higher housing satisfaction’ (Elsinga and Hoekstra, 
2005: 401; Woods, 2017), whereas social housing does not provide the 
quality or security it once did, and private renting can be precarious 
and is largely unregulated (Shelter, 2008). While home ownership is 
generally considered the most appealing tenure, it should be noted that 
preferences may vary between (and indeed within) ethnic groups (Peach 
and Shah 1980; Phillips and Karn, 1992; Hamnett and Butler, 2010).
Statistics on housing show that 9.8  million people in England 
and Wales – 19% of the population – are living in privately rented 
accommodation compared to 12% a decade ago (Dorling, 2015). The 
shift equates to an additional 1.6 million households privately renting 
in 2011 compared to 2001. Changes to the housing landscape have 
affected ethnic minority households but it is important to note that 
these changes have not affected all groups equally and there are also 
substantial within- group differences. The 2011 Census for England 
and Wales is used for Figure 7.1 to examine the levels of each ethnic 
group’s home ownership, and concentration in the PRS and SRS. The 
analysis is a reproduction of the work by Finney and Harries (2015) 
and is used in this case to examine the intergroup differences across 
18 ethnic groups.
Figure 7.1 shows that the ethnic minority groups with the highest 
levels of private renting are the Other White (51%), Arab (49%) and 
Other Asian (39%) groups whereas the lowest levels of renting are 
among the Black Caribbean (15%), White British (15%) and White 
Irish (17%). The high figure for the Other White group is unsurprising 
given that this group includes EU migrants who arrived to Britain 
during the 2000s and adopted, in the first instance at least, housing 
in the PRS on account of its accessibility and flexibility (Pemberton, 
2009). Finney and Harries (2015) summarise that all ethnic groups 
saw a proportional increase in their concentration in the PRS between 
2001 and 2011 and this is evident in Figure 7.1, particularly for African, 
Other White and Chinese ethnic groups.
Analysis of the English Housing Survey (2014 and 2016 combined) 
shows the percentage of ethnic groups in the private rented sector as 
 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
158
Figure 7.1: Type of housing tenure (private renting, social renting, ownership) 

















































































































































EACH OF THE VALUES NESTED IN THE COLUMNS
SHOWS THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TENURE
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Note: Ethnic groups shown in increasing order of Owner Occupied. Figures overlain on each section of 
the bars show the absolute per cent change in proportion of the ethnic group in the tenure between 
2001 and 2011. There are no data on tenure for the Arab and Gypsy/ Irish Traveller ethnic groups prior to 
the 2011 Census and therefore their percentage change is ‘N/ A’ across all tenures.
Source: 2001 and 2011 censuses for England and Wales – per cent of each ethnic group (household 
reference persons).
an up- to- date indicator of the exposure that each ethnic group has 
to precarity in the housing market Table 7.1 suggests that the ethnic 
minority groups that show the highest levels of private renting (2015/ 
16 and 2016/ 17) are the Other White (59%), Chinese (53%) and Any 
Other ethnicity (46%) groups whereas the lowest levels of renting are 
among the White British (16%), Mixed White and Asian (17%), and 
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Black Caribbean (18%). Considering the data by rank we can see that 
the Chinese and Arab groups have become highly concentrated in 
private renting and thus at increased risk of housing precarity. Table 7.1 
shows, by comparing the levels of private renting across the ethnic 
groups between 2011 and 2016, that levels of private renting have 
grown noticeably for the Chinese (+15%), Pakistani (+8%), White 
Other (+8%), Mixed White and Black Caribbean (+8%) and Asian 
Other (+7%) groups, with a notable decrease for the Mixed White and 
Asian (- 15%), Other Mixed (- 14%) and Arab (- 10%) groups. Table 7.1 
shows that for all other groups, including Indian, Bangladeshi and 
Black African, the levels of private renting have remained relatively 
stable between 2011 and 2016.
For social renting, as shown in Figure 7.1, it is the Other Black 
(48%), Mixed White and Black Caribbean (43%) and African groups 
(42%) who have highest levels whereas the lowest levels of social 
renting were among the Indian (7%), Chinese (11%) and Other White 
(12%) groups. All ethnic groups witnessed a decrease in the proportion 
in social renting between 2001 and 2011 (Figure 7.1), and this was 
particularly marked for the African and Bangladeshi groups, reflecting 
the uneven effects of contraction of social housing.
Table 7.1: Percentage of households privately renting their home by ethnicity 
(England, 2001– 2011– 2016)
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Note: Ethnic groups shown in increasing order of Private Renting in 2016.
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In 2011 the highest levels of home ownership (owner- occupied 
housing) were among the Indian (69%), White British (68%) and 
Pakistani (63%) groups, and the lowest levels were among the African 
(24%), Arab (27%) and Other Black (28%) groups (Figure 7.1). All 
ethnic groups experienced a decrease in representation in owner 
occupation over the 2000s except for the Bangladeshi group who 
experienced a small increase in their representation in this tenure 
(4%). For example, in 2001 8 out of 10 people of the Indian ethnic 
group lived in houses which they owned; by 2011 this was 7 in 10, 
with the difference being evident in an increase in the PRS (10% in 
2001 to 24% in 2011).
In recent years there have been concerns over a ‘generation rent’ 
phenomenon developing in Britain, where young adults are particularly 
disadvantaged in terms of purchasing a home in the current economic 
climate (Meen, 2018). Dorling (2015: 149) asserts that ‘competition for 
employment, stagnant incomes and the rising price of houses coupled 
with more restricted access to mortgages’ after the housing crisis of 
2008 has closed off specific tenures of the housing market to younger 
households. For young adults trying to enter the owner- occupied 
section of the housing market, Coulter (2017) identifies that parental 
(financial) support is a major factor that can significantly affect young 
adults’ transition into the tenure. The extent of the financial support 
offered to young adults by their parents can inhibit or facilitate social 
mobility, and inequalities in intergenerational wealth transmission 
contribute to housing inequalities. In fact, Coulter (2017) finds that 
the amount of financial support young adults receive from their 
parents is vital particularly in a housing market with increasing housing 
prices: young adults’ housing outcomes are ‘persistently stratified by 
parental class and tenure’ (Coulter, 2018: 1). It seems that young adults’ 
housing outcomes are shaped by parental tenure, with the children 
of those who rent becoming less likely to enter home ownership and 
more likely to privately rent. Thus, private renting has implications 
for the housing careers of children of those who rent as well as the 
persistence of housing inequality.
There is concern that the broader effect of ‘generation rent’ might 
have a heightened impact on some ethnic minority groups. For 
example, Finney and Harries (2015) looked exclusively at young 
ethnic minority households (25– 43 years old) and found that levels 
of home ownership were lower for ethnic minority young adults 
compared to their peers. In addition, the levels of young adults from 
ethnic minority groups in PRS housing were higher than for the 
population as a whole. For example, PRS housing was higher for 
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Other White, Arab and Chinese young adults than other groups, 
potentially reflecting the high prevalence of recent migrants and 
students in these groups. However, there were also high levels of home 
ownership for young adults in specific ethnic groups particularly for 
the Pakistani (52%), White British (46%) and Indian (44%), which 
may reflect long- standing cultures of home ownership and parental 
investment in housing
Ethnic minority households and overcrowding
Another significant issue of ethnic minority housing relates to 
overcrowding. Finney and Harries (2015) define it in line with official 
definitions, as a situation where a household has too few bedrooms to 
meet the needs of the household. Overcrowding can affect housing 
conditions and has substantial physical and mental health implications. 
Replicating one of Finney and Harries’s (2015) analyses of the 2011 
Census, the findings in Figure  7.2 show that Bangladeshi (41%), 
Pakistani (32%) and Black African (32%) households demonstrate 
the highest levels of overcrowding compared to White British (5%) 
and White Irish (6%) households, which have the lowest levels of 
overcrowding. That a third or more of some ethnic minorities live 
in overcrowded conditions compared to 1 in 20 White households is 
striking. Furthermore, the results show that the Pakistani group exhibits 
the largest percentage increase in overcrowding between 2001 and 
2011 (+7% to 32%) while the Black African demonstrates the largest 
percentage decrease in overcrowding between 2001 and 2011 (43% 
to 32%). It is difficult to discern the causes of overcrowding but what 
can be concluded from these analyses is that housing provision is not 
meeting the needs of certain ethnic minority groups in Britain.
Homelessness
Although housing is a major issue, little work has been done on the 
links between housing and homelessness that considers ethnic minority 
households and their risks and transitions into housing precarity. The 
RDA confirms that ethnic minority households are more likely to 
experience homelessness than white households.
The 2016/ 17 data paint a disturbing picture with 59,100 households 
considered to be ‘statutory homeless’ and, of those, 35,890 (61%) are 
white households (including White ethnic minorities). The data suggest 
that 16% of all homeless households were Black, 9% were Asian, 3% 
were from a Mixed ethnic background and 5% were from the Other 
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ethnic group; ethnicity wasn’t known for the further 6% of homeless 
households. This is concerning given that 80% of the population are 
White British:  ethnic minority households are over- represented as 
statutory homeless in Britain. Indeed, Bramley and Fizpatrick (2018) 
find that a person’s ethnicity is one of the key characteristics (alongside 
poverty, local labour market variations and gender) that increase the 
likelihood of experiencing homelessness. Crucially, while ethnic 
minority households are over- represented among those who are 
Figure 7.2: Percentage of households (household reference persons), by ethnic 
group, in under- occupied, required size and overcrowded accommodation, and 























































































































































































































EACH OF THE VALUES NESTED IN THE
COLUMNS SHOWS THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE
BETWEEN THE 2001 AND 2011 CENSUSES
Note: Reproduction of Finney and Harries (2015) analysis that is ordered by decreasing per cent of 
overcrowding. Figures overlain on each section of the bars show the absolute per cent change in 
proportion of the ethnic group in the category of overcrowding between 2001 and 2011.
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homeless, these numbers could, in fact, be an undercount because of 
the way in which homelessness is conceptualised and operationalised 
in administrative and official statistics. The official definition (Gov.uk, 
2018f) demarcates a person as statutory homeless only if the household is 
unintentionally homeless and demonstrates a priority need, for example 
through having dependent children. Multiple reports by Shelter (for 
example 2004, 2017) note that these criteria overlook many homeless 
people as the definition does not include single homeless people with 
specific vulnerabilities (migrants and asylum seekers, for example) or 
people who do not approach local authorities to seek help (Shelter, 
2004; Gov.uk, 2018f).
It seems there is a plethora of factors that explain the over- 
representation of ethnic minority households classified as homeless. 
A collection of reports by the charity Shelter (for example 2004, 2017) 
suggest these factors include overcrowding, which is more pronounced 
among ethnic minority households as shown earlier. Furthermore, the 
problems that some ethnic minority households face in buying their 
own homes, such as poverty and low wages, reduce their housing 
security and increase their risk of precarity and homelessness. Poverty, 
racism and discrimination by local authorities in the SRS, or racism 
and discrimination by private landlords may further strain ethnic 
minority people in accessing quality and affordable housing. Changes to 
Britain’s housing terrain, with a broader decrease in home ownership, 
have accelerated across ethnic minority households in particular, as 
shown earlier. In addition to the housing- related disadvantages that 
ethnic minority residents face that have been discussed in this chapter, 
the ongoing multiple impacts of austerity affect ethnic minority and 
other marginal households more than White British households 
(Runnymede Trust, 2017a) making them particularly vulnerable to 
finding themselves without a home.
Marginalisation in housing debates
A significant problem continues to be that race and ethnicity are 
marginalised from housing debates (Finney et al, 2018b), and as a result 
black and ethnic minorities’ needs and voices tend to be excluded from 
housing planning and provision, with the implication that housing does 
not adequately cater for a diverse society. Previously black and ethnic 
minority housing groups have been integral to gains made in relation 
to social housing but these groups are marginal (Harrison et al, 2005; 
Robinson, 2002; Beider, 2012). The housing association sector has 
grown and seen more commercially orientated housing associations 
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merge (Finney et al, 2018b; Lukes et al, 2018), which has a negative 
effect on those black and ethnic minority housing associations that 
have been vital to ethnic minorities’ access to social housing. This 
is particularly the case in a housing market that, as highlighted, is 
characterised by the inadequate supply of social housing and a growing 
ethnic minority population, some of whom are highly dependent on 
social housing. Although ethnic minority housing associations, under 
the umbrella of BMENational, are undertaking pioneering work 
to engage with questions specific to migrant and minority housing 
needs (Lukes et al, 2018), specialist housing associations such as these 
are facing strategic and financial challenges as larger organisations 
increasingly secure contracts for housing provision.
Housing initiatives, such as gentrification, that marginalise 
minorities, illustrate that ethnic minorities have limited voice in 
housing decisions, with policies that in some cases work against 
ethnic minority communities, dismantle local areas and exclude ethnic 
minorities from housing in specific areas (Markkanen and Harrison, 
2013). Moreover, tragic events such as the fire that happened at 
the Grenfell Tower in 2017 raise questions about the way in which 
ethnic minorities (alongside other groups including working- class 
council tenants, migrants, refugees and Muslims) have been negatively 
represented and how this is compounded by the stigmatisation of 
people who live in tower blocks (Madden, 2017). This negative 
representation works to silence certain housing concerns, delay 
improvements to housing conditions and exacerbate inequalities 
between ethnic groups.
Conclusion
This chapter has mapped out the changes to Britain’s housing 
landscape over the past thirty years, demonstrating how those who 
are marginalised, including ethnic minority groups, have been 
detrimentally affected. Housing policies that have aimed to increase 
owner occupation (for example ‘Right to Buy’ and ‘Help to Buy’) 
have, we have argued, exacerbated the disadvantage of migrants and 
minorities, for example through discriminatory practices, exposure 
to financial risk and reduction of social housing stock. The housing 
disadvantage of minorities is consolidated by requirements in the 
PRS (for example ‘Right to Rent’) that encourage discriminatory 
landlord practices.
Furthermore, there is evidence that gentrification projects, which 
ostensibly benefit local residents have, conversely, contributed to 
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some ethnic minority households facing greater housing insecurity 
by steering households out of certain neighbourhoods, fragmenting 
communities and disrupting local connections. For example, the 
gentrification project at the former Olympic Park in East London had 
the potential to build newer and more suitable housing for the needs 
of the diverse local communities but had the effect of local residents 
not being able to afford the newer housing available and subsequently 
steering them further east to find more affordable accommodation.
A recurring theme of cases of minority housing disadvantage is 
the execution of change (or lack thereof) without the inclusion of 
residents’ voices. This was true of the 2017 tragedy at the Grenfell 
Tower, where the concerns of residents (regarding the safety of the 
building) were largely ignored. It has taken a horrendous event 
for the government to focus its attention on social housing, particularly 
the conditions people experience living in tower blocks. More broadly, 
the tragedy shows the persistent discrimination that marginal groups 
(ethnic minorities, minorities and working class) face in the housing 
sector where their voices are not heard and their concerns not dealt 
with adequately. It also highlights how stigmatisation results from 
racialisation of groups housed in precarious conditions in the social 
rented sector. There needs to be a substantial shift, from viewing 
these residents as passive to bringing them into decision making to 
influence social housing policy.
The national shortage of available housing in the SRS is a particular 
concern for specific ethnic minority households. For example, the 
Black Caribbean group are concentrated in this tenure as a consequence 
of their immigration history and socio- economic profile at the time 
of their arrival. Britain’s decision to leave the EU in 2019 poses a 
considerable question about the future social housing landscape and 
projects to build new social houses. This is because leaving the EU 
system excludes the country from receiving European Investment 
Bank (EIB) funding, which has been vital to sustain many social 
housing building projects (Maclennan and Gibb, 2018). We currently 
do not know if the government will match the EIB funding for social 
housing post- Brexit. If they fail to do so this poses a considerable threat 
for ethnic minority households. A lack of new social housing could 
potentially steer many more ethnic minority households into the PRS, 
which is already characterised by poor housing conditions, minimal 
regulation and unscrupulous landlord housing practices. For the most 
vulnerable ethnic minority households it could also steer them into 
homelessness. Given that ethnic minorities are already over- represented 
in homelessness, steps should be taken to avoid this inequality growing.
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
166
The chapter has illustrated a broad pattern of ethnic minorities 
experiencing a shift from the SRS and home ownership towards 
the PRS. This has a number of implications, particularly given the 
government’s continued pursuit of a ‘hostile environment’ aimed to 
dissuade migrants from moving to Britain. The Immigration Act 
2016 moves Britain’s borders into the hands of gatekeepers such 
as private landlords: renting to a tenant who is unlawfully living in 
Britain is now a criminal offence. This has, by default, supported racist 
practices, with landlords discriminating against anyone they believe 
might be living in the country illegally or using falsified documents 
to rent a house. A collection of cases have come to light that relate to 
Windrush generation migrants, which show that private landlords have 
discriminated against British citizens in order to avoid the perceived 
risk of potential prosecution.
This chapter has revealed many worrying aspects of ethnic 
minorities’ and migrants’ housing experiences in the UK. Ethnic 
minority disadvantages in housing appear to be growing with potential 
implications for many other life domains including employment 
and health. However, there is also a dearth of evidence about the 
exact nature of the disadvantages; how they might vary across the 
country and between household types and generations; what their 
implications are now and in the longer term; what institutional and 
structural practices are exacerbating or mitigating them; and what 
good practice can be identified to reduce them. The data presented 
here from the 2011 Census and 2016 English Housing Survey are 
useful but they can only tell us limited information about ethnic 
minority households’ experiences of the housing market. Investment 
in housing data and robust research is vital as is political commitment 
and collaborative action if more equitable housing systems and practices 
are to be achieved.
Note





Arts, media and ethnic inequalities
Sarita Malik and William Shankley
Key findings
• Ethnic minority people are less likely than white Britons to 
work in the creative industries and are more likely to experience 
unemployment from precarious labour in the creative industries.
• Ethnic minority people represent 6% of workers in design; 9.1% in 
film, TV and radio; 6.7% in music and performing and the visual 
arts, compared to 14.1% of the overall population for England and 
Wales and 40% in London, where there is a high concentration of 
cultural and creative industries (Warwick Commission, 2015).
• There is a paucity of data available to examine the demography 
of ethnic minority groups in the cultural and creative industries. 
Where data are available, for example, from the BBC or Channel 
4, they are organisation- specific and show a clear need for 
organisations to increase the number of ethnic minority people 
in their workforce.
• The BBC Census (2017/ 18) revealed that 14.8% of staff are from 
an ethnic minority background. Nonetheless, only 10.4% of the 
senior leadership roles are filled with people from an ethnic minority 
background, indicating a wider problem of the under- representation 
of ethnic minority people in decision- making roles in the sector.
• The BBC and Channel 4 (in 2018 and 2015 respectively) published 
new diversity charters with the main aim of reflecting the diversity 
of the workforce of each organisation.
• The discursive shift in how diversity is understood and approached 
in arts and media has led to a shift in cultural policy where funding 
bodies (such as Arts Council England) now require applicants to 
demonstrate their commitment to diversity in order to be funded.
• Cultural policy seems to focus exclusively on the demography and 
representation of ethnic minority people in the creative industries 
workforce with the assumption that more diversity in the workforce 
leads to more diversity in cultural production. However, the 
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Introduction
The growth of the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) in the past 
thirty years has coincided with an increase of research on inequality 
in the sector. This has included how ethnic minority people are 
involved in, represented by and experience the CCIs in Britain. The 
Warwick Commission (2015) found that the CCIs account for £77 
billion in added value and this corresponds to 5% of the economy, 
with 1.7 million people employed in these industries. There are three 
main areas that we concentrate on in this chapter and these relate 
to the concepts of cultural production, cultural consumption and cultural 
representation, as well as policy responses to ethnic inequalities in the 
industry. These three areas are marked by several linked factors in 
relation to ethnic minority concerns, including ongoing problems 
with a lack of employment, differential audiences and problematic 
representations. While there are various problems with data in each 
of these three areas, such as research gaps, the inconsistency of 
terminology and variation of categories, this chapter will reference 
relevant data in what still remains a largely under- researched area, 
even in studies of racial inequality. This is of concern because of 
the significant role that the field of cultural production plays in 
shaping everyday society and culture, how ethnic minority people 
see themselves and are seen by others and in how the nation, literally, 
narrates itself. The field of cultural production and representation, 
therefore, has real social effects.
In the first section of this chapter, we consider matters of cultural 
production where we review what the census data tell us. We discuss 
sector specific figures on ethnic minority involvement in production as 
well as discussing the recently growing concern around privilege and 
inequality in the cultural sector, and how this links with issues of cultural 
production. In the next section, we consider cultural consumption. In 
this section, we discuss the audiences that cultural products and content 
attract, and question if this maintains and reproduces ethnic inequalities 
in this field. We then move on, in the third section, to consider cultural 
representation, exploring how media content provides a window 
into the way ethnic minority groups are constructed in wider British 
society. In order to consider the complex interplay between cultural 
production, consumption and representation, we use the final section 
to consider industry funding and policy responses. Here, we use a case 
study approach, looking at the BBC and Channel 4, to outline how 
cultural and creative policies in broadcasting, a highly influential and 
popular area of cultural production, have evolved and changed and 
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how this, in turn, affects ethnic minority groups in this prominent 
sector of the cultural industries.
Cultural production: ethnic disparities in employment  
in the industry
In Chapter 6 on ethnic inequalities in the labour market, Clark and 
Shankley, highlight how data from 2017/ 18 show that ethnic minority 
people are under- represented across public sector institutions compared 
to the White British population, and with respect to their share of 
the broader population. A similar accusation has been levelled against 
the cultural industries and suggests that ethnic minority people are 
under- represented in sectors ranging from television to advertising. As 
with other sectors, there is a paucity of data, particularly recent data, 
to enable us to explore the extent of this inequality and its marked 
affect in specific sectors in finer detail.
Considering the cultural industries as a whole, data from CIC 
(2019) suggests that in 2017 the number of jobs in the UK creative 
industries overtook 2 million for the first time, and this had increased 
faster than the growth of the rest of the UK economy. If creative jobs 
outside the creative industries are taken into account, this represents 
3,121,000, or a 2.8% rise year on year. According to Consilium 
(2013), ethnic minority workers in the creative industries in 2011/ 
12 accounted for 7% of cultural industry jobs. Furthermore, Morris 
(2017) found that this had risen to 11% in 2016/ 17, representing a 4% 
increase over a four- year period. Of all jobs in the creative economy 
in 2016, ethnic minority workers filled 11%, a similar level to their 
representation in the labour market as a whole (11.3%) (Department 
of Culture Media and Sport, 2016). Moreover, since 2011 there has 
been a 38.2% increase in the number of ethnic minority jobs in the 
creative economy compared to an 18.5% increase in the jobs for white 
groups (Department of Culture Media and Sport, 2016). While it 
seems the creative economy and jobs for ethnic minority people in the 
creative industries are expanding, a specific look at individual sectors 
within the creative industries shows contradictions and tensions in 
the diversity across individual sectors.
Figure 8.1 shows that a large proportion of ethnic minority workers 
in the cultural sector work in IT, software and computing. This is also 
the area that has had the largest increase in ethnic minority workers 
between 2011 and 2015. In other areas, the numbers of ethnic minority 
workers have either remained static or decreased.
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Film and television
A recent BFI (2015: 5) report focusing on the representation of ethnic 
minority people in the film industry in Britain noted that the sector 
generated approximately £6 billion for the economy in 2013, which 
included a £1.5 billion investment overseas. Nonetheless, the film 
industry continues to under- represent ethnic minority people, women 
and people with disabilities within employment. A review by CAMEo 
(2018) showed that ethnic minority employment across the sector had 
steadily declined between 2006 and 2012, from 7.4% to 5.4%, with 
Figure 8.1: The proportion of ethnic minority workers in sectors in the creative 










































Source: Department of Culture, Media and Sport (2016).
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different levels of ethnic minority workers in different sectors. For 
example, ethnic minority workers in the animation sector comprised 
only 3.5% of the workforce. As with other sectors, issues of access to 
information and social networks appear to be particularly important 
in the animation sector (Creative Skillset, 2014).
In television, the findings are slightly better and ethnic minority 
people account for 7.5% of the workforce, which is marginally higher 
than the industry average at 5.6%. Ofcom (2018) recently published 
a report that shows that across the five main broadcasters in the UK, 
Viacom (which owns Channel 5) has the highest proportion of ethnic 
minority people among its employees (19%) compared to ITV which 
has the lowest representation among its employees (9%) (Figure 8.2). 
However, the report publishes data on the protected characteristics 
of its workforce separately. This prohibits any examination of 
the intersectional characteristics of the workforce of the different 
broadcasters being available.
Specific data from the BBC (the UK’s main public broadcaster) 
show that 14.8% of its employees come from an ethnic minority 
background in 2018 (Ofcom, 2018). While the equitable 
representation of ethnic minority people extends across middle and 
junior management positions as well as non- management levels, 
it decreases significantly among employees in senior management 
roles (10.4%) (BBC, 2018a). In spite of the proportion of ethnic 
minority people in junior- level roles being slightly higher than their 
share of the UK working- age population (12%), Ofcom (2018) 
found that ethnic minority people continue to face a mean pay gap 
of 4% in 2018 compared to their white colleagues (Ofcom, 2018). 
While broadcasting represents a sector in the CCIs with a relatively 
good representation of ethnic minority people among its workforce 
Figure 8.2: Employees across the five main broadcasters in the UK by 
ethnic group
BBC ITV CHANNEL 4 SKY VIACOM
ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS WHITE GROUPS UNKNOWN
13% 4% 8% 6%
21%
2%
83% 70% 80% 77% 75%
18% 15% 19%9%
Source: Ofcom (2018) on the period April 2017 to March 2018.
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compared to other sectors, particularly at junior levels, more needs 
to be done to target the sector’s working conditions to ensure pay 
parity extends evenly across all ethnic groups.
In the film sector, the percentage of ethnic minority workers 
employed (4.4%) fell short of the industry average of 5.6%. In director 
positions, for instance, ethnic minority people represent only 3.5% – 
suggesting a serious under- representation of ethnic minority people in 
senior leadership positions or opportunities (Grugulis and Stoyanova, 
2012). Meanwhile, in the video game sector, the proportion of ethnic 
minority people increased in 2012 to 4.7% – which again fell short of 
the industry average. Finally, there is a dearth of current data available 
on the representation of ethnic minority workers in the visual effects 
sectors, with raw figures, however, indicating that they only constitute 
1% of employees (CAMEo, 2018).
The current data suggest that television has higher representation of 
ethnic minority people among its workforce, compared to employees 
in the film, video game and visual effects sectors. Yet, there is currently 
a lack of research to explain why television has moved at a faster 
pace than other sectors within the film and television industry. In 
the absence of UK- based research, the Hollywood Diversity Report 
(2019)  suggests that broadcasting executives are aware that their 
audiences are declining and therefore prioritise the need to attract 
newer audiences (see discussion later in the chapter). This may affect 
their employment practices.
Journalism and publishing
In journalism, there is evidence that ethnic minority people face 
barriers to entry into the profession and face an ethnic penalty. A report 
published in 2016, for example, found that 94% of journalists were 
white compared to 91% of the total working- age population. This 
suggested that ethnic minority people continue to be under- represented 
among the workforce. Geographically, the under- representation of 
ethnic minority people in the newspaper and magazine sector is 
heightened by the majority of the sector being located in London, 
where only 60% of the population is white, suggesting that white 
employees are over- represented and disproportionately occupy jobs 
in the sector. Explanations for ethnic minority people’s under- 
representation links to findings that black and Asian journalist students 
are particularly likely to face discrimination and racism that prevent 
them entering the profession compared to white graduates (Thurman, 
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2016) Meanwhile, black students only have an 8% chance of finding 
employment in the sector altogether. If magazines and newspapers are 
reluctant to employ minority journalists, this creates a vicious cycle 
in which ‘unreflective newsrooms continue to produce unreflective 
editorial and cover content, further alienating readers from different 
backgrounds’ (Hirsh, 2018).
The wider publishing industry shows a similar lack of diversity. 
According to Shaffi (2016), of the thousands of titles published in 
2016 in the UK, fewer than 100 were by British authors from a non- 
white background, although publishers do not keep data on the ethnic 
background of authors. Noting this deficit, the publisher Penguin 
Random House has set a company goal to hire and produce books 
that better reflect ‘social mobility, ethnicity, gender, disability, and 
sexuality’ (Akbar, 2017: 1705). The 100 top selling books of 2018 had 
only one British non- white author, although, interestingly, this was on 
the subject of race (Reni Eddo- Lodge’s Why I’m No Longer Talking to 
White People about Race). There is a particular lack of ethnic minority 
representation among senior publishing executives (Shaffi, 2016).
Leadership in the CIC
While recent statistics highlight that the lack of ethnic diversity 
is endemic across the cultural industries, a recent survey by Arts 
Council England (2019) examined the nature of diversity of decision 
makers and those in senior positions in the creative industries. These 
roles included the Chief Executives, Artistic Directors and Chairs of 
organisations. The Arts Council England (2019) report examined 663 
arts organisations in its national portfolio, with Figure 8.3 showing only 
9% of chief executives, 12% of artistic directors and 10% of chairs of 
organisations came from an ethnic minority background.
Some research considers why the lack of representation endures in 
the creative industries and some of the structural challenges inherent 
within these industries. Koza (2008) explored the way ethnic minority 
people are required to ‘act white’ – to behave in a certain manner to 
be included and accepted into certain cultural professions and the elite 
educational institutions in which practitioners are trained. For example, 
in opera, ballet and certain genres of music, cultural norms exist that 
restrict ethnic minority people’s entry. These predominantly white 
spaces inhibit ethnic minority people from participating, as they are 
often excluded from the knowledge and/ or expected behaviours that 
are needed for entry (The Stage, 2017).
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Arts teaching
This section examines the representation of ethnic minority people in 
arts teaching and studies. Art schools with ethnic minority teaching 
staff are important as those in senior positions, as well as those involved 
in admissions, can act as gatekeepers to the industry. According to 
Snow (2017), who used the workforce data from the UK’s 13 leading 
drama schools for 2015/ 16, only 6% of teachers come from an Asian, 
black or minority ethnic background. Act for Change found in the 
same year that ethnic minority graduates made up a total of 17.5% of 
total drama school leavers from 17 major drama schools (The Stage, 
2017). Unpacking the challenges that ethnic minority staff and students 
continue to face in drama schools, The Stage magazine ran a collection 















Source: The ethnicity of workers in leadership positions at National Portfolio Organisations (NPOs) and 
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of interviews with minority students and found many experienced 
snobbishness, racism and practices of exclusion from the predominantly 
white teaching body. The experiences of some minority students 
suggest that a culture of exclusion runs the risk of alienating ethnic 
minority people from attending drama education and threatening those 
that do attend drama education in their successful transition into the 
CCI sectors of the labour market, reproducing the ethnic inequalities 
in the wider workforce.
Oakley and O’Brien (2016) discuss the possible links between 
higher education and inequalities in the creative industries. They 
argue that as increasing numbers of graduates are leaving university 
with a degree in media studies or related creative degrees, more people 
are attempting to enter into the creative industries, where ethnic 
minority people face particular barriers. Ashton and Noonan (2013) 
have shown how many graduates from arts degrees participate in an 
array of extracurricular activities to increase their employability. These 
pursuits are marked by class as well as ethnic inequalities. According 
to Lloyds (2006), the cultural industries have developed an internal 
industrial culture where creative workers, particularly those starting 
their careers, subsidise their creative work by working at other jobs. 
Others describe the blurring of the boundaries between work and 
life. For instance, this is present in the design of the offices of many 
creative industry professions, such as marketing and advertising, which 
infuse work life with social life (Nixon and Crewe, 2004). These 
aspects are particularly important in the creative industries where 
a lot of people work freelance and the social dimension is vital as 
it is where people find out about future possible employment and 
funding opportunities. This risks solidifying a culture where people 
have to perform being social in a specific way and can never truly 
switch off from work (Banks, 2007). Expecting workers to perform 
a specific type of social interaction is exclusionary, particularly for 
ethnic minority people, as it assumes that people have the same 
access to knowledge of the lay of the industry, as well as the time 
to work both in and out of work to build their industry profiles in 
order to maintain their careers in the creative industries. It also has 
clear gendered implications.
Eikhof and Warhurst (2013) also identify a collection of structural 
features that are significant to the exclusion of ethnic minority people 
in the creative industries. These included wage instability and the 
phenomenon of unpaid internships. Access to the creative sector in 
particular often requires following an unofficial route, which includes 
unpaid internships and utilising social networks to gain entry via 
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contacts already working in the sector. Current data from other 
chapters suggest that ethnic minority people are often more likely not 
to have the same financial capital as white groups to resource these 
routes (Friedman et al, 2017). Entrants to the creative industries are 
predominantly from middle- and upper- class privileged backgrounds 
and have access to the economic capital to be able to undertake 
internships and cope with fragmented employment and unstable wages 
(Friedman et al, 2017). Moreover, many ethnic minority people do 
not have the same social networks to draw upon. Consequently, many 
of the sectors exist as predominantly white spaces where exclusionary 
mechanisms inhibit ethnic minority entry. Research is lacking in this 
area but is greatly needed in order to move beyond the simple idea 
that a boost in diversity of the workforce demographic creates better 
diversity outcomes. As research indicates, internal industrial culture 
and patterns of exclusion persist, even for those working within the 
sector, suggesting that data also need to be compiled around attrition 
rates, retention and career progression.
Cultural consumption: ethnic minority audiences
We can see from the previous section a variable picture has emerged 
with respect to how well ethnic minority people are represented in the 
different sectors within the cultural industries. Nonetheless, what is 
relatively unclear and under- researched is a focus on who consumes the 
different outputs from the creative industries and how ethnic minority 
people feature as consumers of cultural content.
Participation in the arts
A report by the Warwick Commission (2015) used the ‘Taking Part’ 
data to measure how many ethnic minority people took part in the 
creative industries. The findings showed that, in spite of an overall 
increase in the number of minority people taking part in the creative 
industries between 2005/ 06 and 2012/ 13, the gap between the 
majority White British and ethnic minority participation continued 
to widen. More recent data from the RDA suggests that in 2017/ 18, 
78.9% of people aged 16 and over had taken part in the arts at least 
once in the past year (Gov.uk, 2018a). The levels of participation had 
remained relatively stable since the 2013/ 14 (Figure 8.4). The data also 
indicated that a higher percentage of those who fell into the ‘mixed 
ethnic’ category took part in the arts than people from all other ethnic 
groups (Figure 8.4). The data also showed that Asian people were 
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significantly less likely to take part in arts than white people (including 
white ethnic minority people and black people); across the two years. 
The findings supported the idea that ethnic minority people are 
relatively under- represented as consumers of th e arts.
The reasons for the relative lack of consumption of and participation 
in the arts are likely to be complex and would include questions of 
representation (discussed in the following section); perceptions of 
who art is produced for as well as economic factors which prohibit 
participation in the arts. According to the Pulse survey (Arts Professional, 
2018), an ongoing question relates to how to increase the diversity 
among those engaging with the arts and what strategy should be 
pursued by the wider creative industries? Collecting data from the 
509- strong UK- based respondents who completed an Arts Professional 
Pulse survey (2018), respondents were asked how they would achieve 
diversity in their sector. The survey data suggested that those working 
in theatre and music were the most likely to see audience diversity 
as a priority. This seemed to be the result of respondents recognising 
the lack of diversity of their audiences and seeing that their existing 
audience were typically white and middle class and, on average, older 
than the population as a whole. The following section examines what 
is known about television audiences.
Figure 8.4: Percentage of people aged 16 years and over who took part in arts in 

















Source: DCMS (2019). 
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Television audiences
As we have established in other chapters, the ethnic minority population 
of Britain is growing and has a younger age profile than the White 
British population. In the creative industries, for organisations such 
as the BBC, the growth of the young ethnic minority audience has 
raised questions of diversity. Broadcasting organisations are worried 
their audience is declining because of an increase in choice and because 
their programmes fail to reflect the interests of newer audiences. This is 
reinforced by the BBC’s own statement of purpose to ‘reflect, represent 
and serve the diverse communities of the UK’s home nations and 
regions’ (BBC, 2017b: 8). In order to accommodate difference, the 
BBC needs to avoid ethnic tropes and negative stereotypes to better 
engage with ethnic minority audiences if they are to maintain and 
grow their audience base. However, the paucity of data in the UK on 
audience dynamics has resulted in little being known about the ethnic 
minority consumption of channels such as the BBC.
Recent data from the BBC’s audience team suggests that ethnic 
minority people use BBC services significantly less than the national 
average (Figure 8.5), suggesting a need for the BBC to produce more 
programmes that better reflect ethnic minority audiences and their 
interests. A recent report by Kantar Media (2018: 11) found among 
audiences who took part in multiple focus groups that the BBC was 
seen as ‘establishment, stiff, white, middle- class and politically correct’ 
and did not represent ethnic minority people well or in a positive 
light. Other respondents suggested that alternative broadcasting 
outlets such as Netflix and Amazon Prime catered more to ethnic 
minority people’s tastes and represented them better throughout their 
programming content (Kantar Media, 2018). As we will see later in 
this chapter, the newest BBC and Channel 4 diversity policies attempt 
to increase the ethnic diversity of their broadcasting with respect to the 
workforce but also the content of their programmes. However, while 
it seems apparent that ethnic minority audiences are key to the future 
strategy among mainstream broadcasters, the increasing selection of 
outlets, for example, digital and social media, Netflix and other digital 
streaming options, are also offering new opportunities for content and 
programming. These newer digital streaming services such as Netflix 
show more diverse programmes and therefore offer competition to 
mainstream broadcasting with respect to content that depicts ethnic 
minority characters (Kantar Media, 2018). Therefore, if broadcasters 
(public and private) want to retain and grow their audiences, it 
is imperative that they keep up with the diversity of the broader 
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population. As Levin (2018) explains, ethnic minority audiences are 
more likely to watch television shows that depict ethnically diverse casts. 
The following section examines the question of cultural representation.
Cultural representation
As stated, cultural representations matter because they influence 
how we see and understand ourselves and the world, and how social 
understandings are formed. Cultural representation is, therefore, a 
powerful social force that shapes civil society, its politics and discourses. 
This is especially pertinent when it comes to race and ethnicity 
because of the history of cultural representations of racial and ethnic 
populations that have depended on racialised tropes and stereotypes. 
Thus, questions of cultural representation go beyond numbers and the 
proportion of ethnic minority people represented on- screen in film 
and TV or non- white characters in books for example. It is important 
to examine how ethnic minority characters are represented. The Riz 
Test (www.riztest.com), for example, is an intervention that seeks to 
dismantle well- rehearsed stereotypes and ideologies underpinning 
Figure 8.5: Ethnic minority audience of the BBC, 2016– 17
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Source: Internal BBC data, 2016– 17.
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Islamophobia, in order to broaden public perceptions of a much- 
vilified sector of UK society. Improving the cultural representation 
of ethnic minority people is important for building a more inclusive 
society, ascribing identities and a sense of place, as well as generating 
new forms of political participation in which more diverse forms of 
cultural and artistic content can be generated.
If existing quantitative data offer us some information about the 
inequalities that exist in relation to cultural production (employment) 
and cultural consumption, they have very little to demonstrate in the 
area of cultural representation. This is partly because it is challenging 
to quantify ethnic minority representation across different genres and 
cultural sectors. However, although there are methods available to 
enable this quantification, we still lack the studies and data to fully 
examine ethnic minority representation. Nonetheless, there have been 
some local, small- scale quantitative studies that take a particular cultural 
industry, such as publishing, and try to examine representation using 
different metrics.
The lack of ethnic minority authors in the publishing bestsellers chart 
was discussed in an earlier section. Data compiled by the Centre for 
Literacy in Primary Education (CLPE, 2018) titled Reflecting Realities, 
revealed the stark lack of diversity in children’s books. The report 
examined 9,115 children’s books published in the UK in 2017 and 
found only 391 of them featured a character with an ethnic minority 
background. This accounted for only 4% of children’s books overall, 
with a further examination finding only 1% of these books featured the 
ethnic minority character as the main character. Thus, not only were 
ethnic minority characters under- represented they were marginalised 
in the different stories published for children. The CLPE’s (2018) 
analysis of the specific genres where ethnic minority people featured 
prominently found that the majority of ethnic minority characters 
featured in ‘contemporary realism’ books or those set in a modern- day 
landscape. A further 10% of the characters featured in books labelled 
as ‘social justice’, with only one book defined as a ‘comedy’. In terms 
of audience, the data revealed that 26% of the non- fiction books that 
contained an ethnic minority character were aimed at an early years 
audience, leaving older children even more under- served. The CLPE 
(2018) report sheds light on the missing narratives of different ethnic 
and migrant groups’ experiences that were edited in a specific way 
to exclude accounts of suffering and trauma. Many topics that could 
enrich the children’s books and pay particular attention to ethnic 
minority groups’ experiences with respect to current affairs and themes 
of conflict and the refugee experience have been excluded. What is 
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needed are more books that embrace a range of topics to adequately 
represent the diversity of ethnic minority experience and the backing 
to promote them into the mainstream.
Similarly, a survey on the content of glossy magazines revealed that 
printed content was another area where ethnic minority people were 
under- represented (Hirsh, 2018). Recent statistics gathered by The 
Guardian newspaper suggest that of the 214 women’s magazine covers 
by 19 of the bestselling glossy magazines in 2017, only 20 featured an 
ethnic minority person (Hirsh, 2018). This accounted for a meagre 
9.3%, well below the 13.7% share of ethnic minority people in the 
broader population (ONS, 2016b). Comparing similar representation 
among children’s magazines (where ethnic minority people comprise 
more than a quarter of school children in England), The Guardian 
found that representation was even more limited, with 95% of cover 
models being white. The same was true for men’s magazines, where 
only GQ featured two black cover models and Men’s Health only 
featured one. In addition, neither of the men’s magazines featured 
cover models from any other ethnic minority background (Hirsh, 
2018). Therefore, cumulatively across the spectrum of women, men 
and children’s magazines, it is clear that ethnic minority people were 
poorly represented.
According to Hirsh (2018), the lack of representation that is endemic 
across the publishing sector is reinforced by the sector’s unwillingness 
to change. This was most telling in a quote by Alexandra Shulman 
(former editor- in- chief of British Vogue), who stated in 2012 that ‘in a 
society where the mass of the consumers are white and where, on the 
whole, mainstream ideas sell, it’s unlikely there will be a huge rise in 
the number of leading black models’. Nevertheless, change has been 
afoot in British Vogue more recently, with the recruitment of its first 
black editor- in- chief, Edward Enninful, who launched his premier 
cover featuring the British Ghanian model Adwoa Aboah and has 
included a recent edition featuring more non- white models, including 
Halim Aden, the first woman to wear a hijab on the magazine’s 
cover. Enninful’s hiring, and specific response to publishing’s historic 
resistance to change, represents a small and important step that opens 
up a space for the sector to do more to increase the representation of 
ethnic minority people.
Finally, in broadcasting, Cumberbatch and colleagues (2018) analysed 
the on- screen presence of ethnic minority people across BBC One and 
BBC Two programming. Their study found that ethnic minority people 
made up 12.5% of both channel’s television population (between 2016 
and 2017), which is slightly lower than the ethnic minority share of the 
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British population (14%). They also found a slight difference in the on- 
screen presence of ethnic minority people between BBC One (13.8%) 
and BBC Two (10.9%). Further, by examining the on- screen presence 
of ethnic minority people by gender, they found that ethnic minority 
men (54%) were represented more than ethnic minority women (46%). 
While the results suggested a gender difference, in fact, ethnic minority 
women’s on- screen representation is actually better than the national 
average of the representation of all women, where men outnumber them 
by a ratio of 2:1 (Cumberbatch et al, 2018). Moreover, examining the 
on- screen presence of ethnic minority people by age category, the results 
showed that ethnic minority people tended to be young, with nearly half 
(44%) being under the age of 35 compared to less than one third (31%) 
of the television population more broadly (Cumberbatch et al, 2018).
Funding and industry policy responses: a focus on diversity  
in public broadcasting
It is abundantly clear that descriptive representation of ethnic minority 
people is a problem among many of the creative industries, and there 
are calls for industry- wide cultural change and matters of diversity 
to be foregrounded. In broadcasting, Sharon White, a black British 
woman, was appointed as the new CEO of the broadcast regulator, 
Ofcom. White, who became one of the most influential decision 
makers in the CCIs (she left Ofcom in Autumn 2019), has pledged to 
make diversity a priority (Albury, 2016). The growth of the creative 
industries in the UK has expanded Ofcom’s remit to regulate the entire 
broadcasting sector and as a result more businesses and organisations 
have encountered the regulators’ commitment to diversity and 
inclusion. Previously Ofcom had done very little to support broader 
diversity and a particular problem with their lacklustre approach has 
centred on their reluctance to push for more data to be gathered to 
audit and monitor the representation of ethnic minority people and 
other protected characteristics in broadcasting (Albury, 2016). In a 
talk in January 2019 by Sharon White at the launch of the Ofcom 
Annual Plan 2019/ 20, she suggested the government’s Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport had rejected the media regulator’s request to 
have greater powers when collecting data on diversity in broadcasting 
(Ofcom, 2018). Without a collective will to address this disparity and 
a greater drive to collect more precise data on the representation of 
ethnic minority people in the industry, the ambition to target ethnic 
inequality as a whole could disappear. Karen Bradley, then Secretary 
of State, explained that the government’s stalling on the issue was 
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partly due to the broader concern over the country’s pathway through 
Brexit that had precluded a focus on many domestic issues. If Ofcom 
wants to see a significant improvement in terms of diversity, they 
should introduce a set of minimum standards with respect to diversity, 
increase their commitment to transparency and make diversity data 
freely available to monitor change within broadcasting.
Box 2: DIAMOND
One apparatus that shows broadcasters’ (public and private) commitment to 
different types of diversity is the new DIAMOND monitoring system. DIAMOND 
is an initiative that seeks to capture diversity across the major TV channels. 
It aims to assess the diversity of those who create programmes (diversity in 
cultural production) and the representation of diversity within programmes. 
The BBC’s specific involvement with DIAMOND has also come under scrutiny 
by BECTU, the union for creative industry workers in non- performance roles, 
and the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain because both unions accused the 
corporation of not being transparent enough with respect to publishing data 
(for example, data on gender, on jobs and on the grades of staff working in 
the corporation) (The Stage, 2017). The BBC’s response was that it could not 
publish certain demographic data because of data protection restrictions. The 
unions subsequently criticised this stance as being the main obstacle that has 
prevented increasing ethnic diversity. This is because, the unions argued, a few 
gatekeepers at DIAMOND tightly controlled the essential data necessary to 
audit the patterns of diversity across different broadcasters (The Stage, 2017). 
This restricted DIAMOND from being able to make any meaningful change, and 
its power and control over production and access to diversity data regulated 
the speed at which any progress was made in the sector (if at all). The unions 
called for DIAMOND to publish the quality monitoring data by production so 
that they could identify which production companies or broadcasters have the 
most diverse workforce and can learn what works and what does not, to improve 
them for ethnic minority workers. The unions subsequently argued that without 
this information new ethnic minority recruits would experience challenges 
in retaining their position in the sector. As Ofcom’s Sharon White said to the 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee in May 2019, DIAMOND 
‘started with very, very good intentions and there have been challenges in terms 
of the reach and the quality and the depth of data’ (DCMS, 2019). White went 
on to say that this is one reason why Ofcom have used their statutory powers 
to collect from diversity data across TV and radio but that even Ofcom has 
limits to accessing this.
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Diversity policy in public broadcasting
As highlighted in the work of Herman Gray (2016:  242), public 
service television is ‘a key location where diversity is practiced 
materially and symbolically’. According to Malik (2018), something 
of a transformation has occurred within the cultural industries, which 
have seen issues of diversity change from being primarily a social 
concern to being considered a matter significant to businesses as a 
profit incentive. Under this new guise, corporate owners have come 
to view engaging with diversity issues as one way of diversifying the 
audiences they target. Corporate owners, for example, will often 
finance the production of output (programming, for example) that is 
not to their tastes in order to make a profit (Hesmondhalgh and Saha, 
2013). The business case for diversity suggests that businesses benefit 
from the diverse skill set of their increasingly diverse employee base, 
which has come in particular use when they are targeting products 
at new markets (DBIS, 2013). While the business case helps explain 
why the private sector has so readily internalised diversity into their 
recruitment and content, change has also been evident in public 
funded arts and creative industries by steering public sector funding 
in a specific way to support diversity.
In the public sector, a later Arts Council England report, Equality, 
Diversity and the Creative Case (ACE, 2019) mentions how the call for 
diversity in the arts and media sector has directly affected how projects 
are funded. New applications made to Arts Council England (one of 
the four UK arts councils) have to ensure they support the council’s 
three interlocking themes (equality, recognition and new vision). The 
approach not only seeks to diversify the arts and media workforce but 
also change creative processes and working arrangements. Malik (2018) 
suggests that a problem with the prescribed framework for ‘creative 
diversity’ is that it produces and reproduces a specific type of diversity 
rhetoric and expectation. While the shift in the creative industries has 
raised awareness of the inequalities that exist in the industry and the steps 
that need to be taken, a substantial barrier is that the four different arts 
councils in the UK take different approaches to how diversity can be 
achieved in new funding applications. Creative Scotland, for example, 
requires organisations and individuals wishing to apply for funding to 
ensure that diversity is reflected across the application. This includes 
how the art is produced, the staff and working environments, and the 
audience and/ or participants of the programme/ project as well as the 
buildings and spaces used (Creative Scotland, 2018). By comparison, 
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the arts councils for Northern Ireland and for Wales support diversity 
in their future strategies but are less stringent in the precise ways that 
diversity needs to be included in arts funding applications. The different 
approaches and the lack of definition with respect to how diversity can be 
included in art projects can obfuscate how to ensure ensuring the profile 
of ethnic minority people is raised uniformly throughout different areas 
of the creative industries and in equal measure across the four nations.
Pressure to endorse ethnic diversity in the labour market from 
reports such as that of McGregor- Smith (2017) has seen a focus on 
ethnic diversity filter into the business structure and the framework 
of the content that these organisations produce. Focusing on the 
broadcasting sector, it is interesting to see how the broader shift in 
diversity policy has impacted on a specific sector, and, in turn, how 
the policies have endorsed addressing ethnic inequality in various forms 
in specific institutional policies. The newest manifestation of cultural 
policy towards ethnic diversity in broadcasting is now being framed 
as creative diversity. This has differed from previous cultural policies, 
which were targeted directly at ethnic minority issues. According 
to Malik (2013), we have seen a policy shift away from a focus on 
multiculturalism to creative diversity, losing a specific focus on ethnic 
inequalities and arguments around social justice. She argues that this is 
linked to the state rejection of multiculturalism, which has run parallel 
to the marketisation of the cultural industries.
An issue with the new approach related to how ‘creative diversity’ 
would be operationalised in public policy. Creative diversity, as a new 
approach to diversity in broadcasting, was charted as being composed 
of four principles:  access, excellence, education and economic value 
(Garnham, 2005). The argument here is that this policy framing focuses 
on creativity rather than a concern for ensuring equity in the demography 
of the cultural industries and the representation of ethnic minority 
people in its content. It was in the early 2000s that both Channel 4 and 
the BBC put forward their diversity strategies, taking a much broader 
approach to diversity than had previously been applied in separate policy 
approaches to different social identities such as race and ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality and class. There also appeared to be a change in tone in media 
circles towards diversity and the new cultural and then creative diversity 
that placed significant emphasis on the idea of widening access.
Examining the existing work on diversity policy in the UK in a 
specific industry (public broadcasting) and how it responds to ethnic 
minority populations can thus tell us a lot about their position and 
status in the creative industries. Briefly looking at two examples in 
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broadcasting, we can see how influential changes to diversity policy 
have been for ethnic minority employment and representation. The 
first example is the BBC Equality Information Report (2017b) and the 
second example is Channel 4’s 360° Equalities Strategy.
British Broadcasting Corporation
The BBC, as the largest public broadcasting channel in the UK, released 
its diversity policy titled the BBC Equality Information Report 2016– 17. 
The report described the corporation’s commitment to a ‘Diversity 
and Inclusion Strategy’. The policy’s aim was, first, to increase the 
representation of ethnic minority people, women, disability and 
LBGT employees across its workforce. Second, it aimed to include 
more diverse voices in its programming content. The BBC Equality 
and Information Report (2017b) highlighted the BBC’s already diverse 
workforce compared to other broadcasting organisations in the UK; 
however, it also sheds light on areas the corporation could improve 
upon. The corporation commended itself in its report for several of its 
programmes already being dedicated to increasing the ethnic diversity 
in its broadcasting. For instance, shows such as Damilola: Our Loved 
Boy (2016), The People v. O.J. Simpson (2016) and Black is the New 
Black (2016) demonstrate more diverse content. Additionally, it has 
developed a number of schemes to help increase the ethnic diversity 
of its employees in several areas, for example, a scheme to recruit more 
ethnic minority employees among the directors of its programmes, 
with the 2016 cohort admitting 5 out of 12 trainees from an ethnic 
minority background (BBC, 2017b).
A more recent report by the BBC in 2018 focused on the career 
progression and culture for staff from minority backgrounds at the 
corporation (BBC, 2018b). The report was compiled from the 
comments of many ethnic minority staff members (over 200 staff 
members) and made a number of recommendations. First, the 
BBC should increase the ethnic diversity of its leadership team and, 
second, it should build a solid and sustainable ethnic minority mid 
and senior leadership pipeline to get minority people channelled into 
higher positions. Third, the BBC should enhance accountability and 
trust and, fourth, it should develop a modern, agile and culturally 
intelligent workforce. Finally, the BBC should review areas with 
specific ethnic diversity issues. Examples of specific recommendations 
include the BBC introducing a policy to ensure that shortlists for all 
jobs include at least one ethnic minority candidate, to ‘increase the 
[ethnic minority] representation across the interview panel backed by 
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performance monitoring’ and to ‘develop specific action plans based 
on further analysis of all divisions with less than 10% [ethnic minority] 
representation or below par employee survey results including radio, 
Newsroom, Newsgathering, English regions and the World Service’ 
(BBC, 2018b: 1). In 2019 it was announced that the BBC’s dedicated 
Head of Diversity role would be split into two jobs, the Director of 
Creative Diversity and the Head of Workforce Diversity and Inclusion, 
suggesting a separation between approaches to diversity into two 
distinct areas of content/ output and workforce.
Channel 4
Channel 4 also launched its 360° equalities strategy in 2015 and the 
charter stated the organisation’s commitment to record and report 
diversity and remain transparent about its current levels of diversity 
among its workforce. Similar to the BBC’s strategy, the internal diversity 
policy sheds light on diversity for public service broadcasting. In the 
UK the BBC is publicly funded from the licence fee; meanwhile, 
Channel 4 is publicly owned but commercially funded. Channel 4’s 
current strategy celebrates a number of key diversity achievements. An 
audit of the channel’s workforce shows that the organisation is relatively 
ethnically diverse at junior levels compared to the BBC; however, there 
is work still to be done in terms of its senior positions. As a result, 
Channel 4’s strategy has been aimed at recruiting and training ethnic 
minority and other subgroups in progressing into senior leadership 
positions. Furthermore, a central strategy with regard to ethnic 
minority employment is to diversify new joiners by 50% by 2020. The 
policy is clear in stating it aims to increase the representation of ethnic 
minority people in its workforce. However, their diversity strategy 
is not limited to race and ethnicity, but also shows the organisation’s 
commitment to gender equality, disability visibility and inclusion, 
and regionality, suggesting an acknowledgement of the single legal 
framework of the Equality Act 2010. The diversity strategy goes further 
and recognises that it is necessary to foster diversity at all levels of the 
organisation, from commissioners to writers and those who are interns 
to the headhunters who search for talent. The strategy is also focused 
on increasing diversity in the content of programming and this will 
be achieved by a number of schemes and targets that Channel 4 is 
committed to (including a career development model that focuses on 
exposure, education and experience) focused on increasing the presence 
on screen of ethnic minority people, women, disabled people, voices 
from different regions and social mobility.
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While it is clear that both channels have made positive moves 
towards increasing diversity among their respective workforces as well 
as diversity in their programmes, there are still questions about how 
suitable the one- size- fits- all creative diversity approach is in producing 
meaningful ethnic equality.
Conclusion
The cuts to the funding of public arts and creative sector industries as 
well as the uncertainty created by Brexit are impacting on the creative 
industries. It remains to be seen whether the emerging commitment 
the creative industries have shown towards increasing ethnic diversity 
intensifies or is thwarted by their focus moving elsewhere. As Nicholas 
Serota, CEO of Arts Council England stated in 2017, a major obstacle 
in tackling inequality in the cultural industries is that many arts and 
cultural organisations are failing to supply data about diversity and 
inclusion. There is deep variance across the CCIs, so that while there 
are signs of increasing ethnic minority representation in terms of 
leadership and content in theatre in London, for example, the wider 
picture shows a deep level of unevenness across different sectors within 
the CCIs and across the UK.
The chapter has particularly focused on public service broadcasting 
where there has been an acknowledgement of the marginalisation of 
ethnic minority people. This has led to a number of policy initiatives 
that have specifically focused on improving the numbers of ethnic 
minority people working in the industry (such as BBC’s and Channel 
4’s diversity strategies). But more diverse ethnic minority representation 
with regard to content is not a proven outcome of more diverse 
representation in the workforce. The problem is that even though 
ethnic diversity in certain organisations increases, ethnic minority 
workers too can revert to modes of cultural production that depend on 
familiar, racialised representations, ‘thereby reproducing stereotypical 
representations of race.’ (Hesmondhalgh and Saha, 2013: 192). These 
strategies still revolve around the assumption that increasing the ethnic 
diversity of the workplace necessarily produces an increase in the 
ethnic diversity of the content produced. While channels may increase 
the diversity of their workforces, there is little evidence to show that 
those cultural workers have the will, power or persistence to implement 
change in the content of programmes or the audiences who watch or 
listen to content. More ethnic minority representation within sector 
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Key findings
• Following decades of very slow progress, the last three general 
elections saw large increases in numbers of ethnic minority MPs, 
leading to more than a tripling of their numbers in less than 15 years.
• The major political parties had to utilise different strategies to 
increase the numbers of ethnic minorities in Westminster, crucially 
leading to the fielding of ethnic minority candidates in many 
predominantly ‘white’ seats.
• Standing ethnic minority candidates in ‘white’ seats ends the era 
of ethnic ghettoisation of ethnic minority politicians and signals 
a qualitative change in ethnic minority representation in Britain.
• Despite the huge progress, minorities remain under- represented 
and recent data show that ethnic minority candidates still face 
discrimination at the stage of candidate selection.
• The majority of the 52 ethnic minority MPs elected in 2017 came 
from a similar class background to their white counterparts and 
therefore continue not to represent a broad range of voices among 
the ethnic minority electorate.
• Voting of British ethnic minorities has not changed as much in the 
last decades as political representation, with a majority still loyal to 
the Labour party.
• The Conservative party continues to make very slow, but steady 
progress with British Indian voters, despite some headline grabbing 
news announcing that progress has been dramatic.
• The Liberal Democrats have lost the vast majority of their ethnic 
minority vote, since minorities returned to Labour after a short 
period of voting Lib- Dem in protest over the Iraq war.
• Ethnic minority voters have always been thought to participate in 
politics less than white Britons, yet research now agrees that the 
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ethnic minority residents unsure and unaware that they can vote 
in British elections.
• A non- negligible proportion of ethnic minority voters voted to 
Leave the European Union (EU) in the 2016 referendum, but the 
majority supported Remain.
Introduction
The last decade has seen revolutionary progress in political 
representation of ethnic minorities. Yet we are still short of an exact 
match between the proportion of ethnic minorities living in the 
UK (at the last census in 2011 which was estimated at 14%) and the 
percentage of ethnic minority MPs in Westminster, which at the time 
of writing stood at 8% (52 MPs). Although progress was very slow 
until the 2005 election, in the 2010 general election the numbers of 
minority MPs nearly doubled, and advances were made in 2015 and 
2017 as well, meaning that between 2005 and 2017, the number of 
ethnic minority MPs more than tripled. One in ten of the MPs elected 
in the 2019 general election are non-white; however, all non-white 
MPs represent English seats. The story of how and why political 
representation improved is the most dynamic story to be told about 
race in politics. The other aspects of politics have been marred – as 
before – by scarce or poor- quality data. The glimpses into the other 
aspects of politics that are available given the scarcity of data in this 
area focus on persistent Labour party loyalty among minorities, their 
patterns of electoral participation and, last but not least, their vote in 
the 2016 EU referendum. The main challenges for the future remain 
studying the still very under- researched substantive representation, 
and working towards equal opportunity in politics, particularly issues 
around candidate selection and voter registration.
Representation
Historically, Britain has lacked ethnic diversity in Westminster (Saggar 
and Geddes, 2000; Bird et al, 2010). Since 1987, when the first four 
self- identifying ethnic minority MPs were elected, progress has been 
very slow, with the numbers added in each election remaining in single 
digits. Nevertheless, the 2010 general election was a critical election 
in this regard, when the number of ethnic minority MPs elected to 
Parliament nearly doubled, from 16 to 27. The main reason why the 
2010 election proved critical was a step- change in the way the main 





The newly employed party strategies not only continued to lead 
to an increase of numbers of ethnic minority MPs in the 2015 and 
2017 elections, but also represent a watershed moment for minority 
politicians, as they were no longer limited to standing in ethnically 
diverse constituencies (Sobolewska, 2013). The 2010 general election 
provided a good opportunity for the major parties to increase their 
diversity as a record number of incumbents were retiring (Labour 
102; the Conservatives 37; Lib Dems 10) (Criddle, 2010; Sobolewska, 
2013). Individually, all the major parties had an internal interest in 
growing their ethnic minority representation. The Conservative party, 
for example, wanted to overhaul their image as the ‘nasty party’ as 
well as attempt to court the ethnic minority voter, who historically 
had showed a tendency to vote for the Labour party in the postwar 
era (Evans, 2008). Meanwhile, Labour and the Lib Dems wanted to 
increase their representation to reflect the changing structure of their 
party’s support and broader pressure to diversify (Norris et al, 1992; 
Sobolewska, 2013). Some argued that Labour needed to increase 
ethnic minority representation in order to retain their vote and avoid 
complacency, particularly as a sizeable number of voters had defected 
to the Lib Dems previously following Labour’s position on the Iraq 
war in 2003 (Le Lohé, 2004; Curtice, 2005).
While the 2010 general election opened up a number of new seats, 
structurally each party suffered with both demand- and supply- side 
problems in selecting ethnic minority candidates for these vacant seats, 
and had to use different strategies to accomplish this aim. Four main 
strategies were used: centralisation of the selection process, recruitment 
from the outside of the party, selecting local ethnic minority candidates, 
and standing ethnic minority candidates in ‘white’ seats. The first of 
these strategies was designed to overcome a by- product of the British 
decentralised candidate selection model, which has been the very low 
success rate for ethnic minority candidates (and women; see Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1995; Durose et al, 2012). Many have argued that this was 
a direct result of the homophily in the local party selectorate, who were 
more likely to select candidates who were similar to them: white men 
to a large extent. Some level of centralisation of selections had already 
worked in the past to increase the number of women candidates for 
the Labour party, as the party National Executive Committee had an 
existing power to make any newly vacant seat consider an all- women 
shortlist.
The Conservative party attempted to make their processes more 
centralised in the run- up to the 2010 election, by creating an ‘A list’ 
of priority candidates, which they envisaged will be used as a basis of 
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local candidate selection, and which contained a number of ethnic 
minority politicians. In the event, the ‘A list’ was dropped in the face 
of overwhelming opposition, but the indirect result of this has been 
that many of the politicians on the ‘A list’ were in fact selected and 
elected in safe Conservative seats. Conservatives also trialled open 
primaries in these elections, which were thought also to overcome 
the biases of the local selectors. Out of all the new Conservative 
ethnic minority candidates selected to stand for 2010 elections, 
one quarter were previously on the A list or were selected via open 
primaries, indicating that the party’s efforts were paying off. Although 
the Labour party has always fielded much greater numbers of ethnic 
minority candidates, they too struggled to select them into winnable 
and safe seats. Thus, Labour’s efforts to centralise in 2010 were also 
detectable, and yielded a third of their new ethnic minority candidates 
(see Sobolewska, 2013).
However newer research from Representative Audit of Britain 
2015 suggests that candidates of minority origin still face a significant 
number of obstacles, having to apply for more vacancies to get a 
nomination for example, as well as having to be on more shortlists, 
and having to interview more times to get nominated (see Sobolewska, 
2017). Many fewer ethnic minority candidates also reported that they 
were encouraged to stand for election by their own party. However, 
in the run- up to the 2017 snap general election centralisation of 
candidate selection was introduced to some extent by both Labour and 
Conservatives, and it seems that yet another increase in ethnic minority 
MPs elected offers yet more evidence that centralisation is helpful, if 
not necessary, for parties to increase the ethnic diversity in Westminster.
Finding the right ethnic minority candidates to stand for election has 
also been a struggle for parties, again particularly for the Conservatives 
who have fewer ethnic minority voters and thus a smaller pool to 
draw from, so again the 2010 election has seen some new strategies to 
recruit more ethnic minority candidates, which Representative Audit 
of Britain from 2015 confirms are continuing (Sobolewska, 2017). 
These two strategies are trying to find local ethnic minority candidates 
and selecting them from the outside of the party itself. Being a local 
candidate is perceived as desirable thing for all politicians (Campbell 
and Cowley, 2014), and it might be especially important for non- 
white candidates who feel the pressure to fulfil many more criteria 
of being a perfect fit to overcome their perceived ‘otherness’ (Durose 
et al, 2012). There is some evidence that the minority candidates at 
the 2010 election were to a large extent local (Sobolewska, 2013), 
although it is unclear whether this is a trend that continued in 2015 
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or 2017. Recruitment from outside of party politics carries a special 
importance, as it seems to have continued in 2015 as well as 2017, 
with ethnic minority candidates having on average only around half the 
years of party membership of white candidates before getting selected, 
were less likely to have been a party official than white candidates, 
and were also less likely to have held an elected office at the local level 
before standing for a seat at Westminster (Sobolewska, 2017). All of 
this is evidence that they were being fast- tracked in order to overcome 
a shortage of more experienced ethnic minority candidates.
The final strategy, which proved to be the most revolutionary 
in the 2010 election, was to select ethnic minority candidates for 
what are usually considered ‘white’ seats, where the ethnic minority 
population constitute less than 20%, or even 10%. This strategy was 
particularly important for the Conservative party, which has few safe 
and winnable seats in areas with high ethnic diversity. Thus, in order 
to elect new ethnic minority MPs at all, the Conservatives had to 
select them for their best safe seats, especially in the face of evidence 
that ethnic minority candidates still face a small electoral penalty 
from voters (discussed later in this chapter), and these seats are, for 
the Conservatives, predominantly ‘white’. This was a very successful 
strategy, as out of the 27 ethnic minority MPs who were returned 
in 2010 election, only 7 represented seats that had more than 40% 
minority residents, and 10 represented seats in which minorities 
amounted to less than 10% of the population. This strategy has 
continued with the 2015 and 2017 elections, again particularly within 
the Conservative party. What this strategy has achieved, however, is a 
symbolic shift in how ethnic diversity is perceived, in what amounts 
to a paradigm shift in the study of representation. There are three 
main consequences. First, the racial ghettoisation of ethnic minority 
MPs seems to be a thing of the past, with ethnic minority politicians 
no longer seemingly limited to being the spokespeople for ethnically 
diverse constituencies and very narrowly defined ‘ethnic’ issues, which 
used to limit their aspirations and political careers, as well as the types 
and number of constituencies in which they were able to stand and 
win (Saggar and Geddes, 2000). Second, both main parties now offer 
meaningful levels of ethnic diversity, which challenges the traditional 
link between ethnic representation and left- wing politics and throws 
open the party competition over voters of non- white origin wider 
than it has ever been before (although more on this later). Third and 
finally, as a result of both ethnic minority MPs coming from non- left- 
wing parties and their no longer being ‘ghettoised’ in the most diverse 
seats, an assumption of an almost automatic link between descriptive 
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representation and substantive representation needs reassessing (more 
on this later). But before we turn to the consequences of the rapid 
increase of ethnic diversity in Parliament, let’s look at what it means 
in terms of evidence of discrimination from the white voters.
Does the recent dramatic increase in the number of ethnic minority 
MPs, and the fact that they are no longer elected in the most ethnically 
diverse seats mean there is little or no prejudice against non- white 
candidates at the ballot box? Analysis of the voting patterns for ethnic 
minority and majority voters in the 2010 and 2015 general elections, as 
well as an analysis of aggregate election results, gives us some indication 
on whether or not ethnic minority candidates suffer an ethnic penalty 
at the ballot box.
Traditionally, the aggregate- level evidence indicates that non- white 
candidates suffer a small ethnic penalty, losing around 3% of the vote in 
comparison to the general performance of their party in that election 
(Ford et al, 2010; Stegmeir et al, 2013). At the individual voter level, 
studies are much more rare, but generally show that the ethnicity of 
the candidate does not usually make a statistically significant difference. 
Evidence from the 2010 general election showed that white British 
voters were significantly less likely to vote for an ethnic minority 
candidate only if that candidate was Muslim (Fisher et  al, 2015). 
However, even for Muslim candidates, the influence of party was much 
stronger than the impact of candidate’s ethnicity and, where present, 
the ethnic penalty appeared to be rather small and limited to particular 
segments of the white voting population. This matters in contests where 
the winning majority is small, but should not matter in so- called safe 
seats, where the majority exceeds this percentage vastly. As a result, it 
once again underlines that candidate selection, and not the prejudices 
of the electorate, is more decisive in driving – and preventing – fair 
ethnic minority representation.
Before celebrating the rising numbers of ethnic minority MPs, and 
a seemingly small levels of opposition to them from white majority 
voters, we need to assess whether the increase in the number of 
such MPs in parliament means that the interests of ethnic minorities 
are better represented. There has always been an assumption, both 
in the academic literature and in real- life politics, that descriptive, 
numerical representation leads to substantive representation: whereby 
a point of view, or interests, are brought into Parliament by the 
representative who comes from the under- represented group her 
or himself. However, the empirical evidence for this has previously 
been hard to come by, because almost all of the ethnic minority MPs 
were also members of the Labour party, thus it was impossible to 
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see whether their behaviour was caused by their party ideology or 
their ethnicity. The finding that white Labour party MPs were also 
likely to substantively represent minority interests in Westminster, 
especially if they had a very ethnically diverse constituency, has been 
well established (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012).
However, with the recent increase not only of the absolute numbers 
of ethnic minority MPs, but also ethnic minority MPs from both 
Labour and Conservative parties, we have a much better chance of 
discovering if non- white MPs are more likely to represent minority 
voters. Although there are no current in- depth studies of substantive 
representation of ethnic minorities, research into attitudes of ethnic 
minority candidates and MPs suggests that we can now disentangle 
the influence of party and ethnicity. Based on the Representative 
Audit of Britain survey of candidates and MPs, Sobolewska and others 
(2018) show that while all ethnic minority politicians have higher 
levels of motivation to represent ethnic minority interests than white 
politicians, there are significant party differences. Conservative ethnic 
minority candidates and MPs are much less eager to represent fellow 
minorities (although still more so than white Conservative politicians) 
than Labour party ethnic minority candidates and MPs. In addition 
to the directly expressed motivation and will to represent, this study 
asked the politicians if they felt that racism held back British black and 
Asian minorities. This is a crucial attitude to hold if one is expected 
to try and overcome racism and represent the minority interests. 
Again, all ethnic minority prospective and actual representatives were 
more likely to think this than their white party colleagues. However, 
again, the Conservative ethnic minority politicians were less likely to 
believe this than their Labour counterparts. Finally, the demographic 
composition of the constituency has a clear impact on how ethnic 
minority politicians think about their motivation to represent and 
whether they perceive racism as a problem. Those who represent, 
or seek to represent, very diverse areas score much higher on both, 
which makes them more likely to represent ethnic minority people 
in Parliament. Given that, as already documented, the number of 
ethnic minority politicians who represent less diverse areas increased 
dramatically, this is certain to have an impact on representation of 
minority interest by minority politicians. This offers a check on the 
assumption that all ethnic minority politicians will let ethnic minority 
voices be heard in Westminster.
This change in the nature as well as the volume of representation 
of ethnic minorities in parliament raises many new questions that 
future academics and politicians will have to grapple with. Particularly, 
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is ethnic diversity an end in itself, or does it need to be linked to 
substantive representation of interests and points of view, to be valuable?
Local representation
As representation in Westminster receives a lot of scrutiny from the 
media and civil society organisations such as Operation Black Vote and 
Runnymede Trust, we have much more detailed data on its progress 
over the years. In contrast, local government largely escapes such 
scrutiny and little is known about how diverse local representatives 
really are. Existing studies focus either on a particular ethnic minority 
(such as Muslims, see Dancygier, 2017) or localities (see Muroki and 
Cowley, 2019). As a result, the most recent published data are from 
2013, and put the percentage of ethnic minority councillors at 4% 
(Rallings et al, 2013), which is a huge shortfall. The Centre on the 
Dynamics of Ethnicity’s (CoDE’s) own, more recent figures show that 
in early 2019 this figure was at 7.5%, representing an improvement 
comparable to progress at national level. What this research also shows 
is that the local presence of ethnic minorities is the main explanatory 
factor for under- representation of minorities in local government. 
As the majority of local authorities do not have large numbers of 
minority residents, they do not usually have any ethnic diversity on 
local councils. However, more ethnically diverse areas usually do have 
substantial levels of non- white MPs.1
Intersectionality
It is often alleged that the focus on increasing representation of ethnic 
minorities competes directly with a focus on increasing gender 
representation. This has been shown to be true for local representation 
of Muslim minorities by Dancygier (2017), who provides evidence that 
Muslim women candidates struggle to win selections for parliamentary 
office from parties trying to recruit Muslim candidates. However, the 
picture seems less convincing for all minorities at the national level. 
Allegations that all- women shortlists, instituted by the Labour party to 
increase female representation, have been predominantly white (Krook 
and Nugent, 2016) are undermined by the fact that they are in fact a lot 
less ‘white’ than normal shortlists, with 17% ethnic minority candidates 
on all- women shortlists as opposed to 5% on regular Labour shortlists 
(Krook and Nugent, 2016: 626). Also, looking at the gender profile of 
ethnic minority MPs, we find little evidence of a larger gender imbalance 






out of the 52 minority MPs elected in 2017, 50% were female, and the 
overall figure for Westminster was 32% (Cracknell, 2017).
Voting behaviour
The positive efforts that the Conservative party made on representation 
have quite clearly been designed to banish the label of ‘the nasty party’. 
Although some of this effort was aimed at white liberal voters, the 
party had hoped that it would either win them some ethnic minority 
voters or, at the very least, banish the notion that the Conservatives 
are a no- go party for ethnic minorities. In contrast, Labour’s historic 
popularity among ethnic minorities has been further cemented over the 
last decades by the party passing all major legislation that supports their 
rights and opportunities and offers ways of addressing discrimination 
(Heath et al, 2013). With the growing number of ethnic minority 
voters in the electorate this was becoming a crucial electoral problem 
for the Conservatives. As a result, the party has renewed their efforts 
(the last such attempt being in the early 1990s) to fix their relationship 
with ethnic minority voters. Clearly promoting ethnic diversity within 
the parliamentary party has been one of the foundation stones of this 
tactic. In 2015, a slew of front- page headlines seemed to confirm that 
their efforts have started to pay off. A Survation poll commissioned by 
the think tank British Future announced that in 2015 general election 
the Conservatives captured a significant number of ethnic minority 
voters from Labour. However, a closer look at this result showed that 
the Conservatives have made much less dramatic inroads, and these 
were limited to those of Indian origin, a group that was already more 
likely to support the Conservatives (Ford et al, 2015). However, even 
among this group, almost 60% supported Labour in 2015.
The problem that British Future encountered is that data on attitudes 
and political behaviour of the ethnic minority population in Britain 
is scarce and of very poor quality. Since academic polling is very 
expensive, the last in- depth study of this type was done in 2010, and 
most other reliable data sets do not contain many political questions. 
It is predominantly because the ethnic minority population tended 
to be younger than the White British population, concentrated 
geographically, and many have poorer levels of English language 
that they are less likely to be included in the usual polling samples. 
A more recent analysis by Martin (2019) confirms this analysis of 2015 
and 2017 general elections (Martin and Khan, 2019). It seems that, 
despite all efforts to aggressively recruit ethnic minority politicians, the 
Conservatives cannot get through to ethnic minority voters.
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Using Understanding Society survey (waves 3, 5 and 7), Martin and 
Mellon (2018) also found that the advantage that Labour has with 
minorities is unlikely to fade because ethnic minorities aged 20 to 30 
have much higher levels of party identity than White British people. 
In fact their level of partisan attachment is comparable levels to those 
of White British people aged 50. People who identify with and feel 
attached to a party are more likely to vote for that party consistently. 
To explain how this pattern arose, Martin and Mellon (2018) suggest 
that partisanship among ethnic minorities was shaped by parental views. 
Partisanship was therefore transmitted predominantly during socialisation 
processes. Unlike White British voters, ethnic minority voters continue 
to transmit strong signals about politics and the parties to their children, 
and this explains why partisanship is higher among ethnic minorities.
Participation
Historically, the enduring link between ethnic minorities’ vote and 
the Labour party has been carefully maintained by Labour, which has 
relied in many places on the so- called ‘ethnic bloc vote’. The party 
has therefore always cared about high turnout in areas where the 
percentage of minority residents has been substantial. In fact, against 
the picture of slightly lower than average national turnout figures 
for many minority voters, it has been shown that people who live in 
high concentration areas of (particularly South Asian) minorities, had 
higher than average turnout. However, recently, a dark side to this 
pattern has been more publicly acknowledged, and it paints a picture 
of political exclusion and disenfranchisement of large proportions of 
ethnic minority voters. Research on electoral fraud, which has been 
increasingly associated with areas of high concentration of South Asian 
origin minorities, which were previously thought to have high levels 
of political engagement, exposed a pernicious problem. In 2015 a 
study commissioned by the Electoral Commission (Sobolewska et al, 
2015; Hill et al, 2017) showed that in those areas the high levels of 
participation are often actually artificial, as the reality is that women and 
younger people are often excluded from the political process through 
the influence of kinship networks and breaches of the secrecy of voting. 
However, both Sobolewska et al (2015) and Peace and Akhtar (2015) 
show that many, particularly younger, members of the South Asian 
communities in Britain, reject such influence and look to the political 
parties to help them eradicate it.
In addition to these problems, ethnic minority political participation 




2010 general election, the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 
uncovered much lower levels of electoral registration among non- white 
communities than the British average. As many as 28% British Africans 
were not registered to vote (Heath et al, 2013) and other minority 
groups were also affected more than the white majority population. 
The main cause of this under- registration has been due to lack of 
knowledge about eligibility: the majority of non- white British residents 
come from countries of the Commonwealth and thus can vote in all 
elections upon arrival, but a huge number of them do not know this.
In 2014 there was a change to the electoral registration system, which 
further threatened the number of ethnic minorities eligible to vote. The 
change saw a move from household to individual electoral registration 
(IER), with the former previously allowing one member of a household 
to register all of the people resident at the same address, while the 
new system required each person to register individually and, most 
importantly, to provide evidence of their identity such as their National 
Insurance Number (NIN) (Electoral Reform Society, 2019). This was 
a particularly risky change for many ethnic minority women, whose 
workforce participation is lower so they might not have a NIN, and 
who were previously registered by their husbands. While the move was 
designed to increase the accuracy of the register and tackle registration 
fraud, the Electoral Commission recognised the potentially negative 
impact on ethnic minority voters. These voters were also vulnerable 
not just because of their ethnicity but also because they were likely to 
belong to other groups that were likely to be negatively affected. These 
included students, private renters and young adults, groups known from 
previous research to be in specific danger of not registering to vote. For 
ethnic minorities, who, as shown in other chapters in this book, are 
overwhelmingly younger than the white majority population and are 
more likely to rent privately than their white counterparts, the electoral 
change might have negatively impacted on their political participation. 
Further research on this issue is imperative.
Brexit
With the most salient political development in British politics, the 
unexpected decision to leave the EU referendum, dominating the 
political and news agenda, we must ask to what extent ethnic minorities 
supported the decision to leave and what impact Brexit is likely to 
have on non- white people in the UK.
Much of the commentary on who has chosen to support Britain’s 
exit from the EU focuses on white voters who have been the losers 
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of globalisation and have experienced relative decline in social and 
economic status over past decades. They are often characterised as ‘left 
behind’ and their seeming socio- economic exclusion has led to attitudes 
of disenchantment and alienation from existing political options. But, 
as the chapters in this collection make clear, ethnic minority groups 
are not only suffering from many socio- economic disadvantages, 
they also, as we saw earlier in this chapter, are often excluded and 
alienated politically. Many people in working- class jobs or with a low 
return on their human capital are not white, but from ethnic minority 
backgrounds, and yet the possibility that they also voted to leave the 
EU is largely ignored and discounted. Recent research that aims to fill 
this gap shows that while ethnic minority voters were less likely than 
white people to vote to leave the EU, the vote differed according to 
ethnicity (just like party choice, with Indian Britons more likely to have 
voted Leave). It is possible that some minorities have been persuaded 
by the leave campaign’s claims that post- Brexit immigration policy is 
less likely to be racially discriminatory, as white European migrants 
will face the same entry requirements as non- white migrants.
In addition, non- white people who match the description of ‘left 
behind’ were more likely to vote leave, just as among white voters 
(Martin et  al, 2019). Ethnic minorities who believed that they 
cannot ‘get ahead’ in the UK were also more supportive of Brexit, 
suggesting that the subjective sense of deprivation, just as for white 
‘left behind’ voters, correlated with the leave vote. This undermines 
the assumption that the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ is a uniquely 
white phenomenon, but also raises the question of why ethnic minority 
people are excluded from these narratives and the subsequent efforts 
by politicians to reach out to the ‘left behind’. One answer comes 
from the work on what contributed to the result of the referendum, 
which consistently finds that attitudes towards ethnic diversity were 
a good predictor of the leave vote among white people: that is, these 
who were uncomfortable with racial equality were more likely to 
vote leave (Sobolewska and Ford, 2019). The many racial elements of 
the campaign are discussed further in Chapter 10 of this volume. The 
politicians who only include white people in their definition of the 
‘left behind’ voters are effectively leaning in to this highly racialised 
tendency (Kinnock cited in Hughes, 2016).
Despite the fact that some ethnic minority voters supported leaving 
the EU in the 2016 referendum, Brexit is likely to affect ethnic minority 
communities negatively (something which is also true for many poorer 
white leave voters). Although the Conservative party since 2010 has 
placed ethnic equality near the top of their legislative agenda, with 
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both David Cameron and Theresa May speaking on the issue in their 
first speeches as Prime Minister, and in fact they delivered some efforts 
in this direction (for example, Theresa May’s Race Disparity Audit 
in 2017), Brexit now seems set to derail any legislative effort in this 
direction. What exact impact leaving the EU has remains to be seen, 
but we must stay attuned to how it impacts on racial disadvantage in 
Britain, as well as more general effects it may have on the economy.
Conclusions
Although the story of race in politics in Britain is generally one of 
progress, with record numbers of MPs of ethnic minority origin 
now sitting on both sides of the Westminster aisle, there is still no 
equality in politics. The 2011 Census suggests that 14% of Britain’s 
population comes from an ethnic minority background and therefore, 
in political terms, to achieve accurate descriptive representation the 
number of ethnic minority MPs would need to increase from 65 to 
84 MPs out of a total of 650 MPs in Westminster. Moreover, some 
groups are still extremely under- represented. While there are many 
MPs of Black African origin and a growing representation of Muslim 
Britons, the under- representation of people of Chinese origin and 
those of Black Caribbean backgrounds is very severe. This chimes in 
well with findings that candidate selection remains a major hurdle for 
candidates from non- white groups. Research also points out that ethnic 
minority MPs are more likely to be at the margins of Westminster, 
with fewer influential positions in government, the shadow cabinet and 
select committees (English, 2018) although with the Home Secretary 
and Shadow Home Secretary both of ethnic minority backgrounds 
(at the time of writing), clearly progress is being made here too. All 
these changes stand in stark contrast to the almost unchanged image 
of ethnic minority party choice, with the Conservative party making 
very small strides in an Indian community that was already more likely 
to vote for them.
Apart from continuing the effort to diversify the political parties in 
Parliament, other challenges include closing the ethnic gap on electoral 
under- registration and issues around fraud in British politics. It is 
also still uncertain whether the growing ethnic diversity of MPs will 
translate into these MPs tackling the persistent disadvantage minority 
people face in the UK – or will the dominant parties use them as a 
fig leaf to distract from and excuse inaction, or even worse, to pander 
to racially conservative white voters? Finally, the dark cloud of Brexit 
continues to hang over British politics and there is a worry that the 
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continued uncertainty and political oscillations of politicians over 
Brexit might hijack the agenda, distracting from other important policy 
priorities such as tackling race inequality.
Note
 1 The purpose of this research, and reflecting the lower age profile of ethnic minorities 
in Britain, we assumed that in areas where ethnic minorities constituted less than 





Racisms in contemporary Britain
William Shankley and James Rhodes
Key findings
• Racisms are embedded in historically and politically determined 
systems of domination and work to exclude, marginalise and 
inferiorise groups on the basis of purported physical, cultural, and 
symbolic differences.
• The UN Special Rapporteur, reporting in 2018 found ‘striking’ 
levels of ‘structural socio- economic exclusion of racial and ethnic 
communities in the UK’ as well as ‘growth in the acceptability of 
explicit racial, ethnic and religious intolerance’.
• Racism and prejudicial attitudes and practices, while improving in 
some ways persist, with Muslims and Gypsy- Traveller communities in 
particular facing high levels of prejudice. Acts of bias, discrimination 
and racial violence remain a pervasive feature of everyday life for 
ethnic and religious minority groups, evident in hurtful statements, 
and forms of aggression, bullying and harassment.
• There have been increases in reported hate crime every year 
since 2013.
• The shift from recognition of institutional racism to a concern with 
‘unconscious bias’ risks excusing governments, institutions and 
organisations from tackling structural and social causes of racism 
and inequality.
• Religion has become central to contemporary articulations of 
racism, impacting most markedly on Muslims. Counter- terrorism 
policies, including Prevent, have introduced state surveillance in 
which Muslims are positioned as ‘suspect’ communities, exacerbating 
Islamophobic sentiment.
• There has been an increasing political mobilisation of racism and 
xenophobia in fringe parties and the political mainstream. This 
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Introduction
In 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur visited the United 
Kingdom, with a stated aim to ‘assess the situation of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance’ (Achiume, 2018). 
In an interim statement based on preliminary observations and prior to 
the final report (due summer 2019), she presented a complex picture of 
the contemporary landscape of racism. On the one hand, the UK was 
praised for the development of relatively robust governmental policies 
and structures through which to address racial equality and racially 
motivated hate crime. Similarly, the intention behind the publication 
of 2016’s Race Disparity Audit (RDA), which outlined racial and 
ethnic inequalities across various domains, was praised as ‘worthy of 
emulation by governments all over the world’ (Achiume, 2018: 11– 12). 
However, the statement also points to the pervasiveness of racism, 
xenophobia and discrimination in contemporary Britain. It identifies 
the ‘striking’ levels of ‘structural socio- economic exclusion of racial and 
ethnic communities in the UK’ in areas such as housing, employment, 
policing and health, as other chapters in this volume have shown. It 
concluded that race and ethnicity, ‘continue to determine life chances 
in ways that are unacceptable, and in many cases, unlawful’ (Achiume, 
2018:  19). Compounding this, the rapporteur, Tendayi Achiume, 
lamented, ‘the absence of a comprehensive, inter- governmental 
policy co- authored with civil society and racial and ethnic minority 
communities to ensure that the grave disparities documented … are 
fully addressed’ (Achiume, 2018: 13).
More widely, her statement also noted an increasingly charged social 
and political climate in the UK. Conducting her visit in the midst of the 
scandalous treatment of the ‘Windrush generation’ and the government’s 
wider ‘hostile environment’ immigration policy (see Chapter 2), she 
pointed to the negative impacts this exerted on both immigrants and 
established black and minority ethnic groups. She also highlighted 
the exacerbation of ‘Islamophobic sentiment, policy and action’, 
producing a political culture characterised by ‘anti- Muslim panic’ 
(Achiume, 2018: 41– 2). Furthermore, Brexit was cited as revealing 
how political concerns around race, immigration and nation remain 
persistent features of the contemporary political landscape. Achiume 
stated that: ‘The discourses on racial equality before, during and after 
the 2016 referendum in which Britain voted to leave the EU, as well as 
the policies and practices upon which the Brexit debate has conferred 
legitimacy, raise serious issues’ (Achiume, 2018: 58). She pointed to 
rising hate speech and violence in the wake of Brexit, the emboldening 
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of far- right and extremist politics, and a widespread sense that such 
sentiments have gained ground within the political mainstream. The 
result of this, Achiume concluded, is ‘the growth in the acceptability 
of explicit racial, ethnic and religious intolerance’ (2018: 62).
Explor ing these issues further, this chapter considers the 
contemporary landscape of racism in Britain. The chapter begins by 
defining racism, setting out how the concept is being understood and 
used, and considering the different scales at which racism animates 
contemporary British society, with a focus on the individual and 
interpersonal as well as the institutional and societal. The second 
part of the chapter examines the morphing landscape of racism in 
contemporary Britain. Given that racisms continually evolve through 
time and space in relation to changing social, economic and political 
contexts, the chapter traces and situates key shifts in racialised discourse, 
considering emerging forms of racism such as Islamophobia and ‘xeno- 
racism’ (Fekete, 2009) alongside the persistence of established forms 
of hostility and discrimination such as ‘anti- Black racism’ (Anthias 
and Yuval- Davis, 1992) and antisemitism. The final part of the 
chapter examines contemporary political mobilisations around ‘race’. 
The last two decades have seen the rise of far- right and right- wing 
populist parties that have sought to both cultivate and capitalise upon 
a range of concerns pertaining to race, nation, multiculturalism and 
immigration (Vieten and Poynting, 2016). Groups such as the British 
National Party (BNP), English Defence League (EDL), Britain First 
and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), have garnered significant 
levels of both political support and influence, forged around an agenda 
that is both forcefully anti- Muslim and anti- immigrant. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of Brexit, considering what the referendum 
campaign and the response to it reveals about contemporary racisms 
and political mobilisation.
Racism, discrimination and disadvantage
Before we can offer a review of racism in Britain today, we need 
first to define it. Racism exists not in static or singular form but 
as plural and heterogeneous, evolving with and through changing 
socio- historical, cultural and political contexts (Golash- Boza, 2016; 
Garner, 2017). Racisms are embedded in historically and politically 
determined systems of domination and work to exclude, marginalise 
and inferiorise groups on the basis of purported physical, cultural and 
symbolic differences (Golash- Boza, 2016). They operate as part of 
wider processes of racialisation in which racial/ ethnic collectivities 
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are constituted and given meaning, status and value within particular 
societies. Here racial groups are seen to exist as observable realities, and 
are assigned a range of features and qualities on this basis. Indeed, while 
race categories have no scientific basis, either physically or intellectually, 
they remain important social markers of identity, and play a key role 
in shaping ideas of collectivities and groups. Racisms represent these 
groups as ‘other’ in a variety of ways. While historically, racisms drew 
heavily on notions of biology, in more recent times, notions of ethnic 
and cultural difference are drawn on more heavily and racism ‘has come 
to be grounded in anthropology rather than biology; it is the matter of 
the [purported] way of life of a group of people, rather than the way 
in which those people came to life’ (Kinnvall, 2017: 2).
Racisms operate not simply as a set of ideas but through the forms of 
inequity and marginalisation that they sponsor and sustain, as racisms 
inform a range of social policies and practices that produce differential 
outcomes for racialised groups (Garner, 2017). As Tanya Golash- Boza 
(2016: 131) states:
Racism refers to both (1)  the ideology that races are 
populations of people whose physical differences are 
linked to significant cultural and social differences and that 
these innate hierarchical differences can be measured and 
judged and (2) the micro- and macro- level practices that 
subordinate those races believed to be inferior.
Racism therefore results from how ‘racial categories … are used in 
ways that are psychologically and materially harmful’, and the mutually 
reinforcing links between ‘racist ideologies and racist structures’. It 
also operates across different scales, ranging from the individual and 
the interpersonal, through to the institutional and the structural or 
systemic (Golash- Boza, 2016; Garner, 2017).
Racism has been a defining feature of postwar Britain and endures in 
the contemporary period, across various domains and levels of society. 
Post- 1945, the arrival of New Commonwealth immigrants from Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, was met with widespread 
popular and political anxiety, and a range of discriminatory attitudes and 
practices. Shaped by ideas of Empire and Britain’s colonial history, as 
well as the media, ‘black’ immigrants were viewed through a range of 
tropes, stereotypes and prejudices that saw their presence as both alien 
and threatening, linking the ‘non- white’ presence to a range of social 
ills such as crime, poor health, and competition for jobs and housing 
(Gilroy, 1987b; Solomos, 2003; Small and Solomos, 2006). Related to 
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this, discriminatory practices in areas such as housing, employment and 
criminal justice produced a deeply unequal society, in which black and 
minority communities have been disproportionately concentrated in 
more deprived areas, in poorer quality housing, and within low- wage 
and insecure employment. In the contemporary period, as racial and 
ethnic diversity continues to increase in more complex configurations, a 
range of racial attitudes and practices continue to shape the experiences 
not just of established black and minority groups from Britain’s former 
colonies, but also of more recent citizens and migrants (Bhopal, 2018).
Individual and interpersonal racism
Racism importantly comprises sets of attitudes and individual and 
interpersonal behaviours towards racial and ethnic difference. Such 
prejudices, stereotypes and orientations continue to be observable 
today, working to demarcate racialised groups as ‘other’, informing and 
legitimating forms of inequality. Indeed, while there is some evidence 
to suggest growing tolerance of racial and ethnic difference, this has 
been tempered by the persistence of negative and discriminatory 
attitudes (Kelley et al, 2017; Storm et al, 2017). Research by Storm 
et al (2017) suggests that a combination of the increasing diversity of 
the population, a growing acceptance of this fact, rising educational 
levels and shifts in norms and values which reject explicit forms of 
racism, have produced some positive developments in relation to racial 
and ethnic prejudice. For example, they argue that between the 1940s 
and 1990s, attitudes regarding intermarriage improved significantly. 
However, they also observe the perpetuation of collective notions of 
racial and ethnic hierarchies which position the White British majority 
at the top and Muslims at the bottom.
Other research also indicates that attitudes towards racial and ethnic 
difference have remained relatively stable if we focus on the last few 
decades. This stasis becomes even more marked when compared to the 
development of more ‘liberal’ attitudes evident towards, for instance, 
same- sex relationships (Kelley et  al, 2017). Kelley et  al (2017:  6), 
based on evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey, found 
that between 1983 and 2013, the proportion of the population that 
describe themselves as ‘very’ or a ‘little racially prejudiced’ has remained 
between one quarter and one third of the population. The figure has 
never fallen below 25%, and has increased since 1996 (see Figure 10.1). 
When the same question was asked in 2017, 26% of respondents 
described themselves as ‘very’ or a ‘little racially prejudiced’. Those who 
described themselves in these terms were associated with being male, a 
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Conservative party supporter, and a leave voter in the 2016 referendum 
(Kelley et al, 2017: 7). Similarly, while attitudes towards inter- racial/ 
ethnic marriage have improved among the general population, in 2013, 
21% of respondents still said they would ‘mind if a close relative were to 
marry’ an Asian person, and 22% would ‘mind if a close family member 
married a black person’ (Kelley et al, (2017: 10). Most strikingly, 44% 
stated they would mind if a close relative married a Muslim person 
(Kelley et al, 2017: 11). Storm et al (2017) also found that racial and 
ethnic prejudice was most directed towards Muslims, with more 
negative attitudes held towards this group relative to other minorities. 
Worryingly, Kelley et al also draw on findings from the 2014 European 
Social Survey, which indicated that 18% of UK residents agreed with 
a statement that asked whether ‘some races or ethnic groups are born 
less intelligent’ (Kelley et al, 2017: 8).
Racism and prejudicial attitudes and practices also continue to shape 
interpersonal relations in the UK, with acts of bias, discrimination and 
racial violence remaining a pervasive feature of everyday life for ethnic 
minority groups, evident in hurtful statements, and forms of aggression 
bullying and harassment. A Guardian/ ICM survey commissioned in 
2018 found evidence of significant levels of everyday racial bias across 
a range of social domains and types of interaction. Those from ethnic 
minority backgrounds were three times more likely to report having 
been thrown out of or denied entrance to restaurants, bars or clubs in 
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the last five years, with two thirds believing Britain had a problem with 
racism. Of those from ethnic minority backgrounds, 38% said they had 
been wrongly suspected of shoplifting compared with 14% of white 
people. Furthermore, approximately 1 in 8 survey respondents reported 
hearing racist language directed towards them in the previous month 
(Booth and Mohdin, 2018). These ‘micro- aggressions’ are defined by 
Golash- Boza (2016: 131) as ‘daily, commonplace insults and racial slights 
that cumulatively affect the psychological wellbeing of people of colour’.
A recent poll conducted in 2019 by Opinium also suggests that in 
the wake of the European Union (EU) referendum, and within an 
increasingly charged political atmosphere, these experiences of overt 
racial abuse and discrimination are intensifying. Between January 
2016 and February 2019, the proportion of those from Black and 
Asian backgrounds reporting they have experienced discrimination 
increased from 58% to 71%. During the same period, the proportion 
of those stating that they had been targeted by strangers increased from 
64% to 76%. Social media also appears to offer a significant outlet for 
the expression of racist sentiment and, between 2016 and 2019, the 
proportion of people who saw racism on social media on a daily basis 
increased from 37% to 50%, and that figure is even higher for ethnic 
minority people between the ages of 18 to 34 (Booth, 2019). Another 
recent report by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children (NSPCC) stated that incidents of racial abuse and bullying 
directed at children have increased by around 20% since 2015/ 16, 
with 10,571 incidents committed against children recorded as racist 
by police in 2017/ 18 (Dodd, 2019).
Recent statistics indicate increases in race- hate crime. Home Office 
figures show that racially motivated hate crime has risen every year since 
2013. In 2018, 71,251 such crimes were reported in England and Wales, 
and the number of hate crimes – of which racially motivated attacks 
comprise the vast majority – more than doubled from 2013 (Home 
Office, 2018a). While the Home Office attributes some of this increase 
to more effective police recording it also accepts that, ‘there [have] been 
spikes in hate crime following certain events such as the EU Referendum 
and the terrorist attacks in 2017’. Similarly, despite increases in recorded 
hate crime the number of completed prosecutions fell from 14,480 in 
2016/ 17 to 14,151 in 2017/ 18 (Home Office, 2018: 7).
Institutional and societal racism
As observed, racisms exist not solely through individual and interpersonal 
beliefs and acts, but are also manifest in more institutionalised and 
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systemic forms. The state and other key societal institutions, also 
play an active and decisive role in shaping the experiences and 
inequalities faced by ethnic minority groups (Phillips, 2010). In postwar 
Britain, successive Race Relations Acts in 1965, 1968 and 1976, 
highlighted racial discrimination in the realms of housing, education 
and employment. However, it was not until the publication of the 
Macpherson report (1999) that ‘institutional racism’ was identified as 
existing within public bodies. Responding to the police investigation of 
the murder of black British teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993, Lord 
Macpherson concluded that the conduct of the Metropolitan Police 
was symptomatic of institutional racism. Macpherson defined this as:
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an 
appropriate and professional service to people because of 
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their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen and 
detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount 
to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage 
minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1999: 6.34)
While there has been intense debate about the definition offered, 
importantly, Macpherson recognised that racism does not result simply 
from overt or intentional forms of action or inaction, but is also 
present in the form of more covert and indirect policies and practices 
that produce racially uneven outcomes. More broadly, the report also 
made general recommendations on policies pertaining to race relations, 
education and social policy. In response to the inquiry, the then Labour 
government introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act in 2000, 
which placed a statutory duty on all public authorities to prevent acts 
of racial discrimination before they occur and to act with ‘due regard 
to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and to promote 
equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different 
racial groups’ (cited in Solomos, 2003: 92).
As the UN Special Rapporteur has argued, such legislative measures, 
alongside stated commitments to respect the equality of groups on the 
basis of protected characteristics (race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, 
disability), offer a robust framework through which racial inequality 
can be addressed (Achiume, 2018). However, two decades on from 
the Macpherson report and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, 
racial inequalities and discriminatory practices remain. The 2016 RDA 
revealed widespread racial disparities in contemporary society, and it is 
clear that institutions continue to operate in ways which systematically 
disadvantage ethnic minority groups, and which have been covered in 
other chapters in this volume.
The perpetuation of these disparities questions the attempts to 
address racial inequality and exclusion in Britain. The UN Special 
Rapporteur noted that, despite existing legal frameworks to tackle these 
issues, there appeared to be a lack of commitment and coordination 
across state institutions and through engagement with ethnic minority 
communities (Achiume, 2018). Recently, Bourne (2019) also notes that 
there has been a move away from discussions of ‘institutional racism’. 
Instead, training initiatives aimed at reducing ‘implicit’ or ‘unconscious 
bias’ have become the dominant approach to address racial and ethnic 
inequalities in institutions. Bourne (2019) argues that this represents 
an ineffective strategy, and one that situates racism as residing within 
the often unconscious attitudes of individuals rather than as a wider 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
212
social problem. She states that within this approach, ‘racism is covert 
not overt; it is psychological not social; it is individual not structural; 
it is subconscious not conscious. Hence, it effectively exonerates 
governments, institutions, organisations, even individuals, for it is 
unconscious, inevitable’ (Bourne, 2019: 71).
This appears to be symptomatic of a wider reneging on commitments 
to address institutionalised and systemic racism and discrimination, 
with central government policy itself complicit in compounding 
such exclusions and inequalities. In 2012, the government rejected 
mandatory commitments to equality impact assessments, and the 2010 
Emergency Budget, which introduced large- scale austerity policies 
making drastic cuts to welfare and public services, and the 2017 
Budget were not subject to assessments of their impacts on equality. 
This despite evidence which points to the disproportionate impacts 
such policies have had on black and minority ethnic communities. 
A  report for the Runnymede Trust, for instance, stated that the 
reforms to welfare and services would see the living standards among 
the poorest fifth of society decline (where household living standards 
are defined as the value of household disposable income plus the use- 
value of public services), with a loss of 11.6% and 11.2% for Black and 
Asian families respectively, compared to 8.9% for white households 
(Hall et al, 2017). These impacts are particularly damaging for black 
and minority women, who are disproportionately living in poor 
households, more heavily reliant on benefits and public services, and are 
concentrated in low- wage and insecure work. The research estimated 
that, by 2020, Asian women in the poorest third of households will 
have lost 19% of their income, while black women will lose 14%. The 
UN Special Rapporteur went as far to state that, ‘Austerity measures 
today appear to function inadvertently as a prime instrument of racial 
subordination’, as she called for the reinstatement of equality impact 
assessments (Achiume, 2018: 32).
Alongside this, Achiume also observed the disproportionate impacts 
that immigration control and counter- extremism and counter- 
terrorism measures have on black and minority ethnic communities, 
and how they are both informed by and feed wider sentiments of 
racial animosity (see Chapter 2). She lamented the failure to include 
the impacts of such policies in the RDA, and called for equality impact 
assessments to be considered in relation to these policies. Beyond the 
legislative implications, it is also clear that such policies and associated 
rhetoric continue to position both immigrants and established ethnic 
minority communities as precariously and contingently belonging to 
the nation, linking them to a range of social problems.
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The changing landscape of racism
Racism clearly continues to be evident in a range of forms and at 
various scales in contemporary Britain. However, as racial and ethnic 
diversity increases and as social and political contexts shift, the targets 
of racist discourse and practices are also evolving, in ways that reveal 
both the persistence of deeply rooted, alongside more emergent, 
forms of racism. In postwar Britain, much racial discrimination and 
hostility can be captured by what Anthias and Yuval- Davis (1992) 
describe as ‘anti- Black racism’ as ‘non- white’ migrants from the New 
Commonwealth were the targets of racist opprobrium that identified 
them as ‘others’ primarily on the basis of skin colour. Within such 
discourses and actions, the term ‘immigrant’ became synonymous with 
‘black’, encompassing both migrants and subsequent generations of UK 
citizens with backgrounds in South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. 
Here ‘older’ conceptions of biological difference and hierarchy have 
more recently interacted with ‘newer’ forms of racism, which draw 
upon notions of cultural incompatibility to construct these groups as 
both ‘alien’ and ‘threatening’ to the nation and its integrity (Gilroy, 
1987b; Solomos, 2003; Small and Solomos, 2006). Such views became 
institutionalised in successive immigration policies that enshrined 
‘colour- coded’ forms of exclusion, which favoured white migrants.
Clearly racisms predicated on skin colour continue to be directed 
at Black Caribbean and African and South Asian populations and, in 
comparison to the White British, they are exposed to greater levels 
of inequality, institutional racism, as well as racial harassment and 
victimisation. The recent Windrush scandal continues to highlight their 
more insecure claims to citizenship and belonging, and the ‘hostile 
environment’ has also seen a number of high- profile deportation cases 
that have targeted black and minority ethnic groups in particular. 
Similarly, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, long- standing racialised tropes that 
link young black men in particular with violence and criminality – for 
instance through associations to knife crime and ‘gangs’ – continue to 
inform widespread negative media and popular stereotypes as well as 
disproportionately punitive institutional practices.
Islamophobia
Over the course of the last few decades, religion has also become 
central to contemporary articulations of racism, impacting most 
markedly on Muslims. As Karlsen and Nazroo (2014:  373) argue, 
‘religion has become an increasingly important marker of difference 
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as racist sentiment has moved from anti- Asian and anti- Arab to 
anti- Muslim/ Islamophobic interpersonal and institutional prejudice 
and violence’. In 1997, a report by the Runnymede Trust brought 
attention to the growing challenge of Islamophobia. In the wake of 
the Rushdie Affair, the Gulf War, and the criminalisation of young 
South Asian Muslim males, it identified growing prejudice, hostility, 
violence and discrimination towards the Muslim population across a 
range of domains, including the media, criminal justice system and 
labour market.
In the intervening period, anti- Muslim racism or Islamophobia has 
increased significantly, becoming deeply entrenched within British 
society and across Europe, as states including Britain have moved away 
from the promotion of multiculturalism to an emphasis on integration. 
Here, the 2001 riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, and the 
attacks of 9/ 11 and 7/ 7 were pivotal events informing this hardening 
of attitudes and practices (Poynting and Mason, 2006; Kundnani, 
2007; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Jackson, 2018; Kallis, 2018). 
An understanding of Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009) has taken hold within contemporary popular and 
political conceptions. Muslims are widely viewed as a ‘threat’ to the 
nation (whether through associations with terrorism, criminality, 
grooming, sharia law and so on), as not, or only contingently belonging 
to the nation, and as bearers of sets of values deemed irreconcilable with 
the values of Britain’s asserted status as a liberal democracy (Poynting 
and Mason, 2006; Runnymede Trust, 2017b; Jackson, 2018). These 
established tropes work to deny the heterogeneity of Muslims in terms 
of nationality, ethnicity, religious practice, place, social and economic 
positions, and gender. Alexander has noted, ‘an intensification and 
banalization of Islamophobic sentiment, policy and practice in Britain, 
alongside the increased targeting, both violent and mundane, of British 
Muslims’ (in Runnymede Trust, 2017b: 13).
These anti- Muslim sentiments are manifest in various forms of 
hostility, discrimination and exclusion. Perhaps most prominently, the 
introduction of the government’s Prevent agenda through the Terrorism 
Act 2006 has introduced a form of state surveillance in which Muslims 
are positioned as ‘suspect’ communities linked to the increased use of 
police stop- and- search powers (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2014; Runnymede 
Trust, 2017b; Jackson, 2018). Kundnani (2009) has argued that the 
policy has undermined attempts to improve community relations 
through the specific targeting of Muslims, and has been approached 
in a top- down manner which does not engage effectively with local 
organisations or communities. In 2015, the Counter- Terrorism and 
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Security Act placed a statutory duty on a range of public bodies, 
including schools and hospitals, to monitor those they came into 
contact with for signs of radicalisation. According to Cohen and Tufail, 
this has normalised Islamophobia while also serving to heighten a 
sense of suspicion from Muslims about public institutions. They argue 
that the legislation breaches existing equalities legislation through 
its disproportionate impacts on Muslims, curtailing free speech and 
citizens’ rights, particularly in terms of political engagement within civil 
society (in Runnymede Trust, 2017b: 41– 2). Indeed, while Prevent is 
described as a policy to tackle all forms of extremism, figures indicate 
that in 2015– 16, a person from a Muslim background was 40 times 
more likely to receive referrals compared to others (Kallis, 2018: 680– 1). 
As the UN Special Rapporteur concluded, counter- terrorism law ‘has 
vastly exacerbated Islamophobic sentiment’ (Achiume, 2018).
At the level of national government and politics, Baroness Warsi 
has also accused the Conservative party of institutional racism, and 
there have been a number of instances of party members engaging 
in Islamophobic behaviour (Kallis, 2018). In May 2019, the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission announced an investigation into 
Islamophobia within the Conservative party. The discrimination and 
exclusion facing Muslims is also evident in other ways. Muslims are 
disproportionately concentred in the poorest areas of the country 
and face significant barriers within the education system and labour 
market, while also being subject to negative media representations. 
A report by the Social Mobility Commission (Stevenson et al, 2017: 19) 
found that almost half (46%) of Muslim households live in the most 
deprived 10% of neighbourhoods. Muslims are also most likely to live 
in overcrowded housing (42% compared to a national average of 12%) 
(Runnymede Trust, 2017b: 23). These forms of marginalisation are 
particularly evident in the lives of young Muslims in Britain, who face 
severely constrained prospects for social mobility. The commission 
concluded that young Muslims, ‘are excluded, discriminated against, 
or failed at all stages of their transition from education to employment’, 
with ‘Islamophobia, discrimination and/ or racism … ever present and 
pervasive’ (Stevenson et al, 2017: 2).
Islamophobia is also particularly evident in the form of marked levels 
of racial harassment and violence, with increasing attacks on mosques 
and Islamic centres, as well as individuals (Home Office, 2018). 
Figure 10.2 shows that religious hate crime rose by 40% between 2016/ 
17 and 2017/ 18. Tell Mama recorded 1,201 Islamophobic and anti- 
Muslim incidents between January and December 2017. More than 
two thirds of these incidents occurred at street level (most frequently 
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in public spaces and on public transport) and included abuse, physical 
threats and threatening behaviour, with these types of victimisation 
increasing 30% compared to 2016. Between 2015 and 2016, such 
incidents increased 46.9% (Tell Mama, 2018b: 1– 2). The remaining 
third of Islamophobic incidents recorded by the organisation took 
place online, marking an increase of over 16% from 2016 (Tell Mama, 
2018b: 1). The study reveals a number of important findings. First, 
the prevalence and severity of these attacks is triggered by national 
and international events. Instances increased significantly during 
the reporting period in the wake of events such as the Manchester 
and London Bridge attacks. In the week following the attacks at the 
Manchester Arena in 2017, incidents increased by 700% (Tell Mama, 
2018b:  7). Second, attacks also disproportionately target Muslim 
women, with 57% of victims in 2017 being female, and 64% of 
perpetrators male. Of those committing such acts, 73% were white 
men (Tell Mama, 2018b: 9). This phenomenon has been referred to as 
‘gendered Islamophobia’, which references how women, particularly 
those wearing the veil or headscarf and therefore ‘visibly Muslim 
women’, are targeted (Awan and Zempi, 2015; Tell Mama, 2018a). 
An investigation into the impacts of such incidents on Muslims found 
that they produce emotional distress, depression and fear, leading to 
profound disruptions of a sense of safety and belonging (Awan and 
Zempi, 2015).
In the context of rising hostility towards Muslims, there has 
been significant debate about the appropriateness of the term 
‘Islamophobia’. For some the term is problematic, given the way it is 
seen to suggest pathological fear or mental illness rather than indicating 
discriminatory practices (Runnymede Trust, 2017b; Jackson, 2018). 
Other contestations have focused on whether or not this constitutes 
a form of racism. Some, including far- right and right- wing populist 
movements, have argued that as Muslims constitute a ‘religious’ rather 
than a ‘racial’ group, and this is a voluntary rather than an ascribed 
identity, anti- Muslim sentiment is not a form of racism (Meer and 
Modood, 2009). It has been suggested that hostility is directed towards 
Islam as a religious ideology and set of practices rather than Muslims. 
This distinction appears untenable. Alexander has warned against ‘the 
separation of anti- Muslimism from the longer and broader historical 
and social context of racial discrimination and racism’ (in Runnymede 
Trust, 2017b: 13). A range of scholars point to how racisms have always 
been based upon, not just perceived physical, but also ethno- religious 
and cultural differences, citing the example of antisemitism. In this 
way, Islamophobia is widely understood as a form of cultural racism, 
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drawing less on notions of biological hierarchy and instead on ideas 
of cultural heritage (Meer and Modood, 2009; Karlsen and Nazroo, 
2014; Runnymede Trust, 2017b; Jackson, 2018).
The 2017 Runnymede Trust report defines Islamophobia as ‘anti- 
Muslim racism’, characterised as:
Any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or 
preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be 
Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life. (Runnymede Trust, 2017b: 7)
In 2019, the Labour party and Liberal Democrats adopted an official 
definition of Islamophobia resembling the definition offered by 
Runnymede Trust, although the Conservative party, as of January 2020, 
has refused to adopt this. The importance of identifying Islamophobia 
as a form of racism is not simply a semantic issue, as it has real political 
consequences. In 2006 the government expanded existing legislation 
on racial hatred to include religious discrimination, through the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act, which made it unlawful to incite hatred 
on the basis of religion as well as race. This was an important piece of 
legislation given that, unlike Jews and Sikhs, Muslims are categorised 
as a ‘religious’ rather than a ‘racial’ group within the law. However, 
significant issues with this remain. The UN Special Rapporteur noted 
that while race- hate crimes ‘require no showing of racist intent’ to be 
recorded as such, religiously motivated hate crimes exhibit a different 
legal standard which requires intent to be established (Achiume, 
2018: 9). This likely leads to significant under- recording of religiously 
motivated hate crime, and this is of particular import for Muslims, 
given that statistics show that over half of all such crimes in 2017/ 18 
targeted Muslims (Home Office, 2018).
Immigration, xeno- racism and antisemitism
Alongside the intensification of Islamophobia, another important 
development in the evolving landscape of racism has been the 
increasing racist, anti- immigrant and xenophobic sentiment directed 
towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, including ostensibly 
white migrants and communities. During the 1990s, in the context 
of globalisation, geopolitical conflict and instability, and rising 
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economic and cultural insecurity, there emerged across Europe both 
populations and regimes increasingly hostile to immigrants and refugees 
(Kundnani, 2001; Solomos, 2003; Small and Solomos, 2006; Fekete, 
2009). Kundnani argues that during the 1990s, popular animosity 
directed towards asylum seekers from countries such as Somalia, 
Iraq and Kosovo, represented an emergent form of ‘common sense 
racism’. Central to this were discourses that linked these migrants 
with notions of illegality, criminality, disease, and position them as 
‘bogus’ economic migrants. Kundnani describes this hostility as being 
driven by a, ‘vicious circle logics of suspicion and deterrence, by the 
racism that turns human beings into numbers. This mindset migrates 
from the corridors of the Home Office to the streets, the schools, the 
pubs; carried there by tabloid newspapers eager to play up to fears of 
an “influx” ’ (Kundnani, 2001: 42).
For Fekete (2009: 2), such sentiments mark the development of a 
form of ‘xeno- racism’, which she describes as ‘a non- colour coded 
institutionalised racism’, that targets migrants, particularly those from 
poorer countries, and often from outside of the EU. Borrowing from 
the work of Sivanandan, the term reflects xenophobic sentiment which 
excludes or marginalises people on the basis of national origin, and is 
often constructed as a fear of strangers, with forms of stigmatisation, 
segregation and expulsion that have historically characterised racism 
(Fekete, 2009: 19– 20). Fekete argues that increasingly restrictive state 
legislation regulating immigration and asylum, and a growing far- right 
political presence produced a ‘new pan- European racism directed at 
asylum seekers and migrant workers’ (Fekete, 2009:  1). The trend 
Fekete identifies is evident in contemporary Britain, in the creation 
of a ‘hostile’ immigration environment, and negative attitudes towards 
migrants and refugees evident within both the media and the public 
opinion (see Chapter 2).
These notions have assumed prominence again in the context of the 
economic recession of 2008– 9 and, importantly, the 2015 European 
‘migrant crisis’ (Anderson, 2017; Gupta and Virdee, 2018), that is, the 
increasing arrival of displaced peoples within the EU from countries 
such as Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. For Gupta and Virdee, 
the specificities of this series of events, ‘morphed into a generalised 
anxiety about immigration and the presence of immigrants, in fact 
exacerbating long- simmering sensitivities about religious and cultural 
as well as “racial” difference’ (2018: 1750). A European Commission 
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report in 2016 noted how 
terms such as ‘swarms’ of immigrants had been employed by both 
UKIP and the Conservative party. According to this document, ‘The 
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UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for International 
Migration accused politicians of adopting a “xenophobic response” to 
the migrant crisis and said their language had been “grossly excessive” ’ 
(ECRI, 2016: 17). With many of these migrants hailing from majority- 
Muslim countries, this hostility towards migrants has heavily rested 
upon their conflation as Muslim, as xenophobic and Islamophobic 
sentiments have interacted (Gupta and Virdee, 2018).
A 2018 Report from the Migration Observatory at the University of 
Oxford found significant levels of anti- immigrant sentiment. Based on 
a range of data sources including the British Social Attitudes Survey and 
the European Social Survey, they found that 58% of Britons favoured 
reducing the number of immigrants, with almost one third agreeing that 
it should be ‘reduced a lot’. The briefing suggests that this sentiment 
has declined since 2015, when 71% of people desired a reduction in 
immigration, although it remains a defining contemporary political 
issue and was significant in the period prior to the EU referendum. 
Between 2015 and 2016, 56% of respondents ranked immigration as 
the most salient political issue (Blinder and Roberts, 2018). Indeed, 
during the referendum campaign anti- immigrant rhetoric was a 
defining feature of the ‘leave’ campaigns (Burnett, 2017; Virdee and 
McGeever, 2018)
As Fekete notes, xenophobic and anti- immigrant sentiment also 
targets white Europeans, particularly those from Eastern Europe. 
Antagonism towards certain white migrants has a long history in 
Britain, as evidenced through the antipathy directed towards groups 
such as Irish and Jewish people for instance. These sentiments have also 
emerged as a significant issue in the context of changing patterns of 
European migration with the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 
(see Chapter 2). While state regimes continue to favour white migrants 
(Fox et al, 2012; Garner, 2017) and public attitudes demonstrate a 
preference for white rather than non- white migrants, particularly when 
they are skilled and English- speaking, (Blinder and Roberts 2018), it 
is evident that within the media, popular opinion and policy, negative 
and hostile attitudes are also directed to these groups (Fox et al, 2012; 
Anderson, 2017; Garner, 2017). This became particularly evident in 
the wake of the EU referendum as race- hate crimes were also directed 
at white people who were identifiable as migrants or non- nationals, 
something which has been noted as a more recent development in 
contemporary manifestations of racial exclusion (Burnett, 2017; Virdee 
and McGeever, 2018; Rzepnikowska, 2019). Research conducted by 
Rzepnikowska with Polish migrants in Manchester found that since 
the 2008 recession, and in the wake of the referendum, attitudes 
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towards Polish migrants have become more hostile, with media and 
public discourses framing them as competitors for jobs and resources. 
She found that in this context Poles have been increasingly subject to 
racist abuse both before and after the EU referendum. Finally, Carl 
et al (2018) looked at differences in social attitudes expressed by the 
electorate (remain versus leave) towards immigration to unpack why 
there had been an increase in hostility towards migrants. Figure 10.3 
shows a stark difference between leave and remain voters, with 61% of 
remain voters stating they would continue to allow ‘some’ or ‘many’ 
migrants move to the UK, compared to only 25% of leave voters. The 
study also sought to analyse if there existed an implicit preference that 
discriminated between different groups of white migrants and thus 
uncovered why some new white migrants faced increasing incidents 
of discrimination compared to other groups. The results uncovered 
a preference towards migrants from Australia compared to migrants 
from Poland or Romania. This confirmed the existence of an implicit 
hierarchy of whiteness whereby Commonwealth migrants and migrants 
from Western European countries are viewed more favourably and thus 
Figure 10.3: Ethnic hierarchy of immigration preferences by leave / 



























Source: See Carl et al cited in Blinder and Richards (2018).
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their immigration is viewed in a more positive fashion to migration 
from central and Eastern Europe.
Within contemporary forms of ‘xeno- racism’, particular hostility 
is also reserved for Roma and Gypsy- Traveller populations (Fekete, 
2009; Anderson, 2017). Data from the 2015 Eurobarometer Survey 
showed that across the EU28, only 63% of respondents stated they 
would feel ‘comfortable’ if a work colleague was from a Roma 
background, compared to 93% of respondents asked about a white 
co- worker. In the UK, 79% stated they would be comfortable with 
a Roma colleague compared to a figure of 95% if the colleague 
was white (Kinnvall, 2017: 1). Forms of racial discrimination and 
exclusion are also evident in the position and experiences of Gypsy- 
Traveller communities in Britain. The ECRI report noted the 
hostile and negative discourses perpetuated by the media, which it 
described as perpetuating ‘hate speech’, as well as those emanating 
from mainstream politicians (ECRI, 2016:  18). Gypsy- Traveller 
communities also exhibit significant degrees of inequality and 
institutional marginalisation and exclusion, as discussed in Chapter 
5 in this volume. The 2016, ECRI (2016:  34) report called for 
the development of a national strategy to address the disadvantages 
experienced by these communities.
Antisemitism represents another form of racism with long historical 
antecedents that has increased in recent years, both in the UK and 
throughout Europe (ECRI, 2016; Kinnvall, 2017). In the UK, there 
has been a marked rise in attacks at Jewish people, as well as cemeteries 
and religious institutions, and this has increased in the wake of the EU 
referendum. According to a report by the Community Security Trust 
(2019:  4– 5), there were 1,652 incidents of antisemitism in Britain 
in 2018, the highest number ever recorded, and an increase of 16% 
from 2017, with three quarters of incidents occurring in London and 
Greater Manchester, home to the two largest Jewish communities in 
the UK. The figures for 2018 represent the third consecutive year in 
which record- high totals have been recorded, indicating ‘a sustained 
pattern’ of intensification, and figures have increased by more than 
300% since 2012 (Community Security Trust, 2019: 13). The report 
suggests that this spike has coincided with when the accusations of 
antisemitism levelled at the Labour party were at their most intense, 
and the Community Security Trust recorded 148 incidents in 2018 that 
were examples of, or related to arguments over, alleged antisemitism in 
the Labour Party (Community Security Trust, 2019: 5). In recent years, 
Labour has faced a number of accusations of antisemitic behaviour. In 
2016, Shami Chakrabarti conducted a review into antisemitism within 
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the party, however the findings have been widely criticised for failing 
to engage seriously with these issues.. In May 2019, the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission launched a formal investigation into 
antisemitism within the Labour Party.
Antisemitic prejudices and attitudes also remain in evidence among 
the general population, although research suggests this has declined 
in recent years. A  YouGov study commissioned by the Campaign 
Against Anti- Semitism (CAA) found that between 2015 and 2017, 
antisemitic prejudice among British adults declined from 45% to 36% 
of people endorsing what are seen to be antisemitic stereotypes about 
Jewish people. Clearly, however, this remains a sizeable proportion of 
the population holding such views. Alongside this, one in three British 
Jews reported having considered leaving the country, and only 59% 
reported feeling welcome in the UK. More than half of Jews, also felt 
that the Crime Prosecution Service were not sufficiently combating 
antisemitism (CAA, 2018: 4).
Racism, nationalism and political mobilisation
The changes in the landscape of racism in contemporary Britain 
outlined in the previous section have occurred in the context of 
increasing political mobilisations around race and nation. Britain has 
a long history of far- right, nationalistic politics, evident through the 
British Brothers League (BBL) during the early 1900s, the British 
Union of Fascists (BUF) in the 1930s, and the National Front (NF) 
which rose to prominence in the 1970s (Solomos, 2003). Over the 
past two decades, across Europe far- right and right- wing populist 
parties have experienced growing support (Vieten and Poynting, 2016; 
Kinnvall, 2017). Britain has been no exception, as a range of parties 
and movements such as the British National Party (BNP), the English 
Defence League (EDL), Britain First, and the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) have gained increasing political prominence and traction, 
particularly in the context of the EU Referendum vote in 2016.
As elsewhere in Europe the rise of these forms of nationalistic and 
exclusionary politics has mobilised a range of racialised anxieties 
centring principally upon immigration, terrorism, multiculturalism and 
the perceived economic, cultural and political marginalisation of the 
‘indigenous’ white population (Solomos, 2013; Vieten and Poynting, 
2016). Vieten and Poynting (2016: 533) see the rise of ‘right wing 
racist movements’ as characterised by, ‘nationalist, anti- immigration, 
anti- asylum seeker, anti- Muslim politics’. In the context of economic 
recession, the ‘migrant crisis’ and the perceived threat of Islamic 
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terrorism, Kinnvall (2017) has argued that such movements draw 
upon and help to create notions of risk and ‘ontological insecurity’. 
She argues that, ‘[t] he far right has been successful in mobilising 
such anxieties and fears, and has often used the notion of “others” – 
immigrants, foreigners, Muslims  – to spur a development towards 
exclusion and deportation of unwanted “others” ’ (Kinnvall, 2017: 1).
In Britain, such political mobilisations have also been closely 
aligned with both anti- immigrant and anti- Muslim sentiment. The 
EDL, which emerged as a street- protest movement in 2009 led by 
Stephen Yaxley- Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’), developed with the 
specific aim of countering what was seen as the inexorable rise of, 
and existential threat posed by, Islamic extremism and the purported 
‘Islamification’ of the nation. The movement has engaged in protests 
against ‘Islamist’ terrorism, but also issues such as sharia law, child 
sexual exploitation (‘grooming’) and the construction of mosques 
across the country (Copsey, 2010; Allen, 2011; Bartlett and Littler, 
2011; Goodwin, 2013; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015; Pilkington, 2016; 
Jackson, 2018). Research into the nature of EDL support has found that 
hostility towards Muslims and black and minority ethnic groups is the 
most decisive factor. Support for the movement is also concentrated 
disproportionately among male workers, those with lower levels of 
education, and those who tend to vote for more right- wing parties, 
with 40% of EDL sympathisers also identifying with the Conservative 
Party, and who also register significant disaffection towards the existing 
political system (Goodwin et  al, 2016:  10). Elsewhere Goodwin 
(2013: 1) has argued that the negative views of Muslims on which the 
EDL thrives find wider public support in a context in which, ‘few 
mainstream voices in Europe are actively challenging counter- Jihad 
narratives, or the surrounding reservoir of anti- Muslim prejudice 
among the general public’.
Britain First, founded in 2011, has also pursued a strongly anti- 
Muslim agenda, committed to what it views as preserving Christian 
values and identity in the face of the rise of ‘Islam’, multiculturalism 
and immigration (Davidson and Berezin, 2018). Identified as more 
aggressive than the EDL, it pursues street- level demonstrations 
including ‘Christian patrols’, which have seen invasions of mosques and 
Muslim- owned businesses (Allen, 2014; Burke, 2018). In the wake of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015, the movement also launched 
‘safety patrols’, with the declared aim of protecting Jewish communities. 
For both Britain First and the EDL, anti- Muslim sentiment has been 
used to assert their ‘legitimacy’ and to distance themselves from 
previous extreme right movements. Kassimeris and Jackson note how 
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movements like the EDL position themselves as advocates of LGBT 
and ‘human rights’. Here, ‘the new far right, in actively distancing 
itself from neo- Nazi and antisemitic themes, represents a departure 
from traditional far- right concerns but employs a culturally racist 
ethno- nationalist xenophobia which has the same exclusionary effects 
on target groups’ (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015: 175– 6).
Both the EDL and Britain First have made significant use of the 
internet and social media to garner support (Bartlett and Littler, 2011; 
Goodwin, 2013; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015; Pilkington, 2016; 
Burke, 2018). Highlighting growing concerns about the role of social 
media in providing a platform for racist political views, in 2019 both 
Facebook and YouTube introduced policies to ban far- right content 
from its sites. Emerging research has identified social media as significant 
in helping to diffuse far- right and right- wing populist sentiment, 
and the spread of anti- Muslim attitudes in particular (Awan, 2016; 
Davidson and Berezin, 2018; Froio and Ganesh, 2018). Davidson and 
Berezin (2018: 485), in their study of how Britain First and UKIP 
have utilised social media, argue that far- right movements ‘have used 
new technologies to generate an unprecedented amount of popular 
support and to attempt to influence the political mainstream’. A 2019 
report also highlighted how prevalent this was, with social media being 
crucial in elevating the profile of figures such as ‘Tommy Robinson’ 
(Hope Not Hate, 2019).
The rise of such movements and sentiments both online and offline 
is linked to wider concerns about the marked growth in far- right 
extremism, with the murder of Jo Cox in June 2016 by a white 
extremist bringing a growing focus on the rise of racist political 
violence. Recent years have also seen the emergence of violent neo- 
Nazi movements such as National Action, which was founded in 2013 
and advocated for ‘white jihad’, openly supporting the killer of Jo Cox. 
The movement was proscribed in 2016 and, following a court case 
in 2018, members were charged with plotting to kill a police officer. 
Home Office data published in 2019 indicates a significant rise in white 
extremism, with white extremists comprising the largest proportion 
of terror arrests during the 12 months up to March 2019, the highest 
percentage since 2004, with Brexit identified as a contributory factor 
(Giordano, 2019). A report by the anti- racist organisation Hope Not 
Hate (2019) argued that as the protracted negotiations for the UK to 
leave the EU go on, interactions between racism and xenopohobia 
and high levels of political disaffection have served to cultivate a fertile 
environment for the far right to exploit. They point to a far right that 
is becoming more extreme and younger in its composition (Hope 
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Not Hate, 2019). Further reports suggest that these sentiments are 
particularly concentrated in economically marginalised areas with 
relatively smaller populations compared to the large cities, and among 
those with lower educational levels (Carter, 2018)
Alongside these more street- based movements, Islamophobia and 
anti- immigrant sentiment has also been central to the emergence of 
right- wing, nationalistic electoral mobilisations. The far- right BNP, 
which has pursued both an anti- immigrant and anti- Muslim agenda, 
made a series of local political breakthroughs during the 2000s in 
locations such as Burnley, Barking and Dagenham, and Stoke- on- 
Trent. It also secured representation on the Greater London Assembly 
in 2008. In more recent years, UKIP, often defined as a ‘radical right’ 
or ‘right- wing populist’ party, has drawn upon the linkages between 
anti- immigrant feeling and rising Euroscepticism, securing significant 
amounts of political support (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). In the 2014 
European elections, the party gained over 4.3 million votes, amounting 
to a share of over 25%, while it polled over 12% of the vote, representing 
almost 4 million votes, in the 2015 general election in the UK. The 
party’s former leader, Nigel Farage, was a central figure in the political 
campaigning to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, going on to 
form the Brexit Party in 2019.
Central to the appeal of UKIP have been calls for withdrawal from 
the EU, the restoration of national sovereignty, and tighter immigration 
controls (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Geddes, 2014; Anderson, 2017). 
Research on the attitudes of UKIP supporters has found that hostility 
towards immigration and anxieties about its impacts on British society 
are central drivers for the party and right- wing populism more broadly 
(Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). Ford and 
Goodwin (2014) argue that these sentiments have resonated particularly 
with a ‘left behind’ constituency, with UKIP support concentrated 
among older, less educated males, disproportionately located in the 
former industrial heartlands of the Midlands and the North. At the 
same time, the party has also been able to attract more affluent voters, 
with Ford and Goodwin’s work indicating that almost one third of 
UKIP supporters are drawn from the middle- classes.
In recent years, UKIP has moved further to the political right, and 
Islamophobia has become more central to the rhetoric of the party and 
its supporters. In the context of the 2015 ‘migrant crisis’, UKIP’s 2015 
manifesto made specific links between immigration, ‘foreigners’ and 
crime. The fact that at that moment most of these migrants were from 
majority- Muslim countries reveals the ‘conflation between “Muslim” 
and “migrant” (Gupta and Virdee, 2018: 1756). A study of the social 
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media activity of UKIP followers in the wake of the EU referendum 
found that many UKIP supporters frequently justified calls to leave the 
EU through the expression of grievances towards Islam and Muslims. 
The research also found significant online connections between 
followers of Britain First and UKIP, suggesting that this has influenced 
the party’s move to a more explicit anti- Islam agenda (Davidson and 
Berezin, 2018; see also Hope not Hate, 2019)
Brexit and mainstreaming racism and xenophobia
If the past two decades have witnessed an increasing political 
mobilisation of racism and xenophobia, the political struggle around 
Brexit illustrates how such sentiments animate not just the margins but 
the political mainstream in contemporary society. While the vote for 
Brexit comprises diverse political constituencies and political views, 
it is clear that questions of race, nation and immigration were central 
within it, made evident not simply in the campaign rhetoric or the 
evidence about the drivers of support for Brexit, but also in its social 
and political aftermaths.
While the two key political campaigns promoting Britain’s exit 
from the EU drew on a range of issues to stake their claims, Virdee 
and McGeever (2018:  1804) argue that the way in which they 
‘carefully activated long- standing racialised structures of feeling about 
immigration and national belonging’ was central. While ‘Vote Leave’ 
drew on nostalgic notions of Empire and British global dominance, 
the ‘Leave.EU’ campaign, led by Nigel Farage, placed immigration at 
its heart. Citing the use of the ‘Breaking Point’ poster, which pictured 
refugees from the Middle East queuing to enter European territory, 
Virdee and McGeever (2018) note how ‘migrants’ were cast as both 
an economic threat, through competition for jobs and other key 
resources and public provisions such as health care, as well as a ‘security’ 
threat, through links made between immigration and terrorism, and 
the apparently sexual predatory behaviour of migrants. The EU was 
charged with failing to protect its member states and citizens, disabling 
nations from being able to control their own borders and immigration 
levels.
These xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments clearly resonated with 
large swathes of leave voters. A study by Swami et al (2018) found that 
those expressing voting preferences for Brexit were distinct from other 
respondents by virtue of being more likely to demonstrate Islamophobia 
and a belief in Islamophobic conspiracy theories, with ‘perceptions of 
threat to political and economic power posed by Muslim immigrants … 
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directly associated with the intention to vote to leave the EU’ (Swami 
et al, 2018: 170). Similarly, research has revealed that immigration was the 
most significant issue for Brexit supporters. Using data from the British 
Election Survey, Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) found that anti- immigrant 
sentiment was a key driver of support to leave the EU, along with the 
notion that such a vote would allow the nation to ‘regain control’ of 
immigration. They also noted a correlation between the proportion of 
leave voters in an area with increased rates of immigration and ethnic 
change in the years immediately preceding the vote.
If the campaign and the vote itself indicated the wide appeal 
of racialised political rhetoric and an emboldening of racism and 
xenophobia, this became particularly apparent in the marked rise in 
racial violence and abuse in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, 
targeting both migrants and established black and minority ethnic 
communities (Komaromi and Singh, 2016; Burnett, 2017; Virdee 
and McGeever, 2018; Rzepnikowska, 2019). Tell Mama (2018b: 7) 
recorded a 475% increase in the number of offline anti- Muslim 
incidents reported in the week following the referendum. Similarly, in 
the midst of the referendum campaign between 16 and 30 June 2016, 
more than 3,000 hate crimes were reported to the police across the 
UK, representing a 42% increase on the same period in 2015 (Burnett, 
2017: 87). Jon Burnett has argued that Brexit has served to embolden 
racially exclusionary forms of belonging and entitlement. A report 
which investigated ‘post- referendum racism and xenophobia’, based 
on testimonies from ethnic minority and migrant communities, also 
identified ‘an increasing normalisation of xeno- racist narratives’ and 
the manifestation of the ‘hostile environment principle’ (Komaromi 
and Singh, 2016: 1). Their analysis, based on a total of 636 individual 
reports of incidents of racist and xenophobic hate crime, found that 
abuse targeted anyone deemed to be ‘foreign’ or ‘other’, with nearly one 
third of incidents aimed at ethnic minority communities, particularly 
South Asians (Komaromi and Singh, 2016: 5). A study conducted by 
the Migrants’ Rights Network (2017), examined the experiences and 
attitudes of migrants in areas registering particularly high levels of leave 
votes. Migrants reported increasingly negative views of immigrants 
in the wake of Brexit as well as a rise in reported experiences of hate 
incidents, prejudice and discrimination, including from employers.
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the persistence, prevalence and transformation 
of racism in contemporary Britain. As has been argued, racisms exist 
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in multiple forms, evident in forms of individual and interpersonal 
prejudice and discrimination, but also through institutionalised and 
structural forms of racial and ethnic exclusion and marginalisation. 
Ethnic minority communities remain disproportionately subject 
to negative views and forms of racist victimisation, with research 
suggesting that exposure to such incidents has increased in a charged 
social and political climate. Similarly, the same communities remain 
structurally disadvantaged, more likely to be concentrated in poorer 
areas and to experience more negative outcomes in relation to their 
engagement with and employment within key social and political 
institutions, including the criminal justice system and labour market. 
While the UK has historically developed policies and structures aimed 
at addressing racial inequalities, it is clear that significant challenges 
remain and, worryingly, recent years seem to have marked a retreat 
from any meaningful pursuit of racial equality, evidenced for instance 
in the destructive and racially exclusionary impacts of Brexit and the 
government’s ‘hostile environment’ policies.
As argued, racisms are dynamic and become transformed through 
changing social, economic and political contexts. While established 
ethnic minority communities continue to face racism on the basis 
of skin colour and their status as ‘immigrants’ and descendants of 
‘immigrants’, religion has also emerged as a significant marker of racial 
difference. Muslims navigate an increasingly hostile and discriminatory 
landscape as Islamophobia has increased notably in recent decades, 
evident in racist attacks, widespread negative stereotypes and tropes, 
and through institutional and state practices, particularly those such 
as Prevent, initiated under the auspices of counter- terrorism policies. 
Alongside these developments, emergent forms of xeno- racism directed 
towards migrant groups such as Roma and Eastern Europeans have 
both informed and gained increasing traction within a context of 
rising Euroscepticism and anti- immigrant sentiment. These political 
impulses have been mobilised since the turn of the century by a range 
of far- right and right- wing populist actors who have pursued forms 
of discourse and action that call for a rejection of multiculturalism, for 
greater immigration controls, and promote hostility towards black and 
minority ethnic communities. The Brexit vote has served in many ways 
to simultaneously mobilise and intensify these sentiments, representing 
the further development of a social and political climate marked by 
racial and ethnic inequalities, intolerances and enmities.
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Omar Khan, Runnymede Trust
Without data we cannot understand, much less respond to, social 
phenomena, including long- standing and extensive injustices such as 
racism. But the persistence of racism and other injustices shows why 
data by itself cannot tackle those injustices.
This may seem an odd or inapt conclusion from long report built 
on data, especially from the director of a race equality think tank that 
was founded 50 years ago to use evidence to ‘nail the lie’ on racism.
As this book outlines in successive chapters, there is no shortage of 
evidence about the extent of racial inequalities in Britain in 2019 – 
from education to employment, and from housing to health. Or, from 
birth to death. This evidence is still too poorly understood, and many 
of the data sets that include ethnicity are still insufficiently studied by 
researchers as well as policymakers, a gap this book seeks to fill.
But this book isn’t just about data. It’s about interpreting or 
understanding those data, and providing historical and policy 
background to explain why racial inequalities persist, change and in 
some cases improve. Better public and policymaker understanding of 
this background is the only way that we won’t simply be ‘nailing lies’, 
but ending racial inequalities over the next 50 years.
Bringing together the common themes of the book highlights what 
is now a relatively consensual view about race in Britain today, at least 
among academics and researchers. At the end of this conclusion we 
also outline a number of recommendations, more or less organised in 
response to the findings outlined in each chapter. The gap between 
the analysis of these chapters and the failure to implement these 
recommendations partly reflects the gap between understanding racism 
among those who work on the topic, and the policymakers and wider 
public who don’t.
The first theme is that history matters. Understanding our history 
matters for its own sake, so that Britain doesn’t provide a partial or 
inaccurate account of who we were and what we did. History also 
matters in the context of understanding inequalities in Britain because 
those inequalities are not randomly patterned. When someone with an 
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African- or Asian- sounding surname but the same qualifications has to 
send in more CVs in 2019 just to get an interview, this is because of the 
stereotypes about the relative capacities and talents of people because 
of their race or ethnicity. And those stereotypes were developed some 
four centuries ago to justify the inhuman treatment and economic 
domination of people from Africa and Asia.
In Britain we don’t ordinarily have a difficult time understanding 
that how we memorialise the past corresponds to and provides support 
for who we are and the values we believe in today: whether the First 
World War, the Holocaust or Srebrenica. Only by acknowledging how 
Britain not only failed to stand up to racism, but practised and believed 
in racist policies, can we understand why racial inequalities persist today. 
This is not about apportioning blame, but instead about understanding 
the source of the persistent and extensive racial inequalities outlined 
in this book.
Britain is of course far from alone in failing to recognise the role of 
history in explaining current injustices. Earlier this year the New York 
Times initiated a ‘1619 project’ to highlight the extent of the influence 
of slavery on the United States. It is notable that the date being 
commemorated  – when the first Africans were brought to North 
America by English ships – was when the North American colonies 
were part of the British or English empire. There was no United States 
of America in 1619, there would not be one for another 150 years, 
during which time English ships transported more enslaved Africans 
(over 3 million) than any other country. During the hundreds of years 
of Empire the distinctive intellectual, cultural and economic aspects of 
our culture developed, underpinned by denying equality on the basis 
of race even as Britishness consumed and absorbed idea and practices 
as well as resources from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. And, as the 
last year has shown, these are not ancient wrongs, but have a direct 
impact in the present, whether in terms of the Windrush injustice or 
the issues raised by Northern Ireland for the Brexit negotiations.
A second theme is the need to defend but also build on anti- 
discrimination law and policy. Considering the extent of evidence 
of racial inequalities across different domains of everyday life, this 
book’s chapters indicate how Britain’s public services are instrumental 
in producing racial inequalities. Runnymede Trust’s work with the 
Women’s Budget Group has shown that government’s budgetary 
policies have hit the poorest black and Asian women hardest, further 
increasing already existing inequalities. This is not to say that public 
services never address or reduce inequalities. However, if equality 
legislation was working as intended – in particular the public sector 
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equality duty – public service and wider social outcomes would today 
be less unequal over 50 years on from when that legislation was first 
passed.
This raises a wider or more profound question: even if the anti- 
discrimination approach has been weakly or poorly implemented, 
is it sufficient to tackle racial inequalities? In recent years there is 
increasing criticism that ‘equality and diversity’ initiatives focus 
more on supporting ethnic minority people, and less on changing 
institutions. In place of this incrementalist approach, we instead need 
a more comprehensive redesign of our institutions and practices, if not 
revolution, to realise and deliver race equality, and equality generally. 
We don’t need to ‘fix the person’ so that they can better navigate 
Britain’s institution, but rather to ‘fix our institutions’ so that they 
provide fair chances and outcomes to everyone.
The challenge looks sharper still. Across this volume’s chapters there is 
evidence that tackling racial inequality will require tackling inequalities 
more generally. The term ‘intersectionality’ may seem academic but it’s 
obvious enough that simply tackling racial inequalities won’t address the 
various ways in which people are disadvantaged, and that the response 
to those complexities will require targeted as well as universal measures.
It is worth contrasting the ways in which policymakers and even 
activists on the left have thought about tackling race compared to class 
inequalities. Simplifying, race (and sex) inequality has principally been 
viewed through the lens of an ‘anti- discrimination’ policy approach. 
The movement to challenge class inequalities (notably trade unions), 
however, instead focuses on macroeconomic policies and the nature 
of our economy, including how it distributes rewards or benefits. It is 
worth drawing this distinction a bit too sharply because it highlights 
how little of the thinking on ‘redesigning the economy’ has taken 
into account the need to address racial inequalities; or how it’s just 
assumed that addressing class will necessarily involve tackling race. We 
need, instead, to ensure that any thinking and policy development on 
redesigning the economy addresses race at the level of first principles; 
or, putting it a different way, that our approach to tackling racism 
foregrounds structural thinking about the economy. This doesn’t mean 
we should throw out the anti- discrimination approach. In fact, our 
thinking about and response to class may conversely require looking 
at the ways in which discrimination against working- class people now 
pervades our public services and institutions, and whether economic 
policies can alone tackle class inequalities. In policy terms, this would 
mean making class a ‘protected characteristic’ for the purposes of 
discrimination law.
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A third and final theme is the question of how tackling race equality 
relates to our collective or democratic politics, and indeed to our 
identity. There has been much talk of ‘British values’ of democracy, 
equality and the rule of law. With her reference to ‘burning injustice’, 
former Prime Minister Theresa May is not alone in including non- 
discrimination and tackling racism among our ‘British values’.
If race equality is a British value it has only become one recently, and 
is one whose affirmation is some way off in practice. Framing British 
values in this way is also a further barrier to reflecting properly on our 
history, making it seem that racial inequalities were an incidental or 
anomalous feature of our past, rather than one that was intrinsic to the 
nature of the British state and society for hundreds of year.
To the extent that we can talk about race equality becoming more 
of a social norm, that has happened in large part due to the efforts 
and struggles of a generation of black and minority ethnic Britons 
who arrived and grew up in this country in the 1960s. The legislative 
and policy changes were probably more reforming than is sometimes 
acknowledged, not least because English common law has no free- 
standing right to equality. Enoch Powell may have crafted a more 
poisonous way of putting this, but the idea that Magna Carta allowed 
Englishmen to discriminate on whatever grounds they wished was a 
very widespread one, and deployed by the Conservative opposition in 
objecting to race relations legislation. The notion that discrimination 
was justifiable if distasteful was arguably correct from a legal if not a 
moral point of view until the campaign to challenge it. To the extent 
that we now see equality and non- discrimination as British values, this 
is only because people – especially black and minority ethnic people – 
highlighted just how pervasive and unjust racism was.
These three themes help us outline how we better deliver on race 
equality, developing policies as well as a positive narrative that appeals 
as broadly as possible. As Chapter 10 outlines, there are different forms 
of racisms, and although this has long been understood among those 
who study race and racism, the social and political implications have 
only recently become apparent.
There is here a tension between acknowledging and explaining the 
diverse range and origin of racial inequalities in Britain today, while also 
requiring a shared analytic frame for understanding those inequalities. 
Just as importantly, how we analyse racism (or any issue for that matter) 
then has implications for how we respond to it, both in terms of policy 
design and in terms of mobilising social change to combat it.
Building on Alexander and Byrne’s introduction, there are two 
ways of analysing race and racism: an ‘ethnic studies’ approach that 
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focuses more on the particular characteristics, history and cultural 
practices of different groups in Britain, with a focus then on how we 
build a common society through integration while still respecting 
difference. The ‘anti- racism’ approach instead focuses on issues of 
power and inequality, and how these are reproduced generationally 
through institutions that have been marked by that racism for decades 
if not centuries. On this approach, we should address inequalities of 
power, especially how that power is exercised and reproduced through 
institutions.
Generally speaking Runnymede Trust has sought to advance both 
approaches, with a slightly stronger emphasis on the second, anti- 
racism, approach. This is in part because of our analysis of how racial 
inequalities persist, and in part because this perspective is almost 
completely missing from the policy response to racism.
Yet one of the striking findings of this report is just how much racial 
inequalities differ, whether in terms of education, housing, health, 
employment or the criminal justice system. And although the fit is 
not perfect, the pattern is clear: Black people (that is people of African 
descent), Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Gypsy, Roma and Traveller groups 
do worse than Indian and Chinese group, who in some domains 
(especially secondary education) outperform White British groups.
This is not simply a question of analysis, but of how we respond to 
racism, whether in terms of organising or mobilising socially against 
it, or in terms of designing public policy. If groups vary too much in 
how they experience racism, that makes it more challenging to build 
alliances, to resist people creating hierarchies of racism, and to find 
an umbrella frame of analysis, or a banner under which everyone can 
march. This is of course what ‘political blackness’ provided in the 
1970s, and although it is difficult to see how that particular framework 
could now be revived, the conceptual and social purpose it serves 
still remains.
Getting beyond this stalemate is an absolute priority in the current 
environment. As Chapter 8 outlined, the UN found a ‘striking’ level of 
‘structural socio- economic exclusion of racial and ethnic communities 
in the UK’ as well as the growth in the ‘acceptability of explicit 
racial, ethnic and religious intolerance’. We’ve seen an increase in 
hate crime, and increased airing of far- right grievances and hatred, a 
phenomenon that is connected to wider international mobilisations of 
white nationalism. And yet the most common institutional response 
has been to develop ‘equality and diversity’ initiatives or ‘unconscious 
bias’ training instead of directly tackling racism and its ongoing 
consequences.
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One more positive development has been the increase in 
representation of ethnic minority voices, or in ensuring ‘lived 
experiences’ or ‘marginalised voices’ are better heard. The value of 
lived experience is two- fold. First, it explains how racism operates, 
by affording those most affected by racism the opportunity to explain 
their experience of injustice. By listening to those who are differently 
positioned in systems or institutions, we better reveal the nature of those 
institutions, and how it feels as a person to be subjected to indignities 
or contempt, or just ignored. This can lead to a wider understanding 
of and focus on tackling inequalities in institutions without relying on 
overly academic arguments about power and positionality.
This indicates the second way ‘lived experience’ can matter:  by 
changing outcomes. A  good example is the Windrush injustice. 
Charities including Runnymede Trust had been arguing for many 
years that the ‘hostile environment’ was discriminatory and unjust. Yet 
however persuasive or well evidenced those claims, they were ignored 
by a government that was committed to driving down immigration 
numbers as a matter of principle. Any disagreement or dissent was 
quickly dismissed by politicians and policymakers as do- gooders seeking 
to undermine a government policy priority.
When those affected by the injustice – Anthony Bryan, Paulette 
Wilson, Sarah O’Connor, Sylvester Marshall, Elwaldo Romeo  – 
stood up to explain their experiences, however, the government 
could no longer ignore the consequences of their actions. The 
public was soon outraged by how people were treated: being denied 
employment, housing and health care, and in some cases detained 
and deported. Without this direct confrontation with the lived 
experience, change would probably not have happened. By speaking 
clearly about the horrors of their lived experiences, they benefited 
not just those who stuck their heads above the parapet and were 
asked to reveal their terrible treatment to millions on live TV, but 
the entire Windrush generation.
There are, however, limitations to lived experience as a way 
of building the arguments and social change necessary to tackle 
racism. People experience racisms differently, and it is necessary 
and legitimate to foreground and understand the specific forms of 
different kinds of racism. It’s also legitimate for people to challenge 
those forms of racism that most affect them, and to organise with 
others with similar experiences.
However the very embeddedness of lived experience, the detailed and 
personal knowledge of a particular form of racism, can make people 
misunderstand or even be tone- deaf to other forms of racism. Given 
Conclusion
235
that racisms differ, it won’t actually be true that a lived experience of 
one kind of racism will inevitably help people understand or be sensitive 
to other forms of racism. So while it’s justifiable and understandable 
that people start from their lived experience, tackling all forms of racism 
will require supporting experiences and changes that won’t directly 
relate to our lived experience, and instead are based on an in- principle 
commitment to anti- racism.
We cannot simply pretend that this is happening already, or that it 
will be easy to provide the social support necessary for the policies 
and wider social change necessary to tackle racism. If Runnymede 
Trust is still around in another 50 years, it will be because we haven’t 
succeeded in developing the narrative, policies and social pressure to 
combat the inequalities outlined in this book.
To get there we must first acknowledge that things haven’t always 
been positive, and admit that Britain has often believed in and supported 
racism as a matter of policy and practice. Recognising that we haven’t 
always lived up to our values will allow us to better frame and deliver 
on a positive vision for the future. The various chapters in this book 
provide a strong outline of what that vision must include. It must of 
course recognise the contributions and value of different ways of life 
and communities, and of the value of every one of us being able to 
lead the lives that we ourselves choose. But those aims can only be 
achieved by acknowledging and addressing racism more directly.
By way of a conclusion, we’ve suggested a number of recommendations 
to respond to the key findings of each chapter. These indicate what 
needs to change for the positive vision of a Britain free of racism and 
other forms of injustice to become a reality. The recommendations also 
provide a way for us to hold government and other decision makers in 
the public, private and charitable sector to account. We have the luxury 
to think about and analyse the problem of racism; we owe it to those 
whose work we’ve built on and to those who continue to stand up to 
these injustices to provide a way of tackling racial inequalities in the 
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The following recommendations are directed at all institutions and 
individuals who have the responsibility and ability to implement 
them. This includes government and public sector bodies, as well as 
the private and charitable sectors. It also includes all of us, who have a 
responsibility to ensure that racism is confronted wherever it appears, 
and to act with others to work towards a better society.
Some recommendations, however, are more explicitly targeted at 
public institutions, whose democratic and legal role requires them 
to address racial discrimination, promote equal opportunities and 
encourage ‘good relations’ between different ethnic groups.
General
1) Improve the collection of mandatory data on race and ethnicity (and 
religion/ belief). Ensure that public data sets have consistent annual 
data collection, and continue to adapt ethnic categories to capture 
increasing complexity and demographic changes.
2) Training should be required on tackling racism, not only on 
‘equality and diversity’ nor only on ‘unconscious bias’. The 
responsibility for equality lies with the institutions and not just 
individual employees.
3) Organisations and managers should set targets to hire and progress 
ethnic minority employees in line with national and local 
benchmarks. Where managers fail to meet targets to reduce racial 
inequalities, this should affect their appraisals and progression 
decisions.
4) Ensure equality law is applied, so that existing provisions are 
respected and applied in relation to all policy areas and decisions. 
Follow the spirit of the law by strengthening the ‘due regard’ 
clause in the public sector equality duty, which applies to all public 
bodies from central government to local authorities to hospitals and 
universities.
5) In response to the extensive inequalities outlined in the government’s 
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strategy across all public policy areas. This strategy should be led by 
a senior minister who regularly attends and reports directly to the 
Cabinet.
Citizen rights and immigration
 6) All children should be taught an accurate and inclusive history of 
Britain, including the history of migration, enslavement, empire 
and decolonisation, and the history of racism and the struggle for 
equality in Britain.
 7) Racial discrimination legislation should apply more widely to 
immigration law and policy.
 8) Level up rights of non- European Union (EU) migrants, creating 
equality in rights and access to services and benefits with EU and 
UK citizens.
 9) Lift the ban: give people seeking asylum the right to work, so that 
they can use their skills and live in dignity. Everyone deserves a 
chance to contribute to the economy and to integrate into our 
communities.
 10) Re- introduce birthright citizenship as part of a wider review 
into race, immigration and citizenship law and policy. Revoke 
the ‘no recourse to public funds’ provision and allow for a 
quicker (3– 5 year) path to citizenship, and an end to extortionate 
citizenship fees.
 11) Scrap ‘hostile environment’ immigration policies: the monitoring 
of the right to work by private individuals and non- immigration 
specialist organisations such as landlords, General Practitioners 
and teachers.
Criminal justice
 12) The government should set a target that 20% of new police recruits 
and prison officers are from an ethnic minority background. There 
should be an additional target that 20% of promotions are from 
ethnic minority backgrounds by 2025.
 13) Stop- and- search powers should not be extended and instead 
curtailed, especially the use of section 60. The government should 
establish national youth and community panels, and equivalent 
panels for each police force, to scrutinise the use and outcomes 





 14) The government should institute a formal review into race and the 
youth criminal justice system, including the racially discriminatory 
nature of ideas of ‘the gang’ and the use of ‘joint enterprise’.
 15) There must be an independent review of counter- terrorism 
legislation including Prevent, including to determine whether 
the policy is racially discriminatory. The review announced in 
August 2019 is not sufficiently independent.
 16) The Angiolini report’s recommendations on deaths in police 
custody must be implemented (2017).
Health
 17) The National Health Service (NHS) should establish targets to 
reduce health inequalities and improve health outcomes for ethnic 
minority people. There should be clear action plans to achieve 
these targets.
 18) The NHS Equality Objectives 2016– 20 should be built upon. 
Race and ethnicity need to be more explicitly monitored, and 
action plans developed where data suggest representation and staff 
satisfaction remains unequal.
 19) The NHS should continue to develop and implement the 
Workforce Race Equality Standard (WRES). The aim of 
‘enabling people to work comfortably with race equality’ should 
be further embedded in the 2019 report and beyond.
 20) The NHS should set a target of at least 20% of new NHS Trust 
board appointees to be from an ethnic minority background, with 
all trusts set a target to reach the proportion present in their local 
area population by 2030.
 21) The NHS should set targets for staff progression, to ensure that 
promotions better match the proportion of ethnic minority staff 
in the health service.
Education
 22) A government action plan should be initiated to tackle long- 
standing and persistent ethnic inequalities in education, particularly 
for Black Caribbean and Gypsy, Roma and Traveller children.
 23) Policy should seek to reduce racial inequalities in school exclusions. 
Parents and children should be supported to know their rights.
 24) Schools should better address racist bullying in schools, and support 
teacher training in this area.
 
 
Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK
240
 25) Ofsted (the Office for Standards in Education) should develop a 
number of basic race equality measures as part of their assessment 
of schools. A  school should not be ‘outstanding’ if any ethnic 
minority group has poor outcomes, and any racial inequalities 
in attainment, exclusions, staffing or governance should be made 
transparent to all parents.
 26) The government should establish a target that 20% of all 
apprentices should be from an ethnic minority background.
 27) All universities should establish an action plan for tackling black 
and minority ethnic (BME) attainment gaps. This should include 
the proportion awarded a first- class degree, as well as those 
getting a 2:1.
 28) Universities and research councils and other funders should 
establish targets for graduate studies, to ensure that 20% of PhD and 
postdoctoral positions are filled by people with a BME background 
to address concerns over the ‘pipeline’ into the academy.
 29) Universities should also establish targets for staffing at all levels, 
in hiring as well as progression in academic and professional 
appointments, as well as monitoring probation and promotions.
 30) The Race Equality Charter should be adopted on an equal footing 
to Athena Swan, including financial penalties for institutions that 
fail to meet benchmarks in two successive years.
Employment
 31) Employers with over 50 employees must monitor all hiring, 
promotion, disciplinary and pay decisions by ethnicity.
 32) The Equality Act 2010 provision for all employers with over 250 
employees to publish gender pay gap data should be extended to 
ethnicity gap data.
 33) Better enforcement of the minimum wage, to ensure employers 
are compliant. Adopt a genuine living wage; the current national 
living wage (for those over 25) is £8.21, £0.79 less than a genuine 
living wage. In London the living wage needs to be £10.55.
 34) Adopt the Institute of Employment Rights’ ‘Manifesto for Labour 
Law’ (2018) to improve the security, pay, conditions and bargaining 
power of workers. This includes establishing a Ministry for Labour 
to rebuild and promote collective bargaining structures.
 35) Relink benefits and inflation, and ensure benefits more closely 
correspond to the relative poverty line.
 36) Re- establish child poverty targets, including a specific target to 




 37) Interview panels should generally have at least one BME 
interviewer. If necessary, this may require bringing in outside 
interviewers (with adequate training or support).
 38) A presumption in favour of one BME person on every shortlist, 
especially for graduate positions where around 1 in 4 are from 
BME backgrounds.
 39) Monitoring appraisal and promotion procedures, and disciplinary 
and complaint procedures, by ethnicity and taking action to ensure 
that line managers are equipped to effectively manage all members 
of their staff by providing them with anti- racist training.
Housing
 40) Improve the security of housing tenure. As well as building more 
social housing, this will require providing more long- term, low- 
cost secure private accommodation (for example five- year leases 
with inflation- protected rental rises).
 41) Tackle overcrowding, including by building more three- bedroom 
properties and increasing housing supply, and by placing a duty 
on local authorities to re- accommodate those in overcrowded 
conditions. Implement a policy to end homelessness.
 42) Ensure local people have a real say or voice in housing decision 
making.
 43) Implement the idea of ‘universal basic services’, expanding the 
welfare state to include housing, food, transport and internet 
access1
Arts and media
 44) All creative industries need to adopt employment targets for ethnic 
minority people, from hiring to progression.
 45) The BBC and other broadcasters need to establish more accurate 
targets, including for those who are employed on external 
production contracts, and reflecting the regional and age profile 
of the ethnic minority population.
 46) Better and mandatory data collection and reporting on all publicly 
funded arts bodies to ensure diverse hiring across all roles.
 47) Public funding to be withheld from arts bodies where diversity 
targets are not met over three years.
 48) Public funding of the arts should not just focus on ensuring ‘ethnic 
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Politics and representation
 49) All political parties should continue to increase the number of 
BME candidates in general elections and among local councillors.
 50) Political parties should agree to an anti- racist ‘code of conduct’ 
during election campaigns.2
 51) Political parties should seek to address racial inequalities in their 
policies as well as seek to increase representation.
Racisms in Britain
 52) Race equality, and other civil society groups and organisations 
should work more closely together to build a common platform 
to challenge all forms of racism and prejudice. It is not enough 
for people or organisations to challenge only the form of 
discrimination that directly affects them; anti- discrimination and 
equality are universal principles that must be defended even when 
doing so doesn’t have a direct effect on us personally. It is important 
to understand that different forms of racism have different 
attributes, whether anti- Jewish, anti- Muslim or anti- black, and 
that it is therefore reasonable and justifiable to understand and 
respond to specific forms of racism. But challenging racism 
requires challenging it in all its forms, and understanding anti- 
racism as a wider human rights and equality position entails 
defending other groups that experience discrimination too.
 53) The government should provide a review into the far right in 
Britain, and the threat it poses to safety and security for ethnic 
minorities. This should include recommendations for action to 
address hate crime on the internet.
Notes
 1 See https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ bartlett/ igp/ sites/ bartlett/ files/ universal_ basic_ 
services_ - _ the_ institute_ for_ global_ prosperity_ .pdf
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racial inequalities in British society. It provides an up-to-date and 
convincing case that we have a long way to go in terms of achieving 
racial justice.” 
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Relations Act of 1968, which sought to end discrimination in public life, this 
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of race and ethnicity on data relating to a wide range of sectors of society, 
including employment, health, education, criminal justice, housing and 
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It explores what progress has been made, identifies those areas where 
inequalities remain stubbornly resistant to change and asks how our thinking 
around race and ethnicity has changed in an era of Islamophobia, Brexit and an 
increasingly diverse population.
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